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The Sharm-e-Sheikh Joint Statement has set the stage for resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan. However the time frame remains to be decided. At the same time there is a hue and cry in India over the so called “surrender” to Pakistan on US bidding, particularly with reference to inclusion of Balochistan, and lack of counter guarantees on controlling terror in the Joint Statement. Thus, it is likely that there will be a period of strategic ambiguity in Indo-Pakistan relations.
The Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba (LeT), like all terrorist groups is well poised to exploit this strategic ambiguity. This also fits in with intelligence reports on the LeT and other Pakistan-based militant groups planning a terrorist attack against India. The United Nations (UN) has also indicated that the LeT is planning to target India again. "LeT tactics are quite obvious. It is trying to increase tensions between India and Pakistan at a time when they and their associates are particularly under pressure in western Pakistan," said Richard Barrett, Coordinator of the UN Security Council’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Committee, in New York on July 15.
Indian intelligence sources disclose that there is specific intelligence which points directly to the LeT. Official sources also revealed that six terrorist plots by the LeT have been foiled since 26/11. Of these, two were thwarted in Jammu and Kashmir and one module had targeted the national capital, New Delhi.
Any rapprochement between India and Pakistan is anathema to the LeT, since it will lose its primacy and will have to wind up the vast network of madrassas or seminaries across Pakistan. The LeT also knows that the surest way of thwarting talks is to launch another terrorist attack, which will effectively ensure that the present move to re-start talks will fizzle out in New Delhi due to domestic outrage. Thus it is likely to desperately attempt another strike and has the infra structure in place on the other side of the International Border/Line of Control.
The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs Multi Agency Centre (MAC) for coordinating intelligence across the country has reported that there are 34 ‘active’ and eight ‘holding’ camps operational of the Lashkar in Pakistan. In Northern Areas of Gilgit - Baltistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) there are 17 ‘active’ camps each. There are approximately 2,200 militants present in these camps which have been relocated after 26/11 as per South Asia Terrorism Portal.
According to the MAC assessment, among the 2,200 militants in the 42 terrorist training camps in Pakistan, roughly 300 are affiliated to the Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba, some 240 to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and around 130 to the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), while the rest are reportedly of "mixed" allegiance. The PoK Police has also indicated that the outlawed Jama’at-ud-Da’awa (JuD), an LeT front organisation is expanding its operations and recruitment in the region.
Indian options are essentially diplomatic at present. The first step would be commencement of the Composite Dialogue process with Pakistan. The Indian government has recognised the need for talks, hoping that this may help reduce mistrust and hopefully bring Pakistan to recognise the danger of sponsoring terrorist groups and attacks on the country.
Thus there is support for bilateral talks with Pakistan in the Indian strategic community though the mention of Balochistan has considerably reduced the numbers. Pakistan also to an extent remains committed to talks for that provides the government a degree of deniability and the regime is more acceptable to the international community.
Therefore both sides may be committed to talks with the Indian side having the option of calibrating the same based on progress made by Pakistan in neutralising the terror infrastructure. India can also use the leverage of trade and blockage of revenue earning streams such as travel, tourism and transit to advantage as Pakistan is under great economic duress.
The next option is to seek intervention through the United States but this appears to have now plateaued and the US may not be fully inclined to put pressure on Pakistan. In fact Mike Mullen, the US Joint Chief of Staff has recently complimented the Pakistan Army for its operations in FATA, indicating a change in the past two to three months. This would reduce the leverage that India can exercise through the United States.
However India needs to highlight to the Untied States that it is not just the Al Qaeda which is the threat but the entire “syndicate” of terrorist groups including the TTP, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, LeT, JeM, or others who have the same ideological worldview, and are integrally interlinked. Thus finishing the Al Qaeda and enabling Pakistan fight the TTP through arms support and money supply appears to be the US aim at this point of time which needs a review.
The Indian leadership has so far failed to make the US accept this fact and thus there continues to be ambiguity in the United States over how much should Pakistan act against groups which are fighting India and bring to justice Lashkar operatives, including outfit chief Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, who orchestrated 26/11.
Moreover it should be clear that the LeT and the Taliban are attaining a global profile. Thus Juan Zarate, the Deputy National Security Advisor for counter-terrorism in the Bush administration, had said, "We are and should be concerned about the threat LeT poses, given its global network… It doesn’t just reside in South Asia. It is an organisation that has potential reach all over the world, including the US."
There is some support within the US strategic community as well as the UN and other bodies to shore up India’s contention that Pakistan has not really clamped down on terror. India must use evidence of lack of action by Pakistan against terrorist groups and infrastructure as well as continued involvement of the state agencies through a number of proxy terrorist outfits, now that Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani has agreed to come clean and India has walked more than half way to accommodate him with a reference to Balochistan. Thus a focused information and perception management strategy is necessary and would provide the country added leverage, for the Lashkar is waiting in the wings to exploit this period of strategic ambiguity.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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