The terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team on 3 March 2009 put not only the Pakistani state in turmoil but also made both India and the world stand up and view the situation with alarm. For the first time, terrorists targeted a sport whose popularity amongst all sections of the Pakistani public bordered on the sacred, even at the risk of alienating that very same public. What made them attack a high profile target placed under the highest security cover guaranteed by the Government of Pakistan? Perhaps the terrorists intended to convey a twofold message. One, that they have the will, the wherewithal and the ability to strike at any time, at any place and against any target regardless of how well it is protected. Two, the attack indicates that the battle lines have shifted to a war of ideology, waged against the very nature and concept of the Pakistan state.
Post 3 March 2009, terror attacks have increased in frequency and targets are being chosen not just in the troubled frontiers with Afghanistan but in the heartland itself as indicated by the attack on the police training academy at Manawan in Lahore. It would be naïve to think that these attacks are random in nature. There is a specific design and purpose to the commission of these acts, the ultimate objective being to convert Pakistan to a radical theocratic state. Hence, what is taking place in Pakistan is an ideological war. On one side are ranged the forces of the state which include various shades of democratic opinion, section of liberal society, an urge to uphold the rule of law, government institutions to include the Armed Forces of Pakistan and even various religious bodies. On the other side is a fundamentalist brand of radical Islam which seeks to impose a theocratic form of Government based on a narrow fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. In between lie the masses of Pakistan for whose heart and soul the war is ostensibly being waged. The weapon of radical Islam is terror. Which side wins the war will ultimately determine the fate of Pakistan and to some extent the rest of the region.
As a developing country in which large social inequalities exist, Pakistan is considered ripe for a takeover by Islamic forces. The foremost of these forces is the Taliban. Large swathes of Pakistani territory on its lawless border areas with Afghanistan are outside the control of the Pakistan government. Radical Islam has already claimed its first success when the Government of Pakistan succumbed to the religious fundamentalists in the Swat Valley by signing a peace treaty on 16 February 2009 with Sufi Muhammad, the chief of the pro-Taliban Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammedi, or Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, and the father-in-law of the main militant leader in the valley. To prevent this fragile deal from collapsing, Sharia regulation for the Malakand Division of NWFP was approved on 13 Apr by Pakistan’s parliament and signed into law by President Zardari in a clear concession to the Taliban militants of the Swat. A particular brand of religious thought has thus been enforced at gunpoint endorsing the establishment of a parallel judicial system in the country which will have serious long term repercussions.
The North West Frontier Province and FATA are seriously affected and the possibility of the movement spreading in full force to Punjab and Sind provinces, paving the way for imposition of a theocratic state in Pakistan is no longer farfetched.
How should India respond to the present crisis in Pakistan? An ideal situation for India would be one where democratic institutions in Pakistan are vibrant and functional, civil society is secular, there is great interdependency in trade, people to people contact between the two countries is extensive and the military in Pakistan does not have an overriding voice in the affairs of state. Rather an Utopian order but one which is not totally implausible. While Pakistani society has by and large been conservative, their religious practice has always been more in the Sufi tradition which had a very large measure of tolerance. The present move towards pushing Pakistan to a theocratic state is thus alien to the Asian ethos and can be countered. As the battle is ideological, it must be countered accordingly.
Waging war against Pakistan to counter that country’s support to terrorist activities within India is not likely to work. It will polarise Pakistani society and push them deeper into the hands of fundamentalist forces. Targeting specific bases of the terrorists is an option but would require foolproof real time intelligence which may not be forthcoming. Acting on outdated or incorrect information would be counterproductive as the terrorists frequently change the locations of their hideouts and camps. As these are generally in close proximity to civilian habitation, the risk of collateral damage increases manifold without any surety of effective engagement of the terrorists. The more sensible course would be to target the source of terrorist funding. While this is easier said than done, it will be most effective in the long run. India, along with other countries must take this up in real earnest. India must also provide moral and material support to those sections within Pakistani society to whom a theocratic form of government is anathema. If the Pakistani middle class succumbs to the tactics of terror as propagated by the Taliban, then perforce the state will fall to the Taliban.
Within Pakistan, initiatives need to be taken to restructure the educational curriculum, making it more broad-based, secular and inclusive. On the economic front, greater trade with India, to foster interdependency and promotion of mutual interest will strengthen the hands of the common man. Also, land reforms and other measures to promote social and economic equity must be taken to reduce disparity and discord within society to counter the Taliban appeal. Pakistan has a long haul ahead and the coming years will see a great deal of violence before the scourge of terrorism is contained and eliminated.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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