Counter-Naxal Sweep Strategy, but address developmental needs

The contours of a “new” counter-Naxal strategy were presented during the conference of Chief Ministers of Naxal affected states during the internal security review in New Delhi on 17 August. Chief Ministers of five states seriously affected by left-wing extremism – Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh – the Governor of Jharkhand and a representative from West Bengal attended the meeting chaired by the Union Home Minister, P. Chidambaram.  A consensus on conducting joint operations was arrived at, a major gain. The Home Minister enunciated a two-pronged strategy of the government; development and police action. He highlighted the government response for “police action to wrest control of territory that is now dominated by the Naxalites, restoration of civil administration and undertaking developmental activities – in that order”.  This would counter the Naxalite anti-development plans targeting schools, roads, telephone towers and wean away the masses from their fold.

This is to start with a coordinated operation in Central India to flush out extremists and establish government presence through the strike- sweep- hold- govern pattern. A force of 25,000 para- military and central police forces is being organised, trained and launched for this purpose extending the current phase of operations such as ‘Green Hunt’ and ‘Godavari Abhiyan’. News reports indicate that a number of Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force battalions have been mustered from far flung locations as Karbi Anglong in Assam to Baramulla in Kashmir.

Will the new strategy succeed?

In principle, strike- sweep- hold- govern is the classic counter-insurgency approach, thus the shift from an ad hoc response to a clearly formulated policy is more than welcome. By carrying out coordinated operations across the states it is hoped that rebels would be denied advantage of escaping from one state to another thereby facilitating their apprehension and regaining state control.

With the government claiming operations in Lalgarh, West Bengal in June-July as a model for launching a larger sweep, a pre-assessment can be made after examining the current situation in that area. As per media reports, while the security forces are active in Lalgarh during day, Naxals rule the roost at night when locals are reportedly at the mercy of the Maoist extremists. Moreover rebels have imposed a bandh in the area and have made movement difficult in the districts of West Midnapore, Bankura and Purulia bordering Bihar and Jharkhand.

The Maoists are also continuing to target CPI (M) cadres. “More than 30 members and leaders of our party have been killed since the operation started,” admitted Bijay Pal, district secretariat member of CPI (M) in West Midnapore to the media. To the government’s encirclement, the Maoists have effectively carried out a counter-encirclement, as per a report by Sujan Dutta in The Telegraph, 2 September, published from Kolkata. Dutta who writes after visiting Lalgarh indicates that the Maoists have adopted a three-pronged strategy of resist and revolt in the first stage, cutting off forces from the people as well as informants, and gain or retain popularity through social welfare projects of their own. Thus it should be expected that they would follow a similar strategy in other areas as well. 

While there was much hope of peace returning to Lalgarh after the sweep by security forces, apparently there has been no effective follow up resulting in a return to anarchy, albeit a slow burning one. These operations have also failed to overcome years of neglect of the region with underdevelopment, poverty and deprivation of the poor being endemic.

Moreover such operations militate against sound principles of counter-guerrilla warfare. First and foremost is surprise and deception, which has been lost. The Naxal declaration, “Post-Election Situation—Our Tasks”, issued on 14 June has noted plans by government forces in Chhattisgarh in the Maad area and has called for stiff resistance.

Counter-guerrilla operations are essentially local in nature carried out by swarming in small groups by disciplined and well trained forces rather than grandiose military style sweeps by poorly trained police and para-military who even with 25,000 additional troops mustered would still be too few in number compared to the expanse of the area and number of guerrillas. Finally such sweeps almost invariably cause hardship to the local population without addressing their basic problems, thereby further alienating them.

A sustained campaign at the local level to re-establish governance expanding the present security grid in a step by step manner would possibly have a better effect as this would facilitate surprise, employ forces attuned to local conditions and ensure economical management of resources by keeping the Maoists on the run.
At the end of the day, in the long-term, the decisive factor in successfully countering Maoist extremists will lie in effective redressal of local concerns in regard to education, healthcare and employment and service oriented governance at the grassroots. It will also be necessary to tackle the political vacuum locally and also at the state level as in Jharkhand which is under Governor’s rule for a long time now. If Lalgarh is any pointer, these issues have remained unaddressed though the operations were launched over two months back.
 
Thus, while the counter- Naxal strategy adopted by the government has for the first time indicated consensus amongst all affected states at the highest level, the coordinated sweep needs a review. Naxals who have been warned would have planned their own counter-strategy and will offer limited resistance in the initial stages thereby creating a false sense of success and then strike at will when the force are dispersed in penny packets.

The sweep plan also has to be backed up with follow-up on governance and also a will to address core issues such as redistribution of land and forest without which the new strategy will see only limited short-term gains.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).