Iran and the IAEA: The Saga Continues

Iran’s nuclear ambitions are yet again at centre stage with the Iranian government declaring its new uranium enrichment facility, under construction in Qom, southwest of Tehran, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 24, 2009. It is widely believed that Iran was forced to declare existence of this plant, since Western intelligence had gathered information about the site.

The IAEA Director General, Mohammed ElBaradei confirmed that Iran has violated its obligations given that way back in the early 1990s, the IAEA modified its Code 3.1 according to which, a state is required to report on a new facility ‘as soon as’ the decision to construct it is taken.

The facility situated in Qom has generated concern in the international community as Tehran intends to use new centrifuges that are faster in order to enrich uranium. Supposedly, the new model of the centrifuges is capable of doubling or even tripling the output rate. According to the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, Ali Akbar Salehi, “We have put our effort on research and development of new machines in the past two or three months so that we would be able to produce machines with high efficiency and completely indigenous… at the (Qom-area) Fordu site.”

Recently, on October 1, 2009, Iran and six countries—Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany and the US agreed upon allowing access to IAEA inspectors at the site. This agreement came about in Geneva where a nuclear fuel supply concept for the Tehran Research Reactor was also agreed upon. The follow-up talks for this are scheduled in late October 2009. Additionally, Mohammed ElBaradei met Iranian authorities including Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in Tehran on October 4, 2009 in order to discuss arrangements for IAEA’s scheduled visit to verify the newly disclosed facility on October 25, 2009.

While addressing a joint press conference with the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, ElBaradei stated, “… the Iranian nuclear issue can only be resolved through dialogue, through diplomacy. We need transparency on the part of Iran and cooperation on the part of the international community.” Stressing that the nuclear issue was at a critical juncture, ElBaradei further argued, “I see that we are shifting gears, from confrontation into transparency and cooperation. Iran has a comprehensive programme, has a fuel cycle, sensitive fuel cycle activities… Iran should reapply the Additional Protocol.”

The facility in Qom is Iran’s second uranium-enrichment site, following the plant in Natanz which was identified along with a heavy water production facility in Arak, by the US Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran in August 2002. It could be stated that the debate surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme has been going on more so since the discovery of the facilities at Natanz and Arak. It raised uncertainties that Tehran had been working toward mastering all elements requisite to fulfill a complete fuel cycle that would produce highly enriched uranium—much in violation of its NPT obligations.

Going by a presumable premise that these facilities would produce nuclear energy exclusively meant for peaceful civilian purposes, as Iran has been claiming since long, the potential prospect that the acquired nuclear capability could well be diverted to produce weapons-grade fissile material, cannot be ruled out entirely.

Significantly, the IAEA has noted that till date, Iran has not agreed to the Agency’s request of implementing the Additional Protocol that would enable the Agency to start providing assurances by undertaking exhaustive and in depth inspections. While contesting the issue of implementing the Additional Protocol, in a communication dated September 4, 2009, the Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA stated that the Additional Protocol is not a legally binding instrument. “To urge Iran to ratify/implement the Additional Protocol is in contravention with international law and the sovereign decision of any member-state and its suspension does not constitute violation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement,” the statement underlined.

These arguments and counter-arguments in turn have constantly raised suspicions regarding the potential military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. The IAEA expects Tehran to undertake steps that include resolving questions and provide more information related to the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.

The scenarios of supreme concern circulating at this moment include a plausible reality that once Iran is able to produce quantities of low-enriched uranium, it could well build a stockpile of the material and consequently design a bomb and build its non-nuclear components. Tehran has sought to develop all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle while emphasising on the ‘enrichment’ part, although its progress in different areas cannot be empirically determined to exact figures.

Iran needs to comprehend that its claims of a ‘peaceful and civilian’ nuclear pursuit shall only become certifiable once it implements the Additional Protocol and clarifies all the outstanding issues in order for the IAEA to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. It is well accepted that Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the UN Security Council. Given that the Agency has not been able to engage Iran in any sort of substantive discussions for over a year, the present deliberations surely come in as a positive development with the hope of yielding tangible results, in what could best be termed as an endless saga between Iran and the IAEA.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).