Home Kerry-Lugar Bill and its Implications for the Region

Kerry-Lugar Bill and its Implications for the Region

The Kerry-Lugar Bill (Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009) signed by President Barack Obama recently, promises $1.5 billion every year for five years to Pakistan. Going by past records, the Pressler Amendment of the eighties was unable to stop Pakistan’s fresh acquisition of arms and its nuclear proliferation. Inter alia, Pakistan also invested well in terrorist groups that operate in its neighborhood and the US & Europe, as well.

Stipulations in US aid bills have always stringent. However, during the eight-year rule of the previous government under Gen Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistan Army mastered the art of bill circumventions to perfection, which led to ’faithful’ compliance with US conditions.

There was a time, in 1980, when Pakistan labelled a $ 400 million aid package from the US as ‘peanuts’ and then was rewarded with an even larger package of $3.2 billion.This is now a closed chapter. Still, hoping that history would repeat itself, some muted noises were heard this time too. Pakistan’s official hierarchy, the Senate and lobbyists abroad were tempted to reject the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Radical Islamic groups including clergy with little knowledge of prevailing economic conditions, grudgingly accepted it as their sovereign right, though they would much rather prefer Saudi dinars than dollars from an arch enemy, the US.

The Pakistan Army too, felt the same way about this aid package but reconciled to it later, considering the mess the country is in. The Army would have been naïve to raise objections as they receive an additional $1 billion every year. Confidentially, this aid for ‘civilian needs’ is too attractive a bonanza, for it to swoop on.

The Kerry-Lugar Bill has far too many agendas/conditions which tend to obfuscate issues, make actions unverifiable and complicate simple facts. The bill  gives a clean chit to Pakistan for the current year, commending it on its efficient conduct of anti-terrorist operations in the Swat Valley. Some other conditions that have to be satisfied before qualifying for this aid are very nebulous, to say the least.

The Comprehensive Strategic Plan utilising all “constituents of national power of all countries of the region” is proposed to be initiated without the participation of the leading player in the region, India. It may be prudent to clarify whether the US would like India to play its part in this region?

Operations in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab are India’s prime concern. In particular, prevention of trans-border movement and hot pursuit inside Afghanistan & India cannot be ruled out. Closing terrorist camps on Pakistani soil and action to destroy them must now take place. The US should monitor Pakistan’s actions on India’s intelligence inputs and the reasons for their non implementation.

Likewise, Pakistan’s role in    comprehensive Regional Security Strategy, as a part of US Af Pak policy,  is   to be spelt out. Operations  in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab are also India’s  prime concern. In particular, prevention of  trans border movement and hot pursuit inside  Afghanistan & India  cannot be ruled out.  Closing terrorist camps on Pakistani soil &   taking action to destroy them, must now take place.  US needs to   monitor   Pakistan’s actions on  India’s  intelligence inputs and the reasons for  their non implementation.

Control of radical Islamic  terrorist groups such as Taliban good or bad, al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar -e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammed or their  progenies is no longer a  catch 22 situation.  What is   probably  implied is,  no bluffing,  stopping  clandestine activities  and Army’s  accountability on  being  assigned a clear cut role in Af Pak war.

The bill has asked for strengthening counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering laws and ensuring security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially allowed to subvert the political or judicial processes. This is correctly aimed at receipt of funds directly by terrorist organisations and those masquerading as NGOs in Pakistan. Curbs on non-state actors, the ISI and security forces is a welcome development in the region but needs careful monitoring by the US.

Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for the next five years may be used for construction and related activities but not vice versa. US Secretary of State may issue waivers where its national security interests are involved. When such a diversion of funds to security related assistance is made, it would be important for the US to keep India in the loop.

A Pakistan CI Ops (Counter Insurgency Operations) Fund has been created, over and above the US annual allocation of $1 billion. The Pakistan Army has all the weapons it needs. Neither spectacular results nor easy monitoring of this expenditure can be expected, as funds in CI Ops are always shrouded in secrecy.
Security-related assistance or non-assistance payments (direct cash transactions made to civil officials for five years, are difficult to enforce. What is pertinent is where is   end user utilization   and not whether the original recipient   was in uniform  or not.

American process documentation is always meticulous for Security Related Assistance & Non-assistance payments. Waivers as usual, may be provided when US national security interest are involved. Lack of clarity on what these activities are, provide loopholes to Pakistan to exploit US failures to oversee proper documentation.

Levels of assistance including the seventeen norms of good governance, proposed for Pakistan in the Bill is nothing but an academic exercise and can be fudged with impunity.

It is not understood how such a vast canvas involving programmes, project, and activity can be covered without recourse to manipulation of facts, figures and targets during the five years. Operations against the al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas will not be easy. Some independent methods of monitoring and submission of reports should be evolved.

What is pertinent and should have been done ages back is reported control over mushrooming madrassas (increase from 250 in 1947 to over 11,000 today). Approval of common curriculum and closing down those with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups is a laudable step.

No self-respecting country would like to have its government’s hold over its military assessed or questioned by anyone. In the bill, Pakistan has been required to provide a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and Parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, its chain of command and the selection system of senior military leaders, besides civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

Well, that’s the price Pakistan has to accept for not being labeled a failed state. Afghanistan & Iran may not matter now, but India can certainly expect a Pak Army in near future, sporting brand new weapons.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

 

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Brig Dinesh Mathur (Retd)
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