A HISTORICAL PARALLEL

There may be a parallel between this American-Afghan war and the First Anglo-Afghan war.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh was an ally of the British by compulsion – because he needed to keep a world power at bay.  However, an adventure by the Russians in 1838 wherein they planned an invasion of Afghanistan’s Herat province using Persian Troops and Russian/Italian officers was taken very seriously by the British, which brought stress on that alliance.

Always afraid of Afghan expansionism and aggression towards India, epitomised by Mahmud Ghazni, Mohammed Ghor, Zahir-ud din Babur, and Ahmad Shah Abdali, the British fretted when they discovered that various factions of Afghanistan had sought Russian assistance. The British were also aware of the invasion of India by the Persian ‘outlaw’, Nadir Shah. So, the combined action by Persia and Russia was considered as a grave threat to their (valuable) possessions in India.

To counter this threat, the British sought to bring Afghanistan under their control. Capitalising on the internal dissensions, unrest, and struggles for Afghanistan’s throne, the British brought forward a puppet, Shah Shuja – grandson of Ahmad Shah Abdali and living in exile in Ludhiana – and encouraged him to take the throne of Afghanistan.

Unlike their own 1838 adventure in Afghanistan where the British sent Shah Shuja all by himself to recapture the throne of Afghanistan – in which attempt Shah Shuja’s forces were repulsed in a battle at Kandahar – the British aimed this time to send in their own troops. So quite naturally, the British sought the help of Ranjit Singh, their ally in the region who had a border with Afghanistan, like Pakistan today.

While Ranjit Singh offered diplomatic support and endorsed the installation of Shah Shuja in Kabul, he did not commit troops and did not allow the British to march through his territory to Afghanistan.

However, the British tried their best to convince Ranjit Singh that their travelling through the Punjab was necessary for their forces – that going around his kingdom via a circuitous route would be taxing on their troops. While lending his ear and playing good diplomacy, he nonetheless refused to allow the British to traverse his kingdom en route to Afghanistan, ostensibly fearing that the British would gain intelligence on his kingdom for future adventures against him.

History records that the harder the British tried to make Maharaja Ranjit Singh change his mind, the harder his position became. The end result was that the British had to launch their invasion via Sindh and Baluchistan, which caused tremendous hardship on their troops and supply lines. Consequently, many Britishers were outraged, others insulted, by Ranjit Singh’s attitude, supposedly an “ally” of theirs. They vociferously advocated the invasion of Punjab for his “unreasonable” behaviour, but were overruled by their political overlords of the time. 

Observe that Pakistan has not allowed USA to station major troop components in Pakistan, even though USA has tried hard. Thus, USA is unable to launch a full ground offensive from the base of an “ally,” much the same as the British were unable to attack Afghanistan from Khyber via Peshawar in 1839. Pakistan provides diplomatic support, much the same as Ranjit Singh did.

Many Americans called for “forcing” the dictatorial Pakistani regime to allow their ground troops to be stationed in Pakistan, but Pervez Musharaff resisted defiantly, just as happened between Ranjit Singh and the British. Even the current government of Pakistan is not allowing USA to station ground troops in their country.

The first wave of invasions of Afghanistan resulted in severe setbacks for the British, for which the British never forgave Maharaja Ranjit Singh. After his demise, the British “swore” to overthrow his kingdom, and luck would be on their side.

Similarly, it was contended five years ago that a protracted air campaign could break the Taliban, much as air strategy broke the Serbs in Kosovo. But we see today that the US aerial bombings by UAV’s on Talibani strongholds have not returned adequate military dividends. Can the US campaign be thus adjudged a relative failure? Analysts are already saying that the US has failed to fulfill its aims or attain its mission. Moreover, for how long will the current Pakistani offensives in Swat be successful? While winning such battles, could Pakistan lose the war against Taliban zealotry? All this can make USA lose its objectives in Afghanistan.

Chagrined at that failure, might the US seek to “force” their ground troops in Pakistan, since the route through Pakistan is the most cost-effective for them – better by far compared to the mountainous routes through Central Asia? Moreover, Pakistan has seaports that can help the US bring troops and supplies via Diego Garcia. Thus, entry through Pakistan is of immense benefit to the USA in this war against Afghanistan.
 
Moreover, since Osama bin Laden is expected to be in hiding somewhere in Pakistan or POK, the US may be further emboldened to “force” their troops into Pakistan, in a desperate attempt to take his head and demoralise potential Talibani elements. For this, might they plan the overthrow of the Pakistan regime, much as the British did to the Kingdom of Punjab in annoyance over the Sikhs’ British/Afghan policy? Is it possible that the US will woo the assistance of India in planning a mighty invasion of Pakistan, while themselves neutralising Pakistan’s nuclear and air capabilities through a pre-emptive strike?

Parallels in history may not be conclusive; historians and readers may impose circumstances to claim that there really is no parallel between a 19th century Anglo-Afghan war and this 21st century American-Afghan war. However, historical models, like many scientific models, are built around certain boundaries, constraints, and assumptions. Given particular conditions, parallels can indeed come to life. Is there a lesson in this historical parallel? There might be.
 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).