Implications of Sri Lankan General Elections

The din around the 2015 Sri Lankan General Elections has refused to ebb even after more than  a month of announcement of its results.  The two main alliances in the arena were the Ranil Wickremesinghe-led United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) and President Sirisena-led United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) which fielded Mahinda Rajapaksa in the fray. The UNP under UNFGG has emerged as a single largest coalition, resulting in re-election of Wickremesinghe as the new Sri Lankan Prime Minister on his own strength. Mahinda Rajapaksa has won as predicted albeit with a sharp decline in his following. Shortly after the announcement of election results, SLFP has agreed to form the National Government with UNP for two years as both the major groupings have failed to secure majority in Parliament. Ramifications of this outcome for Sri Lanka in general and India in particular is discussed below.

Outcome of 2015 General Election

The 15^th Parliamentary elections witnessed a voter turnout of 77.66 percent, far greater than the 61.26 percent in last parliamentary elections held in 2010. Following table depicts the voteshare of political parties along with distribution of district seats and bonus seats.[i]Number of Bonus seats, also called ‘National List’ seats, is directly proportional to percentage of total votes fetched by an alliance or political party.

With total 106 seats, the UNP-led UNFGG has seen a sea change of 46 seats up from the 2010 General Elections, whereas the SLFP-led UPFA has witnessed a decline of 49 seats since previous elections.[ii] The UPFA has become part of the ruling coalition at least for the span of two years; hence technically it cannot claim the Opposition Leader’s post. This has paved the way for appointment of TNA leader R.Sampanthan as the new Opposition Leader.

Implications of electoral out-turn for Sri Lanka

• Even though no single party has secured majority in the Parliament, this mandate has strengthened Presidency and good governance coalition built by President Sirisena, Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe. In other words, this outcome has attested the ‘silent revolution’ of the January 8 Presidential election, by endorsing Sirisena’s plan of action ashe has retained the support of the UNP-led alliance.
• Mustering the requisite  two third majority in Parliament for passing new constitutional reforms should not be a problem for the new government, as SLFP has already formed a ‘National Government’ with UNP for next two years. But the reform agenda might suffer with varying degrees if dormant schisms within SLFP are revived.
• Co-opting Tamil mainstream politics can herald a new era in Lankan politics. R.Sampanthan is the second Tamil to have been chosen as Opposition Leader after A.Amirthalingam of Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1977.[iii] This development could act as a bulwark against unabated furore created by fringe elements of Tamil diaspora, who complain about perpetual discrimination. Also, newly added political responsibilities may cast a moderating effect on TNA, which in turn can help in defeating Sinhala and Buddhist demagogues.
• Mahinda Rajapaksa’s political ambitions seem to be neutralized for a while. Now he has to settle on simply being a Member of Parliament. There has been clear erosion in his electoral defeat, so much so that he has received close to ten lakh fewer votes compared to the Presidential elections early this year. His support base is likely to diminish further as he is not in the center of power. Yet the fact remains that he has given a good fight. His alliance has secured 42.38 percent votes and UPFA has won significant seats over  almost the entire island barring Batticaloa and Jaffna.[iv]He still retains his support base in those who cannot forget his contribution in ending the 26 year long war. Going by his legacy, he would like to create trouble again the way he did after Presidential results, but the difference is his weapons are much blunted this time. This can be attributed to his reduced strength and the ongoing investigation on corruption charges against many of the Rajapaksa family; Gotabaya Rajapaksa is currently being grilled by aPCoI (Presidential Commission of Inquiry), Basil Rajapaksa is on bail, while his wife is under scrutiny; the controversy surrounding rugby player Mohammed Wasim Thajudeen’sdeath has also contributed to Rajapaksa’s rising woes.

Implications for India

• This new political dispensation is in favour of devolution of power. Ranil Wickremesinghe has a record of being fairly accommodative and so is Chandrika Kumaratunga. This increases chances of genuine war crime justice which reverberates with Tamil Nadu politics.
• Sri Lanka is likely to follow the ‘Asia Centric middle path foreign policy’.[v] China will not be brushed aside as Sri Lanka has old relations with it, but there are good chances that this government will be more cautious while dealing with China and may not grant it such projects that may ruffle India’s sensitivity. This care has already been taken by Ranil and Sirisena. Even before Presidential elections, UNP was warning about Sri Lanka slipping into Chinese clutches which may turn into a second colonization of the country.[vi] This vicissitude of turns in events in the form of Rajapaksa’s defeat in Presidential elections followed by Parliamentary elections can further propel China to consolidate its grip on Maldives as it provides an inlet into Indian Ocean.
• UNP has a well formulated vision for economic partnership with India, and its party members have publically spoken about advantages of the languishing Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement (CEPA) on election eve. This augurs well for India-Sri Lanka economic ties.

Conclusion

The General Election results have shown that whipping up of chauvinistic rhetoric or inciting a section of people to strive for separatism is not enough to win the elections. People want clean governance within democratic framework, coupled with accountability to ensure a stable, prosperous and peaceful life. Every successive government had shown desire to work at it, but it is under President Sirisena that the UNP-led minority government has backed that desire with requisite action. Critics are also compelled to take note of their sincere efforts while pointing at their partial success.  President Sirisena needs a special mention for his resolute and patient stance, despite some sporadic vacillations. Ultimately it is he who has contributed a lion’s share in UNFGG’s win, while successfully preventing the looming split in his party. UNFGG could attract a considerable portion of Sinhala votes owing to Sirisena’s tacit backing to that alliance than Ranil’s political tactics. It also needs to be noted that President Sirisena has already had a reasonable experience of cooperating with Ranil Wickremesinghe.

Every change, be it political or any other, brings with itself some unanswered questions. Is this a defeat of Sinhala chauvinism? Will this outcome act as an eye open for autocrats of the continent? If UPFA splits, then will that strengthen Rajapaksa or weaken him? Will the act of electing defeated candidates through National List augur well with Sri Lankan voters? Time alone beholds the answers with certainty. But one thing seems certain at this point in time- if not ideal, this was the better choice and due credit must be given to Lankan electorate for making a credible judgement.