'Ambiguity Aversion' by Taliban: Death of Mullah Omar

The reports of death of Mullah Omar came in the vicinity of veracity after two years. In political philosophy two questions are pertinent, ‘who gets what?’ and ‘says who?’^[i]  Here the relevant questions would be ‘why is Mullah Omar dead now?’, ‘who brought out this first?’ and ‘who will benefit from this?’ Does the truth about death of Mullah Omar change the terrorism landscape in the Af-Pak region? The answer would be yes, because it is more about geopolitics of regional players than ideological pervasiveness of terrorists and insurgent groups, the Afghan Taliban in particular. However the status quo which has existed since the past 15 years in Af-Pak region has been broken and states have started approaching the new emerging leadership in Taliban as well as the Afghan establishment. A diplomat from the Russian embassy in India admitted that Russia is actively supporting commanders of the former Northern Alliance including Dostum, Mohaqiq and Atta Nur. The visit of the Taliban leadership to Tehran and Riyadh, Chinese mediation in the peace process and flourishing Afghan-US relationship upholds the argument.

            It is clear now that operational activities of Taliban are being led by Mullah Akhtar Mansour since the death of Mullah Omar. There is no question about the ability of this commander because Taliban has gained substantial ground and inflicted unprecedented casualties upon the Afghan National Army (ANA) in the last two years which had not been done under the leadership of Mullah Omar in 13 years.  It goes to prove that the command structure of Taliban is decentralized and exhibits strong and independent tactical decision-making and execution at both higher and lower levels. Continued logistical support to Taliban under Mansour’s leadership strengthens his position; hence, the lack of awareness about the death of Mullah Omar by Pakistan, Afghanistan and US appears counterfactual. The rise of the new Taliban leadership thus appears to have been slowly building up to this state, rather than a sudden event presenting itself as a fait accompli.

              In 2014, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai pushed Pakistan for release of Abdul Ghani Baradar for initiation of peace talks. He was Taliban’s second in command before he was captured by Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) in 2010. After spending three years in ISI jail he lost his influence and value within Taliban’s command structure.  Mullah Mansour was appointed as a deputy of Mullah Omar in 2010 itself. Prior to this, in 2012, Karazai and the US tried to start peace negotiations with Taliban leadership. It included Mohammad Ismail who served as the Military Council Chairman for the Quetta Shura until 2011, Shahid Khel, the shadow governor of Laghman province, and Ahmadullah Wror, Taliban’s intelligence officer. All these three leaders were executed by a so-called rival Taliban faction opposed to peace talks. Ghulam Hassan a senior leader of Taliban, who was close to Maulavi Ismail, accused Mullah Zakir (who replaced Mullah Ismail as chairman of the Taliban military council) of these executions. He was captured by Taliban later in 2012.

            By the end of 2012, only three higher ranking Taliban leaders Mullah Omar, Mullah Mansour and Mullah Zakir remained influential.  According to the reports Mullah Omar died somewhere around mid 2013. Hence Mullah Mansour and Mullah Zakir took over the political and military command subsequently. In April 2014 Mullah Qayum Zakir stepped down from his post of chief military commander; the reason was internal rift between Zakir and Mansour. However, he remains influential in the Quetta Shura , pledged his allegiance to Mullah Mansour and said “These claims (about rift) are absolutely baseless.” This left Mullah Mansour as the sole legitimate leader of the Afghan Taliban except some claims made by Yaqoub the elder son of Mullah Omar. Earlier this year, the remaining senior Taliban leadership that was close to Mullah Omar either vanished or was killed by unknown persons. In June 2015, Mullah Abdul Qayum Noorzai, aid to Mullah Omar was kidnapped from Quetta by unknown gunmen, and Maulvi Mir Ahmad Gul Hashmi, shadow governor of Eastern Nangarhar province, was shot dead in Peshawar.

            This is an opportune moment for the news of death of Mullah Omar to come out since peace negotiations are at a critical juncture and Taliban is on the offensive all over Afghanistan. No credible opposition to Mansour’s elevation remains, especially at a time when the unity government seems incapable of dealing with Taliban and the threat posed by the Islamic State. This was followed by the declaration of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as Amir-ul-Momineen the new leader of the Islamic Emirate on 30^th July. A person who killed more than five thousand afghan soldiers in one year is being termed as moderate, pro-peace talk’s leader, While Mullah Sirajuddin Haqqani chief of Haqqani group and who organized hundreds of attacks in Paktia, Paktika and Kabul including the recent attack on the Afghan parliament, has been appointed as his deputy.

            The President of Afghanistan appealed that “all armed opposition groups to seize the opportunity and join the peace process” under this so-called new leadership. However, Taliban maintained ambiguity regarding the peace talks. On one hand they denied the awareness about the peace process and on the other hand a detailed article has been published on the official website of Taliban about the conditionality of peace talks.  This is the classic example of  ‘Ambiguity Aversion’ through which Taliban continued attacks as well as talks at the same time to gain as much as space from both ways.

If this ‘moderate ’leadership of Taliban joins the afghan government in coming months, indeed it will be beneficial for the Taliban and the ‘handlers’ of this new leadership. The security situation will improve in Afghanistan and the US can proudly step out from Afghanistan by leaving small amount of forces back. But equations are still not clear whether the leaders from former Northern Alliance and other regional powers will accommodate Taliban and their handlers in the New Afghanistan?

            Another likely scenario is one where Mullah Mansour rejects the peace process and continues attacks in Afghanistan, as a result of which the security situation will further deteriorate. Already the second round of peace talks has been postponed and the timing for the next round of talks is unclear. Prolonged violence can lead to the division in an already divided Unity Government; further violence can result in the collapse of the government and will give leverage to Mansour and his bosses. Such a situation will force the other regional actors to participate coercively on either side. The Great Game will continue….

Author is Research Assistant at Centre for Land Warfare Studies

Views expressed by author are personal