India�s Counterterrorism Policy: A View from the US

A recent ‘Annual Country Report on Terrorism – 2008’ brought out by the United States State Department is worth looking at, especially those portions pertaining to South Asia. On the whole, the report paints a grim picture on the state of terrorism in the region. The report lists various terrorist attacks and their perpetrators in various countries of the region. Three incidents, especially, were identified as “high profile”: the 7 July bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, 20 September  bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan and the 26 November attacks in Mumbai, India. Of these, two were against Indian targets.

No wonder, the report points out that India is “ranked among the world’s most terrorism-afflicted countries”. Attacks, the report states, were carried out “from both externally-based terrorist organisations and internally-based separatist or terrorist entities”. But, who are these “externally-based terrorist organisations”? Undoubtedly, the organisations are from Pakistan and, to an extent, from Bangladesh. However, the report not only fails to take notice of this fact, but projects Pakistan as a “victim” of terrorism. It also completely ignores the involvement of at least a section of the Pakistani establishment in perpetuating terrorism in the region, especially against India. As long as this deliberate opaqueness on the part of the US continues, it will be difficult to completely root out terrorism both from the region and from the world at large.

Under ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’, the report pertinently pinpoints that “without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have greater difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.” Surprisingly, Pakistan does all the above, yet fail to figure in the US list of ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’. The report reads as if Pakistan has been doing everything as demanded by India to facilitate investigations on 26/11 attacks. This, in reality, is not the case, and is a public knowledge. Despite requests from all over the world, Islamabad has been dilly-dallying on providing even basic information sought by India for investigation purposes, leave alone taking action on terrorists based in its soil.

The report brings out some of the lacunae in India’s counter-terrorism efforts. Rather than making rebuttals, there is nothing wrong in considering the report as a ‘peer review’ of India’s counter-terrorism framework and take necessary course correction:

· The report observes that despite numerous terrorist attacks in India “none of the perpetrators of these attacks has yet been prosecuted.” Why? The report reasons that “the Indian government's counter-terrorism efforts remained hampered by its outdated and overburdened law enforcement and legal systems.” It should be acknowledged that the Indian legal system requires thorough overhauling. Since independence, anti-terror and other security laws in India have been undergoing a cycle of enactment, repeal and re-enactment reflecting underlying weakness in the criminal justice system. Administration of these laws has also varied from state to state. Despite these shortcomings, the main issue in the recent spate of terrorist attacks on India is their extra-territorial nature. In the absence of extradition treaties with important neighbours, India has been finding it difficult to bring the perpetrators to justice. Is the US willing to do something about it?

· The report states that “there is no clear unified command structure between state and federal forces in counter-insurgency efforts, which hampers their effectiveness.” The idea of setting up of a unified command structure for all insurgency-infested states is not new. Such structure is especially required in the northeast and as well in Naxal affected central India. However, not all concerned states are interested in a unified framework, partly due to political differences. Yet, the central government should take a firm view on this taking into consideration overall national interest in mind.

· The report rightly points out that during the 26/11 attacks “local and state police proved to be poorly trained and equipped, and lacked central control to coordinate an effective response.” Indian policy makers are aware of this shortcoming and various measures are underway to rectify the anomaly. In this regard, the United States can upgrade its counterterrorism cooperation with India to include properly equipping and training at least state police forces.

· The report states that “the absence of counter-terrorism cooperation between India and Bangladesh fuelled mutual allegations that each country facilitated terrorism inside the borders of the other.” This is one of the main drawbacks of India’s counter-terrorism policy. It would be appropriate for New Delhi to make efforts to establish firm cooperation on counter-terrorism with all its neighbours including Pakistan. A reworked ‘SAARC Convention on Terrorism’ could be a better shortcut.

· The reports says “The Indian government has implemented an advance passenger information system to receive inbound passenger information from air carriers operating in India. The system, however, is not compatible with or able to share data with the U.S. and EU equivalent systems.” This should be rectified on an urgent basis by India.

Overall, the report talks of “a holistic approach” incorporating efforts aimed at “protecting and securing the population; politically and physically marginalising insurgents; winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures; and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal risk to innocent civilians.” Washington can help India at least in two aspects: to prevail on Pakistan to eliminate terrorist groups operating from there and share credible intelligence inputs on terrorism. The next annual report will hopefully takes into consideration all these.
 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).