Dissolution of Parliament and Upcoming General Elections in Sri Lanka

Within three months of coming to power, Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena set up a ‘National Unity Government’by including 26 opposition lawmakers, with the aim of speeding up the reforms as pledged under his election manifesto. Under this manifesto, ‘Electoral Reforms’ was a prominent commitment, which was tabled as the 20^thConstitutional Amendment in the parliament. Apparently, the deal brokered with political allies failed as this Amendment could not be carried through due to conflicting views of political parties, leading to dissolution of Parliament eight months ahead of the schedule. This has paved the way for parliamentary elections in August 17, 2015.

The situation was further complicated as the United National Party (UNP)and a section within the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP)pressurizedthe President to dissolve the parliament at the earliest. Clearly, apart from electoral reforms, there were other considerations which guided the stakeholders to seek the dissolution of parliament. This is an attempt to explore those considerations to make the larger picture clear.

Why the President gave a nod for dissolution of Parliament?

According to the newly enacted 19^thConstitutional Amendment, the President still retains the power to dissolve the Parliament (but only after four and a half years of its term, which the current parliament finished in October 2014)[1]. Earlier, the President had promised to dissolve the Parliament on April 23, 2015[2]; but had to hold back his decision to implement electoral reforms and transparency in governance. Dissolution came without passage of electoral reforms[3]. The President went on back foot citing that the passage of the 20^thAmendment looked uncertain due to opposition from smaller political parties and he was unwilling to alienate them by trying to push through electoral reforms despite their opposition. Hence the plausible option left for him was to dissolve the Parliament. But there appears to be more to it.

There was a good possibility that this amendment could have been defeated in the Parliament in the absence of the required two-third majority.[4] And if that were to happen then the no-confidence motion already hanging over the Prime Minister and Finance Minister would become an imminent reality. To add to it, there was a palpable absence of coherence within the ruling coalition in taking decisions on parliamentary matters. Thus this timely dissolution seems to benefit almost all the key political players in the following ways-

• It benefits UNP in two ways. It saves Prime Minister RanilWickremesinghe and Finance Minister Ravi Karunananyake from ignominy of no-confidence motion, a move for which one signature less than exact fifty percent of total MP signatures had already been collected. Further, tom-toming of the alleged $10 billion Central Bank bond scam which triggered opposition to bringing this motion was essentially detrimental for UNP’s credentials[5]. Additionally, the UNP wants early parliamentary elections to encash upon the partial success of its ‘100-day action plan’ and efforts initiated ‘to win hearts and minds’ of minorities, which may fade from people’s memory with lapse of time. It is pertinent to note that the UNP has no disagreement over its Prime Ministerial candidate unlike the SLFP.
• It helps the SLFP by acting as a temporary bulwark against the fast approaching split within the party. It was reported that Rajapaksa supporters were set to defeat the 20^thAmendment despite the incessant calls by President Sirisena, who is also the SLFP supremo, to rise above party politics and work together for better governance. Had this bill been defeated on the floor of house, then that could have bolstered the Rajapaksa faction which had the potential to paralyse SLFP, and in turn; the working of government.
• Smaller political parties stand to gain from this development as they were skeptical of first-past-the-post component of proposed electoral reforms. [6]Now the General Elections will be held under present electoral system which District Proportional Representation, which favours smaller political parties.

What are the gains of early elections?

Prominent political figures seem to be in feverish hurry to win brownie points with early elections in mind.Following could be the probable considerations -

• Mahinda Rajapaksa: After an unexpected defeat at Presidential elections early this year, Rajapaksa has been campaigning and galvanizing support especially in the south of Sri Lanka. An astute politician, Rajapaksa knows that the cost of staying away from power for too long can be in terms of erosion of his vote bank. International media’s new found fascination for Sirisena may well cast its shadow on some segments of Sri Lanka. Giving more time to Sirisena and Ranil Wickemesinghe to consolidate as leaders could severely affect Rajapaksa’s plot of political re-entry. Hence early elections suits Rajapaksa’s political ambitions.
• Ranil Wickremesinghe: Current Prime Minister and Chief of UNP has a track record of losing two successive presidential elections to Chandrika Kumaratunga (1999) and Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005) and the parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2004.Rajapaksa’s defeat at the 2015 Presidential election and the consequential political space created thereafter is a golden opportunity for Ranil which he doesn’t want to let slip from his grip. For him, holding back the elections means giving sufficient time to his arch nemesis, Rajapaksa, to revive and reorganize himself, which is detrimental for his political aspirations. Media and Opposition have ensured that the Central Bank bond scam issue remains hovering and thus it is better for Wickremesinghe to call for fresh elections before the issue clasps its hold.
• Maithripala Sirisensa:He personally might not be in favour of early elections as he is yet to fulfill some of his electoral pledges, but elections at this juncture can augur well forthe President in some ways. He has received international acclamation for his efforts towards reconciliation and has succeeded in curtailing numerous trends of authoritarianism in Sri Lanka. This is the opportune time to project himself as a statesman for steering reforms like scrapping down Executive Presidency than let the dust settle on his achievements and allow criticism to intensify for going too slow on other reforms. Otherwise there is a possibility of erosion of his vote base amidst the reports of rising support of grass root SLFP workers for Rajapaksa.

Pre-election muscle flexing& political aligning

The intricate nature of current political situation has created room for intense political bargaining and realignment in the face of various dilemmas which most of the players are facing. After a long play of ‘will he, will he not’ game, the President has agreed to nominate Rajapaksa to contest from UPFA. This has resulted in some of the SLFPers breaking ranks with the party citing ‘political betrayal’. Such SLFP defectorscontesting for general election from the UNP will find their membership suspended.

UNP, on the other hand, has formed the ‘United National Good-Governance Front’ (UNGGF) with Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)[7], United Left Front (ULF)[8], members of the SLFP breakaway faction[9], Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) andTamil Progressive Alliance (TPA)[10]. The Ceylon Worker’s Congress (CWC) and Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) have committed their allegiance to UPFA. Thus the traditional SLFP and UNP rivalry has manifested this time in the form of UNGGF and UPFA and both the sides are extremely confident about securing a landslide victory against each other.

President Sirisena cannot jeopardize SLFP’s interestsbeing the leader of the party but at the same time cannot turn ungrateful to UNP,to which he owes tremendous political debt. He could not have won the Presidential election without UNP support and hence has a moral obligation towards it and SLFP alike. Significantly, in an hour long message to nation on July 14, the President announced his neutrality in the upcoming campaign for General Elections[11].

Conclusion