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The plausible areas for deeper Indo-US engagement in South Asia are numerous, given the growing ‘South Asia focus’ of the Obama administration. India certainly welcomes this involvement ranging from energy to population to cooperation in diverse fields such as education and technology. Nevertheless, there are significant areas that could possibly assume the contours of hurdles in the otherwise burgeoning Indo-US relationship.
From an Indian standpoint, in the prevailing political sphere, there is acceptance that Pakistan remains very high on the Obama administration’s priority list.
Over the years, the Pakistani establishment has managed to garner US aid worth billions of dollars from subsequent administrations in the name of ‘reform and modernisation of the madrasas’ so as to prevent their misuse for Jihad. In fact, the 9/11 Commission had highlighted Pakistan’s deep involvement with international terrorism and recommended a long term US’ commitment to provide comprehensive support to Pakistan. Unfortunately, there have been no tangible results visible on ground with continued terror attacks against India being proof of the same.
According to Ashley Tellis at the Carnegie Endowment, “Pakistan today, is clearly both part of the problem and the solution to the threat of terrorism….”. Islamabad’s intention at cracking down on these extremist radical outfits has always been placed under a realm of suspicion given the fact that there is continuing subterfuge and denial in Pakistan’s response. Time and again since 26/11, it has gone back and forth on statements and assurances in what seem obvious efforts to shield terror outfits that are breeding on its soil. Even though the need for Pakistan to cooperate on the issue of tackling terrorism in the region is immense, the chances of it being certifiable remain bleak.
On the pretext of fighting the Taliban, Pakistan received over 10 billion US dollars from the Bush administration, of which, a large chunk was redirected towards buying heavy military hardware that could be used against India. Therefore, with another massive package in the offing, there is little surety that Pakistan will not delude Washington yet again. This possibility holds despite assurances from President Barack Obama that any future aid to Islamabad will be conditioned to fulfilling its promise towards the global war on terror.
The continuing politics of United States aid to Pakistan certainly concerns India. New Delhi is keen that Washington should not look at India through the Pakistan lens. We would want to be assured of verifiable monitoring mechanisms that would be instrumental in ensuring that the tripled economic assistance in form of the $7.5 billion aid package allotted to Islamabad shall exclusively be used for the said purpose. Besides, the increase in military aid to $2.8 billion makes for a case where these funds could well be diverted and used against India.
India comprehends that any advancement of the Taliban east of the Indus would be extremely alarming for our security. Given the Obama administration’s firm focus on the Af-Pak policy, the prevalent view within India is that the US has worked out this policy without New Delhi’s inputs. Although the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, noted that Washington had consulted the Indian government very closely, divergences continue to remain on this aspect.
This is essential given that the functioning of Pakistan’s military as an institution and its policies within Pakistan have always been a subject that has generated immense debate. More so, the role of the ISI coupled with the mullah-military nexus has been a source of apprehension for India as well as the entire region. It has become lucid since long that Islamabad lacks the capability or the will to target terror bases within Pakistan.
Fallout of these issues could become a source of friction between India and the United States. India is concerned that the issue of Kashmir is constantly being linked to the larger issue of the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan and the consequent security of Afghanistan. Any restating of this issue could potentially be a serious sticking point in India-US relations.
In the field of defence acquisitions, the recent visit of US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, witnessed two significant agreements namely creation of a Science & Technology Endowment Board and a Technical Safeguards Agreement (TSA) which will permit the launch of civil or non-commercial satellites containing US components on Indian space launch vehicles.
Crucially, India and the US have agreed on the end-use monitoring arrangements that will henceforth be referred to in letters of acceptance for Indian procurement of US defence technology and equipment. This systematises ad hoc arrangements for individual defence procurements from the US entered into by previous governments. It would be important to note here that the issue of end-use mechanisms has generated considerable domestic debate within India given its sensitivity towards allowing intrusive physical onsite verification of the defence equipments purchased from the US. The provisions of the agreement, as they stand, have been viewed as intrusive in nature impinging upon our sovereign rights.
Besides, two additional agreements that still remain to be mutually agreed upon include: (i) Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) regarding cashless transfers of fuel and supplies between the two militaries (ii) Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that will enable the two armies to communicate on a common platform.
The area of non-proliferation has been a subject that has caused considerable irritation between the two countries—a fact that continues to loom large till date. The civilian nuclear deal stands completed, however, there still are some difficulties during the next stage of negotiations as far as operationalising the deal are concerned. The Bush administration had publicly announced in 2008 its intention of seeking NPT conditionality for enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) sales.
From an Indian viewpoint, the US has been shifting its stance on this issue. Initially, it stated that there should be a “criteria-based” approach for ENR exports for countries that don’t have it. Subsequently, Washington agreed to an approach that would decide on a “case-by-case” basis on the credentials of the country that applied.
Another issue constitutes that of the US granting reprocessing rights for spent fuel that comes out of US origin reactors. It would be imperative to mention here that this issue was originally left out of the 123 Agreement since both sides had given consent to take up the issue later. India remains hopeful that the issue of reprocessing rights is deftly addressed since it is a critical aspect of India’s three-stage nuclear programme. This is even more essential since talks on the reprocessing agreement with Washington—a vital step towards operationalising the nuclear deal is going to be taken up soon for discussion.
In addition, when the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) discussed the issue of new rules for enrichment and reprocessing trade in November 2008, consensus was established on a broad range of criteria even as some proposals—like the requirement that a state adhere to the Additional Protocol before it can buy ENR equipment remains “bracketed”.” An understanding is building that a rollback on enrichment and reprocessing is being attempted and the Obama administration remains clearly committed to it. However, since India already possesses ENR technology, it does not overtly affect India. Besides, the recent G-8 statement made it clear that there was ‘no consensus’ in the 45-member NSG vis-à-vis tightening controls of ENR technologies to the have-nots.
The issue of the FMCT and the CTBT in all likelihood could cause irritation in the future. Indian trepidation arises on account of both the FMCT and the CTBT and the consequent pressure inflicted by them. The case of FMCT could be dealt with later because it is still being debated in the Conference on Disarmament and is not yet available in the form of a treaty. The CTBT is a potentially, contentious issue facing India and the US. After ratification in the US Senate, the CTBT would generate a very strong domestic debate within India. India remains opposed to any form of a CTBT that hints at any sort of discrimination and would consider a CTBT that shall be linked to the larger issue of universal nuclear disarmament in a credible time frame.
Therefore, all the issues discussed above, when analysed collectively, present a staid challenge in the coming future in Indo-US relations. These challenges are in addition to other issues such as Iran, WTO and the ongoing climate change debate. The present global construct cannot afford to ignore India. With New Delhi as a significant partner of the US in South Asia, the leadership in both countries should address these issues with a sense of urgent priority.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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