Dissecting the Chinese Counter-Terrorism Law

The 18^th Session of the Standing Committee of the 12^th National People’s Congress passed the Counter-Terrorism Law (2015) on December 27. This new law, the first of its kind drafted and adopted for the sole reason of addressing and tackling the issues of terrorism, has raised a number of eyebrows because of a few provisions in this legislation. The 97 articles of the Counter-Terrorism Law that is divided into ten chapters, covers great ground not only pertaining to ‘terror’, but also on other spheres of state and society that are not are necessarily related to  tackling the challenge of terrorism alone. At the outset, provisions of the Counter-Terrorism Law (2015) covers or can be interpreted to address other issues that are sensitive to the Chinese state.

The law as it is: Domestic implications

Terrorism in Article 3 of this law is defined as: “propositions and actions that create social panic, endanger public safety, violate person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods such violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives”.  With a board and sweeping definition, almost all and any public activity that challenges or is perceived to challenge the state can be deemed to be a terrorist activity. Therefore even legitimate political and social activisms that are peaceful would be branded as terrorist activities.

With the inclusion of words like to ‘harm society’ and to create “social panic” in Article 3, the government has given to itself one more legal instrumentality to suppress any form of challenge to its supremacy. This is so since all if not most civil society movements can be either perceived to be an attempt to cause social instability (panic) and therefore harm.  While at the same time in Article 2 the following appears: “State does not make compromises to terrorist organizations or offer asylum or give refugee status to any terrorist activity personnel”. By projecting this law to be strong legislation against terrorism, Beijing either knowingly or unknowing has closed the doors for any attempts of political reconciliation and rehabilitation of those who have been proscribed as terrorists or those who have fallen on the wrong side of the State.

The domestic predicament is further accentuated in Article 3 (2) which stated that “…. (compelling others) to wear or bear clothes or symbols that advocate (terrorism in a public place)”. Thus, the opening sections of the Counter-Terrorism Law (2015) do not only address terrorism through legislations to counter the same, but also bears ramifications in other spheres of China’s domestic political discourse. The first and foremost issue of this law is the possible tone that borders on targeting a specific section of Chinese society;for instance the Uyghurs (Muslims) of Xinjinag and the Tibetans (Buddhists) of the Tibetan Autonomies Region (TAR) would be wary of this law for more than a reason. Primary considerations for these two ethnic and religious minorities, and for others too, would be the possibility of misuse and abuse of this legislation to tag an entire community as terrorist/ terrorist sympathisers. In the case of both the Uyghurs and the Tibetans, their long-standing differences with an atheist Han-Chinese dominated state in Beijing could accentuate their sense of ethnic, religious and political oppression/persecution by the Communist Party.

This, when superimposed with developments of recent times including random or/but coordinated instances of both stabbing and self-immolations, would be presumed by the law enforcement agencies as means to disturb social harmony. Furthermore, the need for a totalitarian state to ensure social cohesion would take precedence over the concerns of monitories that could bear the brunt of possible labelling by the government as terrorists. In the same breath, the provisions of Article 3 (2), that dwells on clothing and symbols, when read along with Article 4 “…the state opposes all forms of using distorted religious teachings or other means to incite hatred or discrimination, and advocate violence and other extremism; eliminating terrorism's ideological basis...”, would only feed into the apprehensions of the minorities, especially the Uyghur Muslims and to a lesser extent the Tibetan Buddhist.  

Both these two communities are closely identified by the government to be harbouring subversive sentiments and can be identified with a specific religious belief & teaching, along with a specific religious symbolic iconography including clothing.  Thus far, Beijing’s approach towards the question of religious beliefs has been a bone of contention with both the above-mentioned ethnic groups. Introducing the ‘distorted religious teaching’ in the Counter-Terrorism Law may be interpreted as another instrumentality to curtail and clamp down on existing ‘unacceptable’ religious practices.

International reaction and Implications

Thus far, much of the global reactions to this new legislation have largely been focused on Articles 18 and 19. These two articles have explicitly stated that all telecommunications and internet service providers shall provide decryption and technical interface when called for. Along with this telecom companies are also expected to halt and delete extremist communications from their respective platforms.

Many telecom majors feared that this law would result in a "backdoor” as initially planned (or so was the interpretation of the telecom companies) in the draft law. However, the law as it stands only states that telecom companies would have to part with information and decryption codes as and when needed. While at the same time this law has placed restriction on reporting of news pertaining to terrorism or transmission of any information about terrorism. Article 63 explicitly states that only information released by authorised entities is to be both carried and transmitted by news media or social media.

This restriction on both the free flow of information, i.e. freedom of speech/ expression along with the expectations placed on telecom majors to share information with the State and/or to control the transmission of that information that the State finds objectionable, has been an area of concern for the international community. The United States is of the opinion that this Law along with the new draft banking and insurance rules would amount to targeting foreign companies through unfair regulatory mechanisms[1]. Beijing has dismissed the concerns that have been expressed from certain quarters on possible restriction on telecommunication by pointing out that many nations including the United States and European Union have legislations on terrorism with similar provisions.

Rights groups have criticized this law, as it will not only alienate disenfranchised minorities but also further restrict their cultural and religious practices that are already subject to government scrutiny. Rights groups also point out that the existing uneasy relationship between the majority Han Chinese and other minorities like the Uyghurs and the consequent unrest stems from the cultural and religious restrictions that they are subjected to.

However, the biggest implication of this law would be Article 71 which states that China, with permission of the host nation, would deploy its personnel on anti-terrorism missions. The exact nature of these deployment(s) has not been covered by this legislation. The caveat on overseas operations, would be only after “… reaching an agreement with relevant nations…”, and is not only a limitation but can also be seen as a reflection of Beijing signaling hot pursuit. It must also be pointed out that China would face considerable difficulties on both the diplomatic as well as on the operational front in executing overseas anti-terrorism missions.

China thus far is not a significant victim of international terrorism, though “East Turkestan”, is a cause for concern. The plausible hot pursuit would largely be nearer to the Chinese border of the disturbed Central Asian Region and Afghanistan, since this region in all probability would be a launch pad for terrorism to make any significant entry into China. To a lesser extent, hot pursuit as a tool might be an excuse to secure Chinese global investments in conflict zones or terrorist infested regions of the world. Would Beijing force the hand of the so-called host nation to permit Chinese agents to undertake anti-terrorism operations is a question that can only be addressed only with time.

Conclusion

For a nation that has claimed to be battling the ills of terrorism, the Counter-Terrorism Law (2015) is the first piece of legislation on this subject. Coming as it may, the law has already been subjected to criticism for its possible infringement on personal freedom, a notion that is not unique to China alone but a trait of any counter/anti-terrorism effort. Notwithstanding possible infringement on the operations of telecom companies this law’s importance lies more on not what it has stated but what it has implies. The implication is this: China is moving away from Deng Xiaoping' dictum of "keeping a low profile" in foreign and military affairs, and will be slowly but steadily raising its head in both these spheres. 

Article 71 of this legislation, when taken along with the recent commitments of Beijing to expand its contribution towards United Nation Peacekeeping by raising a 8000-strong permanent standing force, is of great significance. The geostrategic and geopolitical implications are that Beijing will not shy committing all its might, including military capabilities, to secure its interest. The use or lack of use of force options by China will henceforth be a policy decision and not a reflection of Chinese inhibitions/inability; thus breaking away from its past.

Author is a former Associate Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed here, by the the author are personal.