Bangladesh Mutiny: A Security Challenge for India

Bangladesh's short history has seen political bloodshed, coups and counter-coups since the 1971 War with India that brought independence from Pakistan. The 36 hours long bloody mutiny of 25-26 February 2009, at its Pilkhana headquarters by Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) paramilitary forces, demanding better pay, change in the command and control structure and permission to join United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, which has always been a preserve of the Bangladesh Army, ended with Prime Minister Hasina Wajed offering amnesty to the border guards and positioning of tanks outside the BDR headquarters. The mutiny led to the death of 74 people at the Dhaka headquarters of the BDR.

The mutiny ended with destruction and uncertainty. The extent of the carnage cannot be judged as yet, whereabouts of many army officers remaining unknown and the motives unclear. The mutiny was also devoid of political underpinning as it lacked manifested support from any political party. However, Prime Minister Wajed has mentioned that the events, as they unfolded prior to the mutiny, clearly prove the revolt was “pre planned”. Reacting to the scale of the tragedy, Bangladeshi Premier rescinded the general amnesty and warned that those responsible would be subjected to exemplary punishment.

In the aftermath of the mutiny, Bangladeshi government fears that the Bangladesh Army, with its wounded psyche could retaliate at some point of time, in a bid to wash away the stigma of the bloody mutiny in which majority of the officer cadre were killed by the BDR men. The government has changed the name of BDR and reorganised it in principle. The army has also been deployed across the country for an indeterminate period. In addition, an investigation committee, to uncover the causes behind the rebellion, was constituted under the chairmanship of the incumbent Home Minister, Sahara Khatun. It had to be reconstituted after the opposition and pressure groups expressed their doubts towards an impartial investigation as the home ministry controls the BDR. Bangladesh Army has also formed an investigation committee which started proceedings on March 3, 2009. Additionally, the Army, aided by the Rapid Action Battalion and Police, has started "Operation Rebel Hunt" to capture the BDR rebels. As of March 24, 693 border guard personnel have been arrested. The Bangladesh government had also requested the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, the UN and Britain’s Scotland Yard to help with the investigation.

According to the preliminary investigation the simultaneous attack by the mutineers  at Darbar Hall, which is the conference room at BDR headquarters at Pilkhana in the national capital, that killed BDR Director General Maj. Gen. Shakil Ahmed and at his residence; the rebels destroyed the duty-rosters inside the BDR headquarter and finally the BDR men mutilated Army officers bodies in such a way that it became difficult for the rescuers to recognize them, substantiate the fact that the mutiny was preplanned.

The mutiny has hit at the basic fabric that holds an armed force together, the compact between the officers and the men. So is it with the BDR after the mutiny. It can have serious security consequences not only for Bangladesh but also for India as the BDR personnel are highly trained and are responsible for border security and border management. According to a retired Bangladeshi Colonel Mahmud ur Rahaman Choudhury, the 2,700 BDR soldiers who are untraceable along with arms and ammunition can lead to two possibilities, i.e., they can either form their own outlawed group or may join Islamist groups. In either case it does not bode well for national and regional security. In addition, India’s Border Security Force (BSF) has observed that there are no routine patrolling parties of the BDR since the mutiny. Thus Indo-Bangladesh borders remains unguarded on the Bangladesh side, making the region vulnerable for cross-border smuggling of illegal goods, arms and narcotics, human trafficking and transnational movement of criminals. It has also affected the bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh.

Recently the BSF has reported that heavily armed BDR personnel, without nametags and carrying blue flag approached the zero line, apparently to talk to BSF. Although India has given directions to its troops and personnel deployed on Indo-Bangladesh border to remain on high alert and ensure that armed BDR soldiers and infiltrators are not allowed to enter India, the porous borders and inadequate border management keeps the border security fragile.

It is being said in informed circles that the mutiny was directed at the Army officers and the government, which had taken actions or was planning to do so to break the nexus between Jamaat- e - Islami and other terrorist organisations. Secessionist groups of north-east holed up in Bangladesh and aided by terrorist organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), are under pressure from Sheikh Hasina’s government. They have been trying to control and eliminate the operations of the terrorist outfits, a continuation of Sheikh Hasina’s national policies during her previous tenure as Prime Minister (23 June 1996 – 15 July 2001). The militants could use this opportunity to sneak into India and thus it is essential for India to guard its eastern borders vigilantly, particularly in light of the forthcoming Lok Sabha election.

To conclude, the mutiny has revealed a complete intelligence failure. However, it is important to note that the Bangladesh Army, which has always tried to assert itself as a political force and is not free from the influence of radical Islam, has come out in full support of Hasina Wajed’s government. This is the time when Bangladesh can consolidate its democratic institution, the government and military working in tandem. It is essential to get to the root, fix responsibility and draw lessons to prevent any further incidents. At the same time there is an urgent need for Bangladesh to develop contingency planning and four phase crisis management mechanism as suggested by Gonzalez Herrero and Pratt that includes dealing with issues; management; planning-prevention; the crisis and post- crisis supervision to rapidly asses, understand, contain, mitigate or end such a catastrophe.

On its side, India needs to prevent unauthorized settlements along the border and complete border fencing, which is being set up for the last seven years. On the diplomatic front, India needs to resolve pending issues with its Eastern neighbours, especially the question of enclaves and adverse possessions.

This is also an opportune time for India to take initiative and assist Bangladesh with intelligence and military training which can include counter-insurgency training. Indian Army, which has good experience in undertaking counter-insurgency operations, can assist Bangladeshi Army in its fight against insurgents breeding on their territory. Such cooperation will build strong military contacts and mutual trust.

A twin approach, social and diplomatic and military-to-military Confidence Building Measures will go a long way in stemming the institutionalisation of terrorism in Bangladesh which could have a direct effect on India’s security. In fact, this could be a seed to a South Asian Task Force to deal with terrorism in the region, suggested by none other than Bangladesh Premier when India’s External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, visited Dhaka in February 2009. In all, India has to act as an important and dependable regional player.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).