When Generals Failed: The Chinese Invasion

BOOK REVIEW

When Generals Failed: The Chinese Invasion
By Brig Darshan Khullar (Retd), (Manas Publications 1999), pp. 267; Rs 465/-

The Indian Army suffered major reverses at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. That was perhaps its darkest hour since Independence. When Generals Failed: The Chinese Invasion takes the reader to the Kameng Divison of NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) where one of the Indian Army’s finest divisions disintegrated in the face of a mounting Chinese assault in the autumn of 1962. The author, then a subaltern in the artillery, narrates first hand each day’s events in a gripping narrative as he himself was present in the sector. This lends the story credibility and makes for an interesting reading.

In the first chapter the author describes the deficiencies in the national leadership of the day from Prime Minister Nehru, Defence Minister Krishna Menon to Lt Gen BM Kaul, all failing to correctly estimate the Chinese threat and pushing the army into a sudden conflict with the PLA probably the world’s most motivated army in 1962 with its own doctrine of warfare. The author is of the view that the army in 1962 was not as unprofessional as it has been made out to be and had good marksmen, sportsmen and brave soldiers who brought international fame and glory from South Korea to Gaza. The officer cadre came from a good stock and the army had a decent standing in society. But, the operational focus somewhat also due to Nehru’s obsession, was mainly on Kashmir and the threat from Pakistan. The North-east in particular, was totally neglected and the army lacked expertise in mountain warfare. The author regrets that the strong and popular leader that General Thimayya was also failed to raise the levels of preparedness against the Chinese.
The legacy of the frontier problem with India failing to take advantage of the 1914 Simla Convention binding India and Tibet, which barred China from meddling in Tibet’s affairs and the topography of NEFA is succinctly covered in the first chapters.

The abstracts from The Snows of the Himalayas: The True History of China India War provide interesting insights into the mindset of Mao and the top Chinese leadership of the time. This also gives the reader an opportunity to look at the conflict from both sides.

The disintegration of 7 Infantry Brigade at Nam ka Chu within three hours brought the curtains down on the flawed Indian ‘forward policy’ without any preparations and appreciation of the terrain and logistics required and the Indian leadership thereafter went into a bunk. From now on the book gains momentum and the author has briskly narrated the events in Kameng from the ground, in great detail.

The impression the reader gets is that the brigades were left to fight in isolation with no directives from the above formations. The description of events from mid-October to November will be shocking for most military leaders. In some cases,  leadership was abdicated by officers and the only resolve was to head for the plains. Despite the arrival of large number of Chinese troops marching down from Bumla and Tawang, hundreds of Indian soldiers were sacrificed in fruitless aggressive patrols instead of firming in and holding formidable defences at Sela and Bomdila-Mandala. The rout was most ignominious and Indian soldiers faced numerous ambushes from PLA soldiers who were swarming the Tenga valley. The impression one gets from the author’s description is that the story could have been different had the military leaders stuck to the Thorat Plan or what Brig (later Maj Gen) DK Palit had laid down for defence in that sector. Yet, Brigade Commanders some of them of World War II fame and products of the Staff College at Camberley grew increasingly disillusioned and got trapped into executing directions of the Divisional Commander who was only paranoid of the security of his divisional headquarters.

Yet, there was no dearth of bravery and determination of troops who when faced with formidable challenges put up quite a fight on many occasions and caused the Chinese heavy casualties. The narrative is replete with examples of men like Nk Jaswant Singh of 4 Garhwal and Col Awasthy of 4 Rajput. The devastation that the small number of mortars and field guns brought on the Chinese and delay their advance is also mentioned vividly. The improvisations made in carrying the guns up the mountains and firing them speak of the remarkable  resolve of the Gunner officers and men.

The book makes it evidently clear that had there been proper planning and rehearsing of contingencies, correct appreciation of the enemy strength and its objectives and had troops not been rushed in straight from the plains into tasks which made no tactical sense, the story in 1962 could have been less bleak than it was. The onus for what went wrong lay on the generals and brigade commanders of the time. Today, it is quite perplexing to read about the manner in which the war was fought in Kameng as described in the book, with corps and army commanders never visiting the forward areas and the focus being primarily on withdrawal than anything else. The war was lost even before it had begun it was lost in the minds of the military.

In the end the author has given his set of deductions and recommendations for preventing such a rout from taking place again. The points are apt and valid. Today, the Indian Army is a veteran of the mountains and enormous changes have taken place in the structure of its courses of instructions and training.
But it would be in the National Interest to de-classify the  Henderson Brooks Report on the 1962 India-China war so as to learn the right lessons. As the author has pointed out it does not take long to forget the past and be lulled into inactivity during peacetime. Overall, it is an eminentlly readable book- interesting and well written.     

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).