India's Top Driven Internal Security Strategy

Post Mumbai 26/11, India’s internal security has been in focus. An erudite Home Minister, Mr. P Chidambaram who has the right mix of qualifications of law and management to tackle the gargantuan law and order challenges of the country has gingered up the internal security system with some notable results, be it the surrender of the DHD J in Assam or a new resolve to fight the Naxals in the central police forces. It is quite apparent that Mr. Chidambaram has been given a free hand by the Prime Minister and has unhesitatingly wielded the stick to put things in order.

He has also put in place the rough contours of an internal security strategy. Enforcement of the writ of the state as indemnified by the Constitution, rule of law, effective intelligence and policing through capacity-building in terms of numbers, quality and motivation, technology exploitation, synergy and coordination are the main ingredients of this multi-pronged strategy.

The past two months have provided the Home Minister an opportunity to outline the same and gain support of the states at the Conference of the Chief Ministers and Director General’s of Police of States in August and September respectively. Given that law and order is a state subject, implementation of the strategy would devolve on the states, with the Centre and states necessarily on the same page.

The main rub in the top down approach lies at this level, raising many questions of effective implementation. While the Centre can influence by providing para-military forces and funds for police modernisation, it is states that have to ensure peace and tranquility and capacity-building. The response of the states in this respect has been to say, the least, largely pathetic.

And this is not related to political differences alone. Take for instance Manipur where violence has become a way of life for the people who are continuously subjected to extortion, encounters and kidnapping with a car bomb being discovered in the Governor’s residential complex in September 2009. Then there is Maharashtra, which is going in for elections in 2009 had a larger number of civilian deaths than Jammu & Kashmir in 2008, though these included the numbers who died in the Mumbai 26/11 attack. As the most industrialised state in the country this remains a dubious distinction. Moreover, the state has been pusillanimous in controlling the right wing elements who have been making outrageous demands of exclusion which violate the Constitution as well as the law.

In other cases, such as in West Bengal, there was no follow-up of clearing operations and establishment of governmental authority, thus leading to a backlash by the Maoists. Now the resistance has been, “outsourced” to CPM cadres with the police standing by, a sure recipe for long term social cleavages and sustained violence.

On the other hand, a firm approach by the states would facilitate implementation of the strategy as is evident from surrender of arms by the DHD (J) which had caused mayhem ceasing development works in the North Cachar Hills for the past two years. Known for vacillation, the Assam government has allowed multiple rebellions to fester. This time around a firm signal by the Centre with Mr. Chidambaram deputing the Home Secretary Mr. GK Pillai to monitor negotiations has led to a large terrorist group coming overground. While it may be some time before there is peace and tranquility in the area given that surrenders by militant groups in the North-East have always led to fractionalisation whereby some splinters will survive. This time the message from New Delhi was clear and Dispur had to fall in line.

Results are also evident with a number of leaders of rebel groups in the bag, be it Maoist Politburo members such as Kobad Ghandy and Amit Bagchi or DHD leader Jewel Gorlosa who was picked up from Bangalore, it seems that possibly they were getting away so far not for lack of intelligence but reluctance of the authorities to act fearing political pressures.

These pressures are likely to increase as the second stage of the strategy unfolds in Central India with coordinated operations in Naxal-affected states. These have been elaborately planned with all agencies including the armed forces on board. Human rights groups are already crying foul and the call will become shriller once casualties on both sides mount and the government contemplates use of fire power by helicopter pilots in self-defence.

It would be important therefore to unfold simultaneously a second stage of the internal security strategy that of building political and societal consensus to address the larger issues of, “socio-political convergence”. It is evident that the government is aware of this necessity as the Prime Minister alluded to the same during his speech to the DGPs thus, “Despite its sanguinary nature, the movement (left-wing extremism) manages to retain the support of a section of the tribal communities and the poorest of the poor in many affected areas. It has influence among certain sections of the civil society, the intelligentsia and the youth. It still retains a certain élan. All this adds to the complexity of the problem.”

Then there are other factors which have to be addressed, such as safe sanctuaries to North-East militant groups in Bangladesh and Myanmar and small arms networks in South-East Asia. With the Myanmar government unable to fix the insurgent groups operating in the Sagaing area, any action by the same may not be forthcoming, while the Awami League government in Bangladesh is hampered by the “ISI mindset” of some elements in the government thereby preventing a full scale eviction of anti-India groups.

It would therefore be evident that the current internal security strategy is limited in scope. There is a need for a broader strategy enmeshing socio-political factors, taking on board state governments and civil society. Rapid follow-up plans have to be made to restore governance in cleared areas, human rights and people-centricity have to be emphasised. The larger implications of implementation of the hard end of the strategy would have to be thought through before the forces plunge into Jangal Mahal for the Green Hunt.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).