Brussels Attacks: Sign of Weakness?

In the aftermath of Brussels attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), it has been suggested that the attacks are a response to the string of defeats that the terrorist group has been subjected to by Syrian armed forces as well as by the international anti ISIL coalition. That ISIL is on the defensive and therefore has decided to alter its strategy by attacking the west, conveys a narrative of success.[1] It seeks to express that the momentum on the battlefield has been reversed, and, to portray the image of a successful expansionist group, it needs to orchestrate these attacks.

There is a narrative about the strategy of ISIL that:

• It has always prioritized state building/governance in its core territory of Iraq and Syria. It prioritizes expansion of territory over orchestrating attacks in the west.
• As ISIL loses territory in Iraq and Syria, it will increasingly target places abroad.

Even Europol’s recent report, while warning of an imminent terror attack in the European Union (EU), stated that “The Paris attacks, and subsequent investigation, appear to indicate a shift towards a broader strategy of IS going global, of them specifically attacking France, but also the possibility of attacks against other Member States of the EU in the near future.”[2]

How true are these assessments?

In the last one year, the so-called caliphate has experienced a series of devastating territorial losses. The US-led coalition aided by Kurdish groups and the Assad regime have made considerable progress in reversing the territorial gains made by ISIL. According to a recent estimate by IHS Jane, Islamic State has lost 22% of territory in Iraq and Syria.[3] The Pentagon has stated that ISIL has lost 40 per cent territory in Iraq and 10 per cent territory in Syria.[4] In Syria, it has lost key border towns including Tal Abyad to Syrian Kurds and coalition forces. More recently, it lost the symbolic city of Palmyra to the Syrian Army. In Iraq, it has lost Tikrit, Ramadi and Sinjar.

The group has also come under financial strain. Airstrikes both by coalition and Russia on oil infrastructure have undermined its ability to refine and sell oil. Turkey has also imposed stricter border controls which has severely restricted the movement of fighters, weapons and oil. Moreover, the territorial losses mean that the revenues from extortion (coercive taxation) have reduced which is believed to be the highest source of revenue for the group. There have been reports of defections and internal dissent in the ranks. One leaked document said that the salaries of fighters had to be cut to half due to “exceptional circumstances”.[5] The loss of Palmyra also robs the group of lucrative antiquities smuggling.

Once a terror group that has seized territory starts to lose control of territory, it is highly incentivized to change tactics and resort to attacks that allow for maximizing effects at a lower cost.[6] There exists a tendency for a terrorist group to switch to asymmetrical warfare such as suicide bombings against soft targets and coordinated attacks using a network of affiliates. Al Shabaab had carved itself a mini state in Somalia. But when it was pushed out of its key strongholds, it substituted conventional fighting with waves of terror attacks not just in Somalia but throughout the region in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. Boko Haram was controlling territory in Nigeria, roughly the size of Belgium primarily in the north eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. When an offensive by Nigerian army pushed it into the Sambisa forests, it retaliated by escalating attacks in neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 

Conventional wisdom has been that ISIL has, for the most part, concentrated on amassing territory in Syria and Iraq and focused on governance in the region to attract Muslims to stay in the Islamic utopia that it claims to build. Its ambitions have always been understood to be restricted to the region. However, Paris and Brussels attacks do not signify a strategic shift in terms of targeting by ISIL. It only supplements its strategy of localism (state building) while expanding its footprint globally. It has announced the formation of affiliates in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and accepted pledges of allegiance from a host of terrorist groups. Since 2014 ISIL has executed or inspired 29 attacks on Westerners worldwide, killing more than 650 people. The operational relationship between the core leadership and these affiliates is uncertain. Its global influence and reach has mostly been written off as rhetoric and propaganda.

Recent evidence from the testimonies of fighters arrested reveals that planning of some of these attacks may have started about a couple of years back. According to New York Times, the machinery and institutional framework to train foreign fighters to conduct attacks against soft targets in European cities has been operational for at least two years.[7] While ISIL was consolidating and capturing new cities across Syria and Iraq, its machinery was recruiting fighters with European passports, training and arming them with a plan to conduct smaller coordinated suicide attacks over different destinations in European cities. The existence of an external operations unit proves that the group is not suddenly reacting to losses on the battlefield. The head of the external operations unit is Abu Muhammad Al Adnani who is also the spokesperson of the group. The external operations branch is responsible for recruiting, vetting and training operatives for attacks in Europe.

Prior to the Paris and Brussels, most attempts or attacks in Europe and United States were downplayed as conducted by ‘lone wolves’ who were inspired by the radical propaganda online. The recent terrorist attacks prove the ability of ISIL to tap into the criminal networks of Europe and the workings of a strategy in play well beyond the ‘strategic retreats’ in Iraq and Syria. It is neither a departure from a strategic viewpoint nor a sign of weakness.