Rights and Wrongs in India's Backyard

Sri Lanka and Maldives can be considered front lines states in India’s Indian Ocean backyard. However in recent years apprehensions of this strategic space have crept in, with some challenging New Delhi’s role in these two nations. Sri Lanka, as it is believed was the first nation to look beyond Delhi, with Maldives now seemingly following suit. However an examination of the reasons for Colombo revisiting its ties with Delhi could throw some light on what could be the future trajectory of Indian-Maldives ties.

Sri Lanka, since its independence in 1948 and even before was seen together with India or to be more precise, an extension of India. Its troubled domestic polity did create ripples in bilateral ties with India but the role and importance of Delhi in Sri Lankan affaires did not diminish in any significant way. However in the years that were to follow and the end of the violent phase of its ethnic strife in 2009, Colombo for right or wrong reasons was perceived to be moving away from the Indian ambit by befriending China. A couple of reasons for Sri Lanka to consider the distant and not so overtly willing China to be a better friend than its immediate neighbour India, which has been more than willing to come to the aid and assistance of Sri Lanka (sometime for the wrong reasons too), need not be bilateral in nature. 

In the years that followed the end of the violence in 2009, Sri Lanka, instead of basking in the sun for successfully routing the terrorist organization LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), found itself in the spotlight of human rights violations. The primary charge levied against Colombo was slaughter of innocent civilians during the closing days of the Eelam War in May 2009. As a consequence of these charges, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) set in motion procedures to investigate and bring to book those accountable.. India as a member of UNHRC, partially owing to domestic compulsions did not vote in favour of Sri Lanka. Colombo’s stated position on this issue was firstly to dismiss these allegations, only to revisit its position later. Even then Sri Lanka was averse to any external probe while willing to settle for a domestic one. By the time the UNHRC dust could settle (though not yet closed), Sri Lanka was in search of a friend who would bail it out from this fix. China, predictability, was seen as a friend of Sri Lanka not only coming to its aid  in the UNHRC case contrary to the position of India, but also became an important economic partner in Sri Lanka’s post-war developmental efforts.

Incidentally China’s stated position on human rights and accountability have not endeared it to the West, but has come to be seen as a reliable partner who can bail out those nations that are seen to be in the wrong books of the west. A large economic base complimented with her specialisation of funding and executing large infrastructure projects has also made Beijing a much needed friend for a number of nations across the world. In the case of Sri Lanka, Beijing’s support in the international arena and its assistance in domestic developments won it a lot of goodwill and more, at the expense of New Delhi. The Chinese assistance was perceived to have weakened Indo-Lankan ties and Colombo was seen as a strategic ally of Beijing.

The Maldivian Situation

The Indo-Maldives ties have to be appreciated in this backdrop. Despite enjoying a healthy bilateral relationship for  many years, developments in recent times have not furthered the relationship. Fissures in the bilateral engagement can be pegged down to a few issues. The first development that came in the way of the Indo-Maldives relationship was the controversy over modernisation of the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport near Male by an Indian construction major, GMR.  Owing to a host of reasons, including procedural lapses and lack of due diligence by both sides the contract to redevelop this airport was cancelledby the Maldivian Government. This project along with another project (constructruction a land bridge between Male island and the airport island) have now been handed over to the Chinese. 

While these issues were being played out, the domestic politics of Maldives took a nose dive. In February 2012, President Mohamed Nasheed moved out from Presidency; ; while he and his supporters alleged that he was ousted in a military coup, his detractors say otherwise. The domestic politics of this archipelago nation was seen as a stumbling block in its bilateral ties with India. In February 2013, President Nasheed sought refuge in the Indian High Commission in Male, on grounds of political witch-hunting by the then government. The real issue for India, then and now,since 2008,has partially been the personality of Nasheed, when Maldives had its first free and fair elections;  the political discourse in the Maldives largely revolved around both Nasheed and his personality cult as a messiah. Andsince then much of the domestic political discourse has not only been animated to say the least but also Nasheed-centric.

Conversely for Nasheed, ever since resigning in 2012, he has been facing legal proceedings for acts of omission and commission  as President. These judicial proceesses are currently inthe eye of the storm and,with  signs of becoming internationalised. The attorneys of the former President, now severing a 13 year prison term, have already made a call to theinternational community to consider targeted sanctions and travel bans[i]as a tool to pressurise theMaldivian government under President Yameen to revisit legal proceedings against Nasheed. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein has already made a call for the release of Nasheed[ii]. At the same time the international community for some time now has expressed sentiments for a fair judicial process and the strengthening of democracy in the Maldives. And it is this very judicial process that places India in a difficult position vis-a-vis New Delhi’s engagement with the Maldives.

For India, the interest that has been shown by the international community on the current domestic developments in the Maldives is significant and New Delhi would have to take a nuanced approach. The possibility of domestic issues becoming internationalised is not in the interest of India. In the event of such a development, in all probability, the government in Male would not only expect India’s support but also engage other nations, including China, for the same. Given the sensitivity and the complexities attached to ‘human rights’, New Delhi would find itself once again in a tight corner, similar to the situation it faced with regard to Sri Lanka. In the case of the Maldives, India’s position with respect to its ties with Male has been delicate, with both governments harbouring apprehensions about the other for reasons already highlighted. 

Where from here

Internationalising Nasheed’s current legal issues would be playing into Chinese hands; similar to the situation in Sri Lanka. And for China, extending diplomatic support on such issues does not diminish its political capital; on the contrary only reaffirms its position as a reliable ally. China is already an important economic partner of the Maldives and it has committed significantly on the infrastructure, trade and tourism front of the Maldivian economy. The only limitation that exists in the Sino-Maldives bilateral ties is on the strategic front. Maldives, like Sri Lanka (till recently),could possibly be roped into the Chinese strategic blueprint by acts of favours by Beijing. If Sri Lanka’s UNHRC experience is anything to go by, such a possibility cannot be overruled. China would not mind and may even welcome the prospect of a strategic outpost in the Indian Ocean Region, if either Sri Lanka or the Maldives, or both, are willing partners.

For the west, especially the United States, there are no real and immediate concerns in the Maldives and Sri Lanka. All that can be speculated at this time are possible American intentions with respect to the South Asian Ocean States within its larger strategic approach to Asia. With its policy of Pivot to Asia/ Rebalancing, the United States is revisiting its engagement with nations in the greater Chinese periphery. For Washington, Sri Lanka or the Maldives, or both, are in a position to provide it with an enduring strategic presence in this part of the Indian Ocean. Impending expiry of the lease of the American military base in Diego Garcia in 2016 too should be made note of. For the United States either or both these Indian Ocean States are much desired real-estate; Washington’s outlook with respect to these two nations is not much different from the Chinese position. 

India is currently a passive observer to all that is unfolding, both domestically and otherwise. Unlike the US or China, India does not carry sufficient clout to dictate global events. Irrespective of the outcome, internationalising Maldivian domestic politics would immediately play into the hands of China with a remote possibility of the United States capitalising at a later date. Thus for India the prospects of such a situation is not only undesirable but also counterproductive, and will not only undermine New Delhi’s position and role in South Asia but also in much of the Indian Ocean Region. Thus it is an imperative for Delhi to engage the Maldives on one hand and the global community on the other, in a bid to arrest the international attention that Maldives is gaining.

If and when the comity of nations decides to dictate or direct the democratisation process in the Maldives there lies the inherent risk of not only destabilising this Indian Ocean archipelago but also the security/ strategic architecture of this part of the Indian Ocean. Neither of these two possible outcomes is in the best interests of either India or the Maldives. For the Maldives, given the fact that its political culture is still in early stages of evolution, it is imperative for the international community to allow both time and space for to let the Maldivian variant of ‘democracy’ take root.