Pakistan Army Operations in the Swat Valley

Swat Valley, an administrative tribal district in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan known for its beauty is nestled in the mountains, north-east of Peshawar, 160 km from Islamabad. The capital of Swat is Saidu Sharif, but the main town in the Swat  Valley is Mingora. Swat was ruled by the Wali whose family opposed any Pakistan government in power, till dissolution of their princely status in 1969. 

Any land reform in Pakistan so far has always ended up securing the privileges of zamindars (landlords) rather than strengthen the lot of the landless and tenants. Taking advantage of these people, the Taliban has singled out four dozen landlords over the past two years in a strategy intended to foment a class struggle in the Swat Valley replacing it with orthodox Islamic ways. It was not an insurgency in the conventional sense and enjoyed the government’s support initially, since it suited them to have someone else do their dirty job. In any case, it was beyond the capabilities of the Frontier Constabulary, located in the Swat Valley to enforce law and order.

In December 2008 most of the area was captured by the Taliban insurgents and about two million people fled Swat and the surrounding areas. Islamist militant leader Maulana Fazlullah and his group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) banned education for girls and bombed or torched more than 170 schools along with other government-owned buildings. Quick retributive justice was dispensed with the landless peasants rewarded by the Taliban with redistributed land & profits of the crops of the landlords, a strategic move to keep the Taliban’s roots intact. Some resentful landless peasants and the landlord’s erstwhile private militias even signed up as the Taliban’s shock troops in the region. The Pakistani government writ had ceased to exist.

The Pakistan government in late May 2009 began a military offensive to regain control of the region fearing that retributive justice meted out by the Taliban could affect other wealthy landlords in Pakistan. Thousands of people streamed back to the Swat Valley after two months of fighting. According to unverified reports, of the majority who have not yet returned, are the wealthy landowners who were once the economic pillars of rural society. Their reluctance to return is a significant blow to the Pakistani military’s campaign to restore Swat as a stable & prosperous part of Pakistan, and it presents a continuing opportunity for the Taliban to reshape the valley to their advantage.

It is difficult to assess how many peasants collaborated with the Taliban or how many stayed back after being rewarded. Local reports emerging from Swat show that the Taliban top leadership is still intact in neighboring Dir, and has the strength to terrorise important areas. Army operations have only succeeded in allowing some refugees to reclaim their homes, though, a bit too soon. Fight against Taliban in their strongholds, particularly in the Matta and Kabal regions of Swat, close to the main city, Mingora, is far from over. That Mingora is still insecure, was clearly evident when President Barack Obama’s emissary, Richard C. Holbrooke, was denied request to visit the town last month.

Rebuilding of Swat, a fertile area of orchards and forests, is a critical test for the government and the military as they face Taliban insurgencies across the tribal belt, particularly in Waziristan on the Afghanistan border. Raising new community police forces in Swat quickly enough to protect the returning civilians, arranging basic essential services like schools & banks opening, communication facilities , implement public food distribution schemes, arranging transportation and sufficient medical care for the local population besides their protection are some aspects not even considered.

Pakistani authorities are in Swat have shown utter professional incompetence in  executing counter insurgency plans in winning the hearts and mind of local people and in implementing  military civic actions. Army neither has the dynamism nor the intention to come to grips with the problem. UN Relief operations are seriously hampered by kidnapping/ransom threats. Admittedly, it is a very difficult & remote area but most insurgencies in South Asia spawn in this type of terrain, where lack of local resources and hostile tribal population is a force to contend with.

Both the Punjab & the central government in Pakistan fear that the redistribution of land to the landless in the absence of landlords will have lasting ramifications not only for Swat, but also for Pakistan’s most populated province, Punjab. Landholdings here are vast, and a big landless community exists, whose aspirations could be ignited by the Taliban to foment dissent against landlords and regional conditions in Swat can be replicated anywhere in Pakistan.

Pakistan Army’s track record today in tackling the counter-insurgency operations in Swat Valley has been far from spectacular, despite allocation of maximum Pakistan Army’s resources from FCNA, Rawalpindi Corps and some troops from the eastern formations. Army claims to have killed more than 1,500 militants out of 4000 Taliban fighters ever since it launched its operations in the troubled Swat valley. No top Taliban leader has been reported killed, which makes the claims even murkier.

The immediate future also does not appear hopeful: increased numbers of mullahs have created cults around themselves and seized control of the minds of worshippers. In the Swat valley, poverty, deprivation, lack of justice and vast disparities in wealth provide the perfect environment for these demagogues to recruit people to their cause. Their gruesome acts of terror in Swat Valley are being perceived by the tribesmen merely as a fallout of the oppressed classes retaliation against the landlords. This would remain hidden till it erupts again when incited by Taliban or its cult leaders. Words of praise from the Obama administration on successful Swat Valley operations have been carefully voiced, an incentive for the Pakistan Army to perform better, but should be treated at their face value.

(The author is a defence analyst and a Visiting Fellow at CLAWS)

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).