India�s Role in Sri Lankan Ethnic Issue: Enhancing the Scope

It has been more than a month since the Sri Lankan forces put down the top LTTE leadership and won the insurgent driven war in the country. But the real work begins now. Mines have to be cleared, the devastated North-east have to be rebuilt, and above all the Tamil population have to be returned to their homes and their sense of identity and place in Sri Lankan society restored. In the present context, what is the scope for a role for India in the Sri Lankan ethnic issue?

Firstly, on the humanitarian front India could play a major role especially in the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of the internally displaced. The Sri Lankan government has already put forward a “180-day plan” to resettle all the IDPs. However, this timeline looks unrealistic given the mammoth challenges, especially in terms of resource and manpower constraints. It is appreciable that India has pledged Rs 500 crores (US $100 million) for the purpose. The fund should, however, be ploughed directly to the affected instead of routing through the government. In addition to the monetary assistance, India is also sending 2,600 tonnes of galvanised corrugated steel sheets to Sri Lanka to construct shelters for approximately 5,000 families living in relief camps in northern Sri Lanka. At the same time, India should try to send more supplies like food items, medicines, clothes, utensils, and stationery. The Indian Army has been running a temporary medical centre in the island’s northeast to treat those affected by the war, and senior presidential adviser and legislator Basil Rajapaksa has gone on record commending their work. New Delhi should firm this initiative and could consider augmenting the medical centre by sending more professional psychiatrists who are currently in shortage.

Four Indian demining teams have been working tirelessly in sanitising the conflict areas for resettlement. On request, four more teams are on their way. Given the tediousness of demining, India could work in unison with other international actors to increase the pace of the process. The United States and Japan have offered a grant of 3.2 billion Sri Lankan rupees to the Lankan government for demining in the Mannar district. Belgium has also offered to help in technical training and equipping Sri Lankan security forces in the demining process. India should convince some more countries to come forward to help, but directly, in demining remaining areas of the North-east. This will go a long way in resettling the displaced Tamils in their original place of origin.

Secondly, on the political front, India’s consistent position on the island’s ethnic issue has been in favour of “a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights”. Over and again, New Delhi conveyed to the Sri Lankan government that peace through war is not a good option and unsustainable in the long run. India wants Colombo “to put forward a credible devolution package at the earliest”. In this regard, New Delhi “expressed readiness to share our constitutional experience”. Ideally, India pushes for a ‘13th Amendment plus-plus formula’ as a final solution and the implementation of the 13th Amendment as an interim measure until a lasting solution is reached through the processes of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC). At the same time, having realised the importance of a bi-partisan agreement between the two main Sinhala parties of Sri Lanka (UNP and SLFP), India has urged UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe to work with President Mahinda Rajapaksa in finding a consensus on the ethnic issue. India can also play a vital role in unifying all the Tamil groups of Sri Lanka to offer a common front. India is the only actor that has immense leverage on all Sri Lankan Tamil parties and New Delhi should not hesitate to make use of Tamil Nadu for this purpose.

Although India discouraged Colombo from exercising the war option, it went ahead and provided non-lethal military supplies to Sri Lanka and training of Sri Lankan security personnel. This was India’s dilemma: on one hand maintain good relations with Sri Lanka, and at the same time, take into consideration sentiments from Tamil Nadu and the interests of Sri Lankan Tamils. The Tamil Nadu factor, however, has always come as an intervening variable as and when New Delhi has wanted to upgrade her defence relations with Sri Lanka. At the same time, Tamil sentiments in India did not prevent India either in extending the ban on the LTTE or cracking down on the Tigers’ supply lines from India.

Such Indian actions, however, were perceived by the LTTE as “biased against the Tamil community”. It was for this reason that the Tigers did not favour a direct role for India in resolving the ethnic issue. The LTTE argued that “until the Indian central government approaches this (ethnic question) intellectually and recognises that ours is a struggle for survival by an oppressed people in the land of their birth, India cannot make any healthy, fruitful contribution”. The Tigers had partners in Sinhala hardliner JVP, which saw any Indian role in Sri Lanka as “hegemonistic”. It is important to note that earlier Indian involvement in Sri Lanka in 1987-90 was bitterly opposed through armed means by the same actors. In the present context, the LTTE – and the political wing remains active – is not in a position to oppose a role for India in the ethnic issue. Nevertheless, India should not get discouraged by the oppositions that wax and wane from time to time. It is in India’s interests that a perpetual peace is established in Sri Lanka. And India should work towards that end.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).