China-Pakistan Nexus Poses A Strategic Challenge

During his visit to Islamabad on April 20-21, 2015, as part of his “Silk Road and Economic Belt” strategy, President Xi Jinping of China announced plans for massive investment in the development of infrastructure for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor linking Xinjiang with Gwadar port. Earlier in April it had been reported that China will sell eight modern diesel-electric submarines to Pakistan worth US$ 4-5 billion. When this deal is formalised, it will enable Pakistan to double its submarine fleet.

Another agreement was signed to cooperate for setting up joint projects for coal, gas and solar energy to produce 16,400 MW of electricity. This will give a big boost to Pakistan’s energy security. The total amount planned to be invested by China – approximately US$ 46 billion – is more than Pakistan’s entire budget – US$ 39.8 billion – for FY 2014-15. In all, 51 agreements were signed, many of them in the trade, banking and communications fields. China is Pakistan’s second largest trading partner.

According to the joint statement issued during the visit, the China-Pakistan “all weather” friendship is “strategic” and “enriches the Pakistan-China Community of Shared Destiny to ensure the perpetual continuity in Pakistan-China friendship from generation to generation” (sic). The statement also avers that China “supports Pakistan’s territorial integrity”. Earlier, the leaders of the two countries have described their friendship as “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans and sweeter than honey.”

The collusive nuclear-missile-military hardware nexus between China and Pakistan poses a major strategic challenge to India. China is known to have provided direct assistance to Pakistan for its nuclear weapons programme, including nuclear warhead designs and enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) for at least two nuclear bombs. It has been amply documented that China has clandestinely transferred dual-use technology and materials for the development of nuclear weapons to Pakistan.

China has violated its treaty obligations under the NPT and the MTCR to help Pakistan with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes. It has helped Pakistan to build nuclear reactors to produce weapons-grade plutonium at the Chashma and Khushab nuclear facilities, enabling Pakistan to produce weapons-grade Plutonium. China has transferred M-9 and M-11 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and has facilitated the transfer of Taepo Dong and No Dong ballistic missiles from North Korea to Pakistan.

China subsidises Pakistan’s defence budget as almost 50 per cent of China’s surplus arms are exported to Pakistan at ‘friendship’ prices. China and Pakistan have jointly developed a fighter aircraft – JF-17 Thunder/ FC-1 Fierce – and a main battle tank – Al Khalid, besides other military hardware like anti-tank missiles.

Chinese military personnel are known to be present in Gilgit-Baltistan in large numbers, ostensibly to construct roads and hydel projects. However, it is likely that Pakistan has outsourced counter-terrorism operations against extremists of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), who are active in Xingjian, to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China.

Chinese engineers have been engaged in building Pakistan’s second major port at Gwadar on the Makran coast as part of its “string of pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean. This port could be upgraded to a naval base for Chinese naval vessels with minimum effort. China is quite obviously engaged in the strategic encirclement of India.

In fact, given its internal instability, fissiparous tendencies and doddering economy, it would not be possible for Pakistan to wage its proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of the country, but for China’s military backing and support. In as much as that, it is also China’s proxy war with Pakistan acting as China’s proxy.

The history of the military collusion between China and Pakistan goes back over fifty years. During the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, China had made some threatening military manoeuvres in Tibet in support of Pakistan. It is also noteworthy that during the Kargil conflict in 1999, Chinese military advisors were reported to have been present at Skardu in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

China has consistently shown inflexibility on the resolution of the territorial and boundary dispute with India since the two nations fought a war over it in 1962. Despite 18 rounds of talks between political interlocutors and many meetings of the Joint Working Group, there has been no progress. Even the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has not been clearly demarcated on military maps and on the ground due to China’s intransigence. Patrol face-offs are common and an armed clash could take place any time. If it is not contained quickly, it could lead to another border conflict.

While a semblance of stability prevails at the strategic level, in recent years China has exhibited marked political, diplomatic and military aggressiveness at the tactical level. The large-scale transgressions at Demchok, Depsang and Chumar – the last one during the visit of President Xi Jinping – in Ladakh are particularly noteworthy.

Hence, it would be prudent to conclude that during a future Indian military conflict with China, Pakistan is likely to come to China’s military aid and vice versa. It was in this context that General Deepak Kapoor, former COAS, had said during the Army Training Command doctrine seminar in end-December 2009 that the Indian armed forces must prepare for a two-front war.

The China-Pakistan nexus has naturally led to anxiety about China’s future intentions. It is in India’s interest to seek early resolution of the territorial and boundary dispute with China so that ultimately there is only one military adversary to contend with. Meanwhile, India should upgrade its present military strategy of dissuasion against China to deterrence, which comes from the ability to take the war into the adversary’s territory and from the ability to cause unacceptable damage.

As the old maxim states, while capabilities take decades to develop, intentions can change overnight. India should concentrate its energies on developing its economy and building its military capabilities. In order to face up to the combined Chinese and Pakistani challenge, India must evolve a comprehensive national security strategy – diplomatic and political – in concert with its strategic partners.

The author is former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.