Lessons from Sri Lanka�s Just Concluded Civil War

Sri Lanka being an island country, a support base in India was always critical for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to wage war. The late LTTE supremo, Vellupillai Prabhakaran having successfully created this base destroyed it by his own inexplicable action of having Rajiv Gandhi assassinated. In fact, the LTTE had begun to dominate many important organs of the Tamil Nadu government in the early days and had created a sympathetic constituency amongst the masses. But the LTTE support base withered away following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination will always remain a mystery because the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) had already been de-inducted from Sri Lanka and there was not even a modest probability of intervention again, even if Rajiv Gandhi were to become Prime Minister, given the hostility of then Sri Lanka president, Ranasinghe Premadasa and intense domestic criticism. In fact, Prabhakaran had colluded with Premadasa in ensuring the ouster of the IPKF because the Indian Army had begun to mount pressure LTTE after some initial setbacks. It should also not be forgotten that the presence of the IPKF enabled the Sri Lankan government to crush the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurrection, which had bedevilled the southern part of the country for more than two decades. It was the first time that India had looked beyond its borders to secure its security and interests. Unfortunately, many people in the political class and other segments of society, bereft of strategic thought, questioned the sagacity of Indian intervention in Sri Lanka.

To someone who later dealt with Sri Lanka in two intelligence organisations since 1995, this moment of final triumph of the Sri Lankan Security Forces (SLSF) is rather rewarding since a united Sri Lanka is the key for security and strategic stability of the region. An Eelam as envisaged by the LTTE meant a divided Sri Lanka, which in effect implied two antagonistic countries, wooing different set of powers, in an area which is ideally located for power projection in the Indian Ocean, by virtue of its dominance over critical Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and presence of some of the best natural harbours/ports, cynosures of extra-regional powers.

It is true that the Sri Lankan leadership, right from independence alienated the Tamil community in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. But it is also true that when the problem seemed to have become intractable, India intervened diplomatically and later militarily to hammer out an arrangement whereby the Tamils in Sri Lanka got more than a fair deal. The provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord validate the contention. It is also true that Chandrika Kumaratunga, during her stints as President of Sri Lanka offered a very magnanimous devolution package to the Tamils of the north and east. So did Ranil Wickremasinghe, twice Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

The tsunami of 2004 was able to bring the warring parties in Aceh, Indonesia together, but not in Sri Lanka. It underscored the fact that till Prabhakaran was at the helm, there could be no political solution within the unitary framework of Sri Lanka. It was the responsibility of the Sri Lanka government to not only preserve the country, but salvage the future of Tamils in the north from the curse of the LTTE and its leader Prabhakaran. The SLSF, which in the 1970s was a ceremonial force, faced many reverses and humiliation at the hands of the LTTE. There were occasions when Eelam appeared to be a reality, but in the last few years one could sense a re-galvanised and resolute SLSF.

Ever since the LTTE onslaught began in the 80s, the SLSF was often on the receiving end. The LTTE attacks, at Mullaitivu (21 July 1996) and later at Killonochchi demonstrated the military audacity of the LTTE. It not only did take on superior numbers but also ensured that there were very few survivors of the security forces manning the defences. In Mullaitivu, there were approximately 1,100 security forces personnel killed and in Killonochchi an entire Sri Lanka Army Brigade was almost wiped out. Such large-scale casualties in a specific operation of short duration have very few parallels. It may be mentioned that India in all the wars it has fought after independence did not suffer as many casualties.

However, such a high voltage internal war did not break the resilience of the country. Even during its peak, visitors to Colombo could not feel that nearly one-third of the country was a war zone. It did not deter the Sri Lankan authorities from organising cricket matches with foreign teams. That the SLSF reinvented themselves and crushed the LTTE is a tribute to the island country. It has many lessons:

No insurgent, terrorist, secessionist group or non-state actor can liberate a territory, because the state, has the ability to act, if it so decides. The preservation and security of a nation-state is the foremost duty of the country’s leadership. An insurgency can be crushed if the leadership is single-minded in its pursuit and accords primacy to national interests over political expediency. There are times when an insurgency can be solved militarily, as Sri Lanka has shown. The response to insurgency, though, has to be calibrated based on the degree of threat and the amenability or flexibility of the leadership of insurgent/terrorist group. In internal wars, there is no victor and there is no vanquished. The war is to salvage the people from a life of despair and intimidation by a few disgruntled elements of society. In the process, some collateral damage may have to be accepted for long term peace.

Sri Lanka and its citizens including the Tamils have paid a huge price in the last three decades. A small island country, approximately 600 Km in length and 250 Km in width, having a population base of only 20 million people, lost more than one lakh innocent people during the conflict. More than 30,000 SLSF personnel perished while fighting the LTTE. Having humbled the LTTE, the task of assimilation of Tamils is even more challenging. President Rajapaksa’s gestures and statements in this regard have been statesmen like. One can sincerely hope that Sri Lanka, ‘the pearl of the Indian Ocean’, regains its tranquility and status-quo soon.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).