Pak Operations in Swat: A Preliminary Analysis

Its official, the Pakistan Army has declared Swat operations a “success”. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani addressing the 119th Corps Commanders’ Conference at General Headquarters, Rawalpinidi on 4 June said, “The tide in Swat has decisively turned and major population centres and roads leading to the valley have been largely cleared of organised resistance by the Taliban.”

The News, Pakistan’s leading daily was however more circumspect. In an editorial on 6 June it cautioned, “As to the tide having turned it may be that General Kayani has made himself a hostage to fortune,” and hoped that the country was not left feeling that the army had been “counting [their] chickens before they were hatched”. Given these differing perceptions a preliminary analysis of the Swat operations is in order, essentially based on media reports and official releases from the Inter Services Public Relations agency of Pakistan.

Firstly, a brief look at the terrain. Swat is a narrow valley running north to south astride the river of the same name, approximately 150 kms in length as the crow flies and 40 kms wide. The northern area is snow bound and glaciated. The main inhabitation is in the southern half from Bahrain to Madyan, Matta, Charbagh, Mingora the largest town and Saidu Sharif, the district headquarters.

This was also the main area of influence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat (TTS) led by Maulana Fazlullah with its key command and control centres in the Peochar Valley north-west of Matta. Taliban strength was estimated to be between 4000-5000 principally located in four areas, Bahrain, Peochar Valley, Matta - Khawazakhela and Mingora - Charbagh.

The military operation in Swat was launched on 8 May and followed that in Lower Dir on April 26 and Buner on April 28. These districts are geographically west and east of Swat respectively, thus the Army presumably wanted to block routes of ingress and egress of the TTS. Simultaneously civilian population was also warned to leave the area through leaflets dropped from helicopters. This led to loss of surprise and it is presumed that a large number of rebels would have got away.

The principal aim of the army operation was to re-establish government control and clear major towns and population centres particularly Mingora and Matta, and the Peochar Valley which had the TTS headquarters and Dumber Training Centre. Three forces possibly brigade sized or lesser were employed in this operation. One addressed Peochar and included elements of the Special Services Group, another Matta-Khawzakhela complex and the third one Mingora. The operations were first launched in the outlying areas of Peochar and Matta in the North and then the forces advanced towards Mingora in two pincers converging on the main township, where the TTS were expected to give stiff resistance.

Tactically, search and destroy missions, helicopter and ground troops were employed to target Taliban strongholds, ammunition dumps, training facilities and command and control centres. A number of assaults were launched on Taliban positions particularly in Matta and Peochar Valley. Simultaneously with the clearing operations, the Army established check posts to control the principal axes and allow movement of troops.

The Taliban provided stiff resistance in the initial stages in Matta, Khwazakhela and Peochar while they resorted to mortar shelling in Mingora. They also controlled defiles such as bridges, laid IEDs along the axes and sporadically assaulted security forces’ posts and pickets. After clearing the northern areas, Mingora was addressed on 23 May from a number of directions and while heavy hand to hand fighting was anticipated given the light casualties, the TTS apparently did not give resistance. Thus the town was cleared on 31 May.

The Swat Taliban had focused on conventional terrorism burning schools, killing deviants and punishing ‘infidels’. They apparently did not have the perennial supply of suicide bombers possessed by Behtullah Mehsud. The Army also employed tribal leaders to negotiate with the Taliban in other areas thus making sure Maulana Fazlullah’s TTS was relatively isolated.

On the face of it, the Pakistan Army’s operations in Swat have been categorised a success, in regaining control of an area which had been lost to the Taliban more than once.  However counter-militancy operations are not about territory. It is obvious that the Taliban shrewdly avoided battle and thus there was virtually no combat in places as Mingora or other urban centres.

No major Taliban leader has been apprehended despite high intensity operations and the ‘pin money’ announced by the government. Given the complex tribal loyalties, it is unlikely that many would be turned over by the locals in the days ahead.

The level of casualties with 1,217 Taliban killed and 79 arrested and 81 security personnel killed since the start of the military offensive till 31 May denotes a ratio of 15:1 Taliban versus the security forces. This indicates the high level of kinetic force used. This also contributed to the large number of persons displaced with only 10 per cent of the population of 300,000 in Mingora district having stayed back.

By opting for swift kinetic operations in populated areas infested by militants, the Pakistan Army has added to the many woes facing the government. Despite substantial international and US assistance, poor capacity to deliver implies that the IDPs would form another recruiting centre for the Taliban in the days ahead.

The alternative of engaging the Taliban in a long drawn out counter-militancy campaign with carefully calibrated force was far too risky given the high degree of penetration of the militants amidst the civil population and would have led to heavy collateral damage. The Pakistan Army was also not trained nor oriented for such operations but it could have at least attempted the same and spared the agony for thousands of its own citizens.

Using third generation tactics in a fourth generation war in Swat thus implies that the Swat operation is just the beginning of a long series of battles between the Taliban and the Pakistan Army, provided it is determined to reclaim territory as well as sovereignty in the Frontier and tribal areas. Else, we may see these areas disintegrating into small vassalages, such as existed till the late 1960’s.
 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).