Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency

Book Review
Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency
Author: Rajesh Rajagopalan, Publishers: Routledge, New Delhi, 2008

Strong nations have suffered defeat at fighting guerrilla warfare, be it the US in Vietnam, Israel in West Asia or India in Sri Lanka. Although there have been instances such as the British success during the Boer War and in Malaya, the author has cited number of examples to prove that large and strong militaries, in the absence of a appropriate counter-insurgency doctrine and due to conventional war bias fail to defeat insurgents who operate in small numbers using light weaponry. The use of large military formations shows the conventional war bias of the regular militaries. Sometimes, an entire brigade could be deployed in cordon and search operations.

Neo-realist and reflective (more precisely organisational cultural) approaches have been applied to determine why conventional militaries find it difficult to win over insurgents. The author takes up the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) which was deployed in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990 as a case study. The IPKF was meant to act as a buffer between the Sri Lankan Army and LTTE, but got engaged in counter-insurgency operations. In the initial phases, the LTTE used conventional warfare tactics, but owing to the strength and superiority of the Indian Army, lost its stronghold, Jaffna. Later, to the LTTE’s guerrilla tactics made things difficult for the Indian Army.  Finally, after suffering tremendous losses, the Indian Army was pulled back in 1990. Although there was a great amount of confusion among Indian politico-military leaders even then IPKF was not only sent to Sri Lanka but actually made to fight the LTTE. Despite the fact that IPKF was always looked with suspicion by the Sinhalese hardliners, it was able to make a significant dent in the LTTE stronghold.

The author has done a remarkable job in explaining often confusing terms like doctrine and strategy. He says that doctrine is “a set of views on war and the principles concerning its conduct that are adopted by military leadership, taught in military academies and which provide the basis for war plans,” while “military strategy specifies how a particular objective is to be reached and is conditioned by various environmental factors that include, but are not limited to, the balance of opposing forces, the capabilities of the respective commanders, and geography.” 
The author argues that the Indian Army was fighting an insurgency rather than a regular war and its counter-insurgency doctrine had a conventional war bias as was manifested in the various operations it undertook, barring few when the guerrillas were fought back using similar tactics. The IPKF could not win ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population and could not perform policing duties properly. Despite having strong will, resistance and several other advantages such as better situational awareness, LTTE lost Jaffna, where majority of its training institutions, arsenals and ammunition factories were based. 

After losing Jaffna and recognising the capability of the IPKF, the LTTE resorted to guerrilla attacks. Though successful in splitting the rival groups, the IPKF had poor intelligence capabilities and to some extent faulty communication, particularly in the initial phases. By the time the Indian Army strengthened its control over the insurgency infested areas, it was called back. The stronger side always wins in the conventional wars but in unconventional warfare, even the weaker side can gain with better doctrine and strategy.

 The author has traced the evolution of Indian Army’s counter-insurgency doctrine through various phases, particularly in its continuous engagement in the North-east of India. There were some innovative experiments like introduction of ‘I’, insurgency battalions as they were comparatively lighter in terms of equipment and arsenals and faster in terms of mobility. However, this experiment did not last long and ‘I’ battalions were again made regular battalions. The most significant difference in the Army’s doctrine was lesser use of force in counter-insurgency operations which was compelled by political directions. The author very aptly brings out the conventional war bias in the Indian Army as it always operate in bigger formations even in low intensity conflicts like insurgency. The first jungle warfare school was established in Dehradun in 1950 but very few battalions underwent training there. It was finally in 1970 that the Counter-insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) (formerly known as Counter-insurgency Training School - established in 1968) was established at Variengte. The school provides more of jungle survival training rather than how to conduct small-scale and small-unit counterinsurgency operations. It was also realised that counter-insurgency has to be supplemented by strategic steps like isolating the insurgents from the local populace and should be followed by winning hearts and minds.

The Indian Army has a conventional war bias because of external threats and its emphasis on and preparedness for these threats including Pakistan and China. The same bias prevented the army from developing appropriate counter-insurgency doctrine. According to the author “in the absence of external threats, the Indian Army would have developed more appropriate counterinsurgency doctrines”. Organisational culture of the Indian Army, which emphasises that external threats are of primary concern, also sustained this bias until 1960. However, subsequently it has witnessed some changes as are evident from the doctrinal innovations. The compilation of a counter-insurgency manual is one of them. There is a widespread belief among the army officers that insurgency is a political problem and needs a political solution. However, this belief did not prove army’s disinterest in making appropriate counter-insurgency doctrine.

This is a seminal work on determining linkage between inappropriate military doctrine and the failure of conventional armies in counter-insurgency. The author has elaborately made use of military operational details to test his hypotheses. The book is must read for all those dealing with strategic matters.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).