The Next Terrorist Attack: Are We Prepared?

It is a year since terrorists struck India in a major way. The next terror attack is not a question of ‘if’, but rather  when, where, how, and by whom. The United States, in its latest travel advisory, warned of an imminent attack, especially “where Americans or Westerners are known to congregate or visit”. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has revealed of intelligence reports warning of “imminent attacks” in the country. The warning was based on intercepts of chatter among important terrorist leaders, including 26/11 accused Lashkar operatives Zaki-ur Rahman Lakhvi, Zarar Shah and Abu al Qama. Anti-India terror groups based in Pakistan have to justify their existence by launching attacks on India. Yet another motive could be to divert Pakistani forces, presently on full throttle against the Taliban, to eastern borders in response to a possible Indian mobilisation such as the one after the 26/11 assault.

A recent attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul is yet another grim reminder of the forces that are pitted against us. It was also a manifestation of how the regional security situation has worsened. It was almost as if the bombing on the embassy was a prelude to 26/11. Indications are that the next terrorist attack will originate from outside the borders using perhaps local help. Indian Mujahideen and SIMI are lying low, but Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad can activate its ‘sleeper cells’ and local collaborators as and when they find slackness in Indian security. Currently, the most popular mode of attacks pursued by terrorists in Pakistan is ‘shoot-kill-flee’. Similar method, which is simpler and least expected, cannot be ruled out to make daring attacks on Indian VIPs. At the other end, an imminent attack could be more complex via air route on the lines of 9/11. Israel and the United States warned of a possible of terrorist attacks across India during festive season of Eid, Dusshera and Diwali. But, nothing happened. Terror strikes take place when none expects them.

Irrespective of the mode of attack, the common denominator would be the attack taking place in an urban area. Terrorists prefer urban areas because of presence of ‘defined enemy’ in abundance: laymen, officials, foreign nationals, corporate heavy weights, government buildings with symbolic/strategic value, bus stands, railway stations, airports, markets, foreign embassies, religious congregations and communication centres. This also gives an added advantage to terrorists to prevent any kind of indiscriminate counter-terrorist operation by the state that could maximise ‘collateral damage’. Unlike in rural areas, inhabitants in cities and towns are more heterogeneous and this facilitates anonymity, the perfect camouflage for a terrorist. Since terrorism is ‘propaganda by the deed’ the attention seeking goal of the terrorist is well served in the urban environment  where the immediate audience is greatest and where the media is readily available and quite eager to report. At the same time, given the fact that NSG hubs have been set up in four more cities – Chennai, Kolkata, Hyderabad and Mumbai – the terrorists may like to try their hand on other cities.

How prepared are we to prevent or respond to a possible terror attack? No doubt that India is better prepared than ever before, yet a long way to claim that there is perfect defence against the ‘invisible enemy’. It should be acknowledged that the ‘new terrorism’ that India presently confronts is more lethal, more audacious, more innovative and more diabolical. Countering this complex nature of terrorism effectively requires a new set of counter-terrorism policies and mechanisms. On reality check, the Centre scores better than its federal units. Intelligence has been strengthened; NSG hubs have been operationalised in four more cities; terror laws have been made more stringent; and NIA has been established. However, coastal security continues to be weak; state polices, which are the first line of defence, are disappointingly static. The coordination mechanism among concerned agencies is not smooth enough, as yet, to react efficiently and immediately in crisis situations. Most importantly, none of the governments at the Centre or for that matter in the states have formulated an action plan to involve citizens as ‘eyes and ears’, an important ‘humint’ asset to policing. 

Yet, all these measures are part of defensive strategies; we have not moved beyond this ‘bunker mentality’ to take on terrorism at its source. A comprehensive approach that relies on lateral thinking and goes beyond conventional methods is urgently required. The basic premise for any counter-terrorism policy for India, at the least, should be ‘zero tolerance’. Terrorism, as a means of redressing grievances, should be deemed unacceptable under any circumstances. A fundamental flaw in India’s approach to fighting terrorism is the lack of comprehensive national security strategy for external and internal security, including counter-terrorism. Such a strategy should have a multi-disciplinary, inter-ministerial, inter-departmental, inter-agency and inter-service approach to meet the ongoing and emerging threats and challenges to national security. Without a comprehensive national security strategy, policy formulation and implementation will remain incoherent as the threats are amorphous and complex in nature.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).