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June 02, 2009 |  | By P K Gautam | ||
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The recent seminar on military sociology held at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) on 29 March 2009 brought up number of issues that need to be debated for better policy options in the future. Some ideas that emerged and that need further deliberation are discussed here.
Firstly, is it true that the Indian military is not representative of the society? This observation is not supported by evidence of recruitable male population and also how SC/ST regiments have Sanskritised the lower strata. The Sikh Light Infantry and the Mahar Regiment, for instance, represent the scheduled castes or dalits in good measure. So are the scheduled tribes well represented in Bihar, Naga and Kumaon Regiments. Even other backward castes in some states such as Ahirs, Gujjars or Jats are well represented. However some are under-represented such as 2 per cent Muslims and some are over-represented such as the Sikhs, the hill people of Uttarakhand and the Dogras from Jammu. But this representation is also based on traditional factors and there are no restrictions on recruitment. Barring women soldiers as combatants, the sum of the armed forces mirrors the society in great measure.
Secondly, can the INA be used as a model for recruitment? All mixed units in Arms and Services are all-India based. Thus to say, to follow the INA (Indian National Army) model, in a sense would imply doing away with one or fixed-class units in the infantry and armoured corps. This will break up the cohesion. Thus, I have argued at length in my book Composition and Regimental System of the Indian Army (2008) not to tinker with the regimental system.
The Indian army has assimilated good facets of the INA. Since partition we have borrowed INA terms like the armed forces greeting “Jai Hind” and also adopted a good marching tune “Kadam Kadam Barai ja” from the INA’s musical repertoire. However, now praising the INA at the cost of 25 lakh soldiers of World War II will make them appear as traitors. A content analysis of USI Journal of last 15 years will indicate how the INA model hasbeen over-hyped. Dr Chandar Sundaram, military historian and scholar at the USI of India has written about the INA (Daniel P Marstan and Chandar Sundaram [edited] A Military History of India and South Asia: From East India Company to the Nuclear Era, Wesport, Praeger Security International, 2007).
For that matter, tomorrow some one could well say that 1857 mutineers of the Bengal Army (purbaiyas from Oudh) were suppressed by Sikhs and Gorkhas on the Delhi Ridge ‑ so why not do away with the latter? Some historians could be waiting for such an invitation.
No research has been done and before suggesting the INA model we need to be very clear and sure. Surely, non INA troops were not anti-national as it is now being implicitly mentioned.
The Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) at the United Service Institution of India has a History Circle (recently formed) which could be used as a platform for such discussions. It would be excellent if CLAWS could team up with CAFHR and organise a discussion. Even civilians enthusiasts, university professors must be invited as also military historians from the Service such as Lt Gen SL Menezes who wrote the much loved book, Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army.
Thirdly, the excellent presentation by Dr MK Mandal of Defence Institute of Psychological Research at the CLAWS seminar needs wider dissemination. It is urged that he bring out a monograph. With this knowledge, military officers directly dealing with the youth (such as the National Cadet Corps) can nurture the right officer material and show the path of true soldiering. However, the following were not clearly addressed by him and need more deliberation:
(i) Lowering of standards
(ii) What qualities does the government want in the officer cadre? After all, ex-President APJ Abdul Kalam and actor Amitabh Bachhan were rejected. Future wars needs scholar warriors but at the same time officers with stamina who can stay on High Altitude pickets for months with troops. Conflicting requirements, indeed!
(iii) Media reports had mentioned that jawans will also be tested psychologically. How is it being done? Is it practical?
There was a paternal hope that the Indian jawan is unchanging. We must not live like Rip Van Winkle. My research shows that the jawan is changing ‑ more educated, urban, professional and demanding a good officer leadership. I reproduce an extract from my article ‘Geographical Factors in Indian Military Operations’ in Strategic Analysis Vol. 32, No. 2, March 2008:
Recruitment and Individual Training: Spreading urbanisation has laid to rest the romanticism of the rural specific slogans such as ‘Jai Jawan Jai Kissan’. The quintessential soldier material is no longer the village rustic having a keen eye for all tasks related to Mother Nature. Recruits from agricultural or rural settings are on the decline. A large number of service and industrial (towns/cities) types are being enrolled. Such trends are not unique to India but are a worldwide phenomenon. Because of urbanization, traditional knowledge for soldiering is declining. Greater attention to acquiring soldierly skills in synchronization with the environment would thus be required. It is an interesting contrast. After the Second World War and the Partition, mastering technology of modern weapons was a challenge now the problem is reversed. Troops are quick to grasp technology-intensive equipment but fall short in the knowledge of the physical surroundings.[According to the sociologist Morris Janowitz, Indian units fighting in Arakan jungles during the Second World War showed lower incidences of neurotic behaviour than the British units in the same area. See Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment, Russell A Sage Foundation, New York/Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, 1959, pp. 74–75.]
It is time that we revisit these issues. The seminar at CLAWS has made an excellent beginning.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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P K Gautam |
