Senkaku Islands and Taiwan�s Internal Political Fissures

East Asia has been caught in what seemingly is a never-ending security crisis with reference to the Senkaku Islands dispute. The much contested Senkaku Islands is a collective term referring to a group of eight islands and rocks including Uotsuri, Kitakojima, Minamikojima, Kuba, Taisho, Okinokitaiwa, Okinominamiiwa, and Tobise located west of the Nansei Shoto Islands in Japan, forming part of Ishigaki City in the Okinawa Prefecture. Further, Okinawa forms part of the Ryukyu Islands, known in Japanese as Nansei-shotō, stretching southwest from Kyushu to Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands are located in the East China Sea (approximately 170 km north of Ishigaki Island and 410 km west of Okinawa Island).

Japan claims that the Senkaku Islands were incorporated towards becoming Japanese territory in January 1895, as per international legal framework existing at that time. The Japanese carefully ascertained that there had been no trace of control over the Senkaku Islands by another nation-state prior to that period. Following World War II, the San Francisco Peace Treaty placed the Senkaku Islands under the administration of the United States as part of Okinawa, thereby reaffirming the Islands’ status as part of Japanese territory. Moreover, the Senkaku Islands were included in the 1972 Okinawa Reversion Agreement between the United States and Japan as part of the area over which the administrative rights were returned to Japan. Tokyo asserts its claim over the Senkakus based on the above events and facts stating that the Islands have been a consistent part of Japanese territory in the post-war international order in accordance with international law. [1]

Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) vehemently contests Japanese claims, Tokyo points out that even after the San Francisco Peace Treaty placed the Senkaku Islands under the administration of the United States as part of Japanese territory, and the United States made use of some parts of the Islands as firing ranges, the Senkaku Islands continued to be treated as part of Japanese territory in Chinese Communist Party publications as well as on Chinese maps.

In this very public and bitter squabble, almost exclusively between Beijing and Tokyo, there is increasing threat to peace and stability in the East China Sea. However, a third party laying claim over the Senkaku Islands, calling it as the Tiaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), is often ignored and to a large extent, not considered a factor at all. This third party is the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Taiwanese claims get heavily weighed down with critical provisions, beginning with the fact that Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and consequently does not have the right to negotiate with Japan over sovereignty issues. Second, and more importantly, Beijing considers Taiwan as a renegade province of China and places it as its top most area of “core interest”.

Significantly, the “One-China” policy (一个中国; yī gè Zhōngguó) refers to the view that there is only one state called China, despite the fact that two governments claiming to be China exist today. According to the codified 1992 Consensus, the One-China policy has been held by both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC, also known as Taiwan). Although both agree that there is only one sovereign state encompassing both mainland China and Taiwan, there is disagreement about which of the two is legitimate.

Having completed six years in office, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s policy of engagement with the Mainland did win him applause, however, simultaneously facing sharp political opposition, with only two years remaining for him as President. [2] Ma’s presidency has seen 21 economic and non-political cooperation agreements aimed to ease out the relationship between Beijing and Taipei. What inherently seems to confront this push for warmer ties is the very strong prevailing undercurrent for an ideological struggle over what increasingly is being termed as the “Taiwanese identity”. [3]

Even on the issue of the Senkaku Islands issue (or the Tiaoyutai), President Ma Ying-jeou’s August 2012 proposal initiative calling for peace in the East China Sea has come under heavy fire domestically. [4] The East China Sea Peace Initiative is based on the concept that while sovereignty is indivisible, resources can be shared and suggests facilitating dialogue, shelving territorial disputes through negotiations, formulating a Code of Conduct in the East China Sea and engage in joint development of resources.

Taiwan’s primary opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has often questioned as to why the international media refers to the conflict in the East China Sea only as being Japan-China centric, and pays no heed to the Taiwanese claims. The DPP also faces condemnation from Beijing for its display of “a lack of national pride” and “flattery of Japan” over the territorial issue (釣魚台), as cited in the February 7, 2013 edition of the Taipei Times. It becomes only clearer that the domestic political rumblings in Taiwan are far too clear on the Senkaku issue.

According to an editorial in the September 2012 issue of the publication Lianhebao, there appears to be a linkage between the Senkaku Islands issue and Taiwan’s relationship with China. While China claims its sovereignty over these islands, claiming that they always have been part of “Chinese territory” (釣魚台自古就是中國的領土, diaoyutai zigu jiushi zhongguo de lingtu), the situation gets complicated with Taiwan’s counter claims. Now, the question becomes, “which China” shall prevail? There are arguments that the concept of “China” should not be seen as a divisive factor, but instead as an “interface” (介面, jiemian) in defining the relationship between the two sides of the strait. Conversely, an opinion in the August 2012 edition of the Ziyou Shibao considers that Taipei’s different reactions to Beijing and Tokyo end up serving the interest of the PRC, which wants to present the image of a common pan-Chinese front.

While it is not hard to discern that the political spectrum within Taiwan is split on the Senkaku Islands issue in an apparent bid to gain de facto recognition as a sovereign actor from Beijing, what seems difficult to fathom is whether Taipei’s internal political fissures on this issue will become too wide and complicated, more so with a Presidential election coming up in 2016.

Views expressed are personal.