The Arjun, a Black Swan and the Future Ready Combat Vehicle

“Army, DRDO fight it out again over Arjun and Futuristic Tanks”^[1]. This headline in a news item in The Times of India, of 05 Aug 2015 sought to grab attention by alluding to a ‘fight’. It would be more appropriate to term the issue a debate. Both organisations, the Army and the DRDO, serve the same country and where national interests matter there is a debate over the best course of action but never a ‘fight'.

Weight and maintainability are two issues of the Arjun fleet.^[2] The former precludes it from being fielded in the riverine terrain of Punjab. To view the issue in perspective the tables below list out certain basic parameters of the Arjun and two contemporary tanks. These are regarding timelines and increase in weight in successive variants of the same tank.

Table -1 Timelines^[3]

Table -1 Combat Weight^[4]

The tables above highlight the following points:

• From project conception to first prototype the Arjun took 12 years, the Merkava four years and the Chieftain one year (the short time line was a result of it having been evolvedfrom the Centurion).
• Shir 1 and Shir 2 were improvements on the Chieftain ordered by Iran. The order was cancelled in 1979 after the Iranian revolution. The Shir 2 was improved for British Army requirements in three years’ time and became the Challenger 1.
• From prototype to induction for the Arjun took 20 years, Merkava five years and Challenger three years.
• The combat weight of the Arjun increased by 9.5 tons from Mk 1 to Mk 2, the Merkava by five tons from Mk 1 to 4. In case the Chieftain Mk 5  is called the first Mark of the Challenger, then from Mk 1 to Mk 4 the weight increased by 7.5 tons.
• There has been no increase in the weight of Merkava Mk3 to Mk4 though a number of features have been added including an active protection system and upgradation of the power pack from 1200 hp to 1500 hp.^[6]

Tanks are designed (or purchased) based upon the threat from enemy weapons, the physical environment that they are to operate in, and the military doctrine of a country. Post the 1967 and 1973 wars the IDF^[7] had prioritised the requirements in their tank to be armour protection, firepower and mobility.^[8]  The Merkava was conceived based upon the technological and military wisdom and experience of Maj Gen Israel Tal, one of IDF’s foremost tank commanders.^[9]He designed a tank most suited for Israel’s envisagedbattlefield environment and the IDF doctrine of fighting. The Camp David Accord in 1978 and the peace treaty signed the next year with Egypt signalled the end of a major tank threat on the Southern Front of Israel. The 1973 war had seen many more Israeli tank casualties from infantry ATGMs than from tanks. This experience was reinforced in Operation Peace for Galileein Lebanon (1981-1983) where in spite of major Syrian tank forces being committed, Israeli armour casualties were more from ATGMs especially in the rugged hilly area in Eastern Lebanon as well as the built up areas along the coast leading toBeirut. Some early Merkavas were used here^[10] and with their capability to carry upto six infantrymen^[11]and with an integrated 60mm mortar proved their worth against defiladed^[12] anti-tank teams.

For all its success, almost no interest was shown for the Merkavaby foreign armies. The reason is that it is tailor made for the Israeli environment and not for the environments of other countries. This reinforces the argument that the tank we must have must be most suitable for our environment.Those who quote the complete outclassing of the Iraqi T-72 tanks in the Gulf Wars by the 63 ton Abrams and use this to justify heavy tanks, miss out the complete air superiority of the Coalition and the technically obsolescent Iraqi tanks.

The last of the first production batch of 124 Arjun Mk 1 on order will probably be delivered this year. It has been 45 years from conception to final delivery of the Arjun Mk 1. During this same period a Black Swan event^[13] happened. A Black Swan event has the following three attributes, Firstly, it lies outside the realm of regular expectations; secondly, it carries an extreme impact; and lastly, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.^[14]

The Rajasthan canal was conceived in 1947 but work on it could start only in 1957 after the Indus waters treaty was signed. In 1983 an year before the first prototype of the Arjun was made, Stage I of the canal reached North of Bikaner.^[15]The canal led to a Black Swan event in the 32 years that the Arjun Mark I took to enter service. The deserts where tanks could have unrestrained mobility started becoming restricted. A latticework of canals snaked all over especially parallel to the border and are planned to go upto Gadra Road in Barmer district.^[16]An area which was classic tank country has gradually changed into a populated area with restricted employability especially for heavy tanks. A majority of the numerous canals that exist there don’t have bridges/culverts to take over 60-ton behemoths.

A tank is cost effective with economies of scale. Presently the 50 ton T-72 tanks are deployed from Ladakh^[17] to the Rann of Kutch.Conversely the Arjun, because of its weight constraint,is employed only in restricted areas of Rajasthan. The restriction is compounded because the Arjun does not have appropriate tank transporters, Armoured Recovery Vehicles or Bridge laying tanks. This is a Catch-22 situation of sorts because it is not cost-effective to build such support vehicles without an adequate tank fleet to support.

During the same period weapons and technology have also changed. This is not a Black Swan event, but it has had its effects. The Arjun and the Challenger remain the only two MBTs in the world which have rifled main guns. These are suitable for HESH^[18] ammunition which has much reduced effectiveness against modern composite tank armour. Conversely, rifled guns are not the best option for firing either APFSDS^[19] ammunition or guided missiles through the main gun, which are contemporary munitions giving enhanced range and kill probability.

The Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV)as the name suggests is conceived as a future solution. The project is proposed to be developed on a modular concept as part of a family of combat vehicles. The tracked Main Battle Tank will be the primary/base variant on which the support and combat vehicles will be based.^[20]Headlines in various military columns and online sites cry hoarse that this is killing the Arjun Mark 2 or the DRDO’s proposed FMBT^[21] program. However, a design competition to pick up the best design suitable for our doctrine, terrain and environment and which can generate economies of scale is a step worth taking.

It takes little imagination to conclude why the Army feels that the Arjun Mark II which is reaching a 68 ton weight does not meet its requirement for the future. Its basic features were conceived for a different era. A lighter tank made heavier by adding on armour and additional features can still be made to retain its character by getting a more powerful engine. A heavy tank may not be tolerant to be made lighter without the basic design going awry. This piece opines that the FRCV is a good initiative. What is important is that the project should not go the Arjun way with far too long lead times before moving from one stage to the other. If that happens it is not too difficult to predict that we may again see another Black Swan event. When faced with a Black Swan probability it is best to work out radically new approaches than to stick to status quo methods.

Views expressed by the author are personal.