Sri Lanka: Lions, Tigers and an Elephant

 

The Elephant Pass has changed hands once again -- this time to the Sri Lankan forces from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) after nearly nine years. The Tigers had earlier captured this ‘most fortified’ place of the island in April 2000 in an amphibious operation. Since then they had held it as a precious possession. Various attempts by the military in breaching forward defence lines (FDLs) on this front were unsuccessful, mainly due to the LTTE’s seriousness in retaining hold over the hard-won Pass. The LTTE was also unyielding on this front with an aim to capture Jaffna, which it lost to the security forces in 1995. Popularly known in Sri Lanka as EPS, the Elephant Pass is strategically so important that the famous adage in the island is “those who rule the Elephant Pass rule the north.” The loss of the Elephant Pass can, therefore, be considered yet another major blow to the Tigers in a short span of one week, after the fall of Kilinochchi.

 

During the colonial period when road transport was uncommon, elephants were used to carry goods to Jaffna peninsula from the mainland across the shallow salty waters of the isthmus giving it the name ‘Elephant Pass’. This area is also one of the largest slatterns of Sri Lanka producing thousands of metric tons of salt annually. Realizing the strategic importance of the Pass, successive colonial rulers maintained a garrison in this area. A small military base, in the modern sense, cropped up only in the 1950s mainly to check smuggling and illegal immigration from India. However, when armed militancy came to the fore in the early 1980s, EPS acted as a transition base for troop movement into volatile Jaffna peninsula from the mainland. Since then, EPS had become the military epicenter of ethnic conflict and the ‘mother of all battles’ of the island were fought in this area. As a result, over a period of time, the EPS had become heavily fortified with concrete bunkers capable of withstanding aerial bombings and artillery shelling.

 

The first attempt by the Tigers to capture EPS in 1991 resulted in failure due to military’s fierce resistance and last minute reinforcements. But, the government forces were not lucky nine years later, when the LTTE managed to capture the Pass with fewer casualties. Interestingly, Tigers’ victory over EPS had come after securing Kilinochchi in 1998. The Sinhalese had dubbed the fall of EPS to the Tigers as a “national disaster” then. History has repeated itself, but now in favour of the Sri Lankan forces. With this victory, the military has gained control of the entire 325 kilometre-long Kandy-Jaffna A-9 highway after 23 years. The government is now in a position to resume supplies to the Jaffna peninsula through the land route. Since August 2006, when the A-9 highway was closed, supplies to both, civilian and security personnel, in the peninsula were carried out by air and sea that was not only costly, but also intermittent. The regaining of control of EPS by Sri Lankan forces would enable them to approach from all fronts to clear the Tigers in the remaining Mullaitivu district.

 

It is surprising that the Tigers let the EPS, which they held so dear, pass on to the government troops so easily. It is a clear indication that the LTTE’s conventional capability has severely been dented. Even if they were to regain this ability, they may be able to recapture Kilinochchi, but not the impregnable Elephant Pass. Some of the able commanders of the LTTE, like Balraj, who were instrumental in capturing the EPS in 2000, are no more. Any way, the record of the government forces in holding the EPS has always been far better than that of the LTTE. However, there is always danger of ambushes to government supply lines along the A-9 by the LTTE. As is characteristic of the LTTE, there are more possibilities for indiscriminate use of claymore mines to disturb traffic on the highway. Future military strategy of the Sri Lankan government should take this into consideration. 

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)