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As fighting intensifies in the Swat Valley and other tribal regions in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the “Af-Pak” region and the seeming failure of the writ of the civilian government in Pakistan has raised deep concerns over the safety of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. United States President Barack Obama has sought assurances this week from Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari that his country’s nuclear arsenal were safe and that the Pakistan Army intends to face down the Taliban extremists. Even though the Obama has stated that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are secure, at least for the moment, overriding concerns that militants would leave no opportunity to seize a nuclear weapon continue to loom large. The situation remains tense amidst the Taliban’s recent advances, as Washington debates internally Pakistan’s commitment to battling the extremists.
Although Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States armed forces , is comfortable about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, he expressed doubts regarding its “continuing safety”. The apprehension seems palpable given the present fluidity of the politico-military situation in Pakistan. In the event of President Zardari’s government crumbling, the Pakistan Army’s failure to root-out militants and terrorists, a situation could arise where extremist infiltration of the military and intelligence services could compromise the safety of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons—a potential catastrophe for the entire region, especially India.
Demanding greater accountability from Pakistan, US’ special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke said recently that Washington has asked Islamabad to allow American intelligence access to Pakistan’s disgraced nuclear scientist AQ Khan. Responding to a query from Congressman Gary Ackerman, Holbrooke said, “I find it hard to understand... that AQ Khan was not immediately made available to the US. We had no access. And I just don’t understand it, given the immense amount of damage he has done.”
All along, as the world debates and ponders on the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons , China’s silence on the issue is conspicuous. After its striking military defeat at India’s hands in 1971, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had said that the Pakistanis would eat grass if need be but would spare no effort to produce an ‘Islamic’ (nuclear) bomb’. Pakistan acquired this capability with generous help from the Chinese, who found in Pakistan a strategic ally willing to countervail India. It was noted with consternation that the international community led by the US pointedly ignored China’s role in nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan throughout the 1980s and the 1990s.
China’s trade of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery within Asia has made for significant debate during the Cold War years and thereafter. China provided crucial direct assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme since the 1980s. US intelligence agencies reported way back in 1983 that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear scientists claimed to have been permitted by the Chinese to test a nuclear device in the Lop Nor test range in China in 1983. The result of Chinese help and US promiscuity led to Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons covertly in 1987.
According to Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies and a noted Delhi-based security analyst, “China is said to have provided assistance and transferred dual-use materials in addition to the transfer of M-9 and M-11 nuclear capable ballistic missiles to Pakistan in fully assembled mode. Besides, Beijing looked the other way when its protégé North Korea transferred No Dong and Taepo Dong ballistic missiles to Pakistan.”
During the early to mid-1990s, China transferred fully assembled M-11 missiles to Islamabad. Though Pakistan was known to have developed and stockpiled nuclear weapons in 1987, Washington continued to certify the contrary to the US Congress. However, in its anxiety to develop its economic relations with China, the US was unwilling to utilise its leverages with China to stop nuclear and missile proliferation and only sought assurances to that effect. It was only in the1990s that Pakistan came under US sanctions. However, in spite of assurances to the US during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s 1997 visit, Chinese proliferation of missile components and technology to Pakistan continued. In February 2000, the CIA reported to the US Congress that despite its promise to stop ballistic missile and nuclear assistance to Pakistan in May 1996, China continued such assistance during the first half of 1999.
The People’s Republic of China has strategic, energy and economic interests in Pakistan with both sharing a free trade agreement including $6 billion in bilateral trade in 2008. Beijing and Islamabad consider each other critical to energy security. The Gwadar port – 400 kms from the Straits of Hormuz – along with a network of rail and roads through Pakistan assures the convenient transport of Middle Eastern oil and gas to China through Xinjiang province.
The continued proliferation of WMDs and advanced weapons technologies coupled with the constant fear of a possibility that they might fall in the wrong hands and further destabilise vulnerable regions in South Asia is extremely worrisome. Beijing is carefully choosing not to comment on the issue of its “hand in glove” ally Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal safety. This is primarily aimed at deflecting attention away from the “proliferating role” it has played towards Islamabad laying its hands on such weapons and their means of delivery in the first place. This is not a very encouraging situation as China is expected to make a case for being a regional stakeholder and play a greater role in stabilising the region—with security being the paramount objective in this turbulent region.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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