Sri Lanka: Contours of the Humanitarian Situation

The prevailing high intensity of violence in Sri Lanka since the Sri Lankan military launched an all-out offensive against the LTTE has made the humanitarian situation precarious. The contours of the crisis range from people caught in conflict areas, the plight of the internally displaced in the northeast, and those who flee from the country as refugees.

By conservative estimates, at least 100,000 civilians are still trapped in the crossfire in Mullaithivu district. They are sitting ducks for indiscriminate shelling, firing and bombing from both sides. Appreciably, the government has suspended aerial raids, which would have caused numerous casualties. Yet the situation is life threatening. Since agricultural lands in these areas have become uncultivable due to sustained confrontation, there is severe shortage of food; life-saving drugs and other essentials like water for the people have also become scarce. People are surviving on food convoys from the World Food Programme and the ICRC. They are too little and too late, however. It has become difficult even to evacuate sick and wounded to the hospitals located in the government-controlled areas.

The government has designated few "safe zones" on the border areas for the trapped civilians to cross over. But, the "safe zones" have not been really safe. While the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) wants to use these zones to filter out LTTE cadres from non-combatants, the Tigers wish to infiltrate into government-controlled areas through these very same "safe zones". There is immense mistrust between the two antagonists. Fearing further loss of territory and attrition, the Tigers do not like the civilians to move to "safe zones" or "cleared areas" and in turn expose them to advancing government forces. The standard query from the LTTE is: "we are fighting your war, then why should you desert us?" As a result, the sanctity of the "safe zones" is lost. The Sri Lankan government is unwilling to allow aid agencies and media into the "safe zones" citing safety. In reality, however, the government thinks that the presence of media personnel and aid agencies would hinder their military push to capture the remaining territory from the LTTE. The government is not willing to assure safety of aid workers. And without safety, it is difficult to conduct humanitarian operations.

Those who have crossed over into government-controlled areas remain displaced, taking shelter in camps and welfare centres. About 500,000 are displaced internally, including 135,000 in the past few months; over 27,000 have fled to India as refugees since 2007 braving arrests by either the Sri Lankan or the Indian Navy. The numbers are expected to increase further as forces advance.

The first and foremost step is to stop the violence and create a permissive environment for the trapped civilians to move out of conflict areas. However, a truce, if not a ceasefire, can be considered between the two antagonists on humanitarian and political grounds. If there is a genuine concern for rescuing those civilians trapped in the cross-fire, a truce would facilitate their crossover. This could in fact be made one of the conditions of the truce. Many lives could be saved at one stroke. Such a shift in civilian base would deny the LTTE any new recruits and a ‘human shield’. Will it not be easy to tackle a segregated LTTE? The Tigers still possess enormous potential to launch suicide attacks, especially in the south. And they have already switched to guerilla warfare mode in the northeast. "Military victory" in the real sense may not be realised by the state forces for quite some time unless they win over the entire Tamil community.

In addition, most importantly, a truce at this juncture will be militarily advantageous to the GOSL – first-time ever in the history of the ethnic conflict. Thus far, ceasefires between the two parties came either due to ‘hurting’ military stalemates or to the advantage of the Tigers. As a result, the LTTE dictated terms during negotiations. Now, there is an opportunity for the GOSL to have an upper hand over the LTTE on the political front as well. Such a gesture would be seen positively not only by the international community, but also by the minority Tamil community, which is apprehensive of an imposed solution in the aftermath of a military triumphalism. It is also a chance to gain a moral high ground and negate the LTTE’s criticism that "the Sri Lankan state has always been genocidal".

Only the international community, including India, can convince Colombo that a truce at this point is good mainly for humanitarian reasons. There is already pressure on the Sri Lankan state in the form of an impending resolution at the UN focused especially on the prevailing humanitarian crisis. Although countries such as China are resisting such a resolution stating that it is "an internal affair", in the long run, it is always better for Sri Lanka to address the issue per se rather than making efforts with the help of "friendly countries" to avoid diplomatic embarrassments.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare)