Countering Left Wing Extremism: Intelligent Intelligence is the Key

Real time and actionable intelligence is essential for any successful counter-insurgency operation. It is all the more crucial if the enemy is invisible as in the case of Left Wing Extremism in India. Without reliable strategic and tactical intelligence inputs, any counter-insurgency force, however trained and sophisticated it may be, is severely handicapped.

The Indian Maoists have an edge over the government forces both on the quantity and quality of intelligence available to them. They are considered smarter so far on this front. The main reason for this advantage is due to their elaborate spy network, apart from having formal and informal informers. The former include sympathisers at the local areas, nearby towns and even far away cities. Informal informers are those who find the Maoist cause “genuine” and voluntarily pass on whatever information available to them. They could be activists, intellectuals, journalists or lay personnel. The Maoists also rely on open source information, consisting of statements, interviews, press releases and news reports, through which they gauge patterns of thinking and behaviour of the government and its forces to an extent.

As rightly pointed out by the Home Minister P Chidambaram, anti-Naxal operations have to be intelligence-based. However, the governments’ intelligence is far from effective, at least with respect to LWE. The issue is not dearth of, but the availability of too many intelligence agencies both at the Central and State levels. Yet, the Central Reserve Police Force, identified by the Group of Ministers as the nodal counter-insurgency force does not have an intelligence arm of its own. It has to depend by-and-large on the intelligence inputs from the state police and intelligence agencies where its units are deployed. Despite presence of numerous agencies,  there is neither effective coordination nor sharing of intelligence among these bodies. This should be set right on a priority basis. Coordination should exist at all three levels: within the Centre, between the Centre and the States and among the States. The Central and State intelligence agencies should share information methodically and it must trickle down in real time to the user who is required to take action. To achieve this, a central database or a national intelligence grid should be set up so that all intelligence agencies can pool their inputs for use by any State or Central bodies. Reactivation of Multi-Agency Centre is appreciable in this regard, but it should be fine-tuned to meet multiple coordination and sharing tasks.

Technical intelligence capability of the counter-Maoist forces are presently not up to the mark, both in terms of equipment and human resources. The Army, the Air Force and the nodal TECHINT agency, National Technical Research Organisation, can be approached for the requisite assistance. The above bodies can be of immense help in aerial reconnaissance, communication interception and terrain mapping. It should be noted that TECHINT is less risky and more scientific compared to HUMINT.

More emphasis should be laid on human intelligence on an enemy who is invisible and evasive like a “fish in the water”. In this regard, it is imperative to develop a proper network of informers consisting of locals who could be relied on for delivering credible and contact intelligence. Winning the trust of the population would enable automatic flow of first hand information. Efforts should be made to penetrate the rank and file of the Maoists to relay accurate inside information. Such ‘soldiers in residence’ and informers should be entrusted with suitable communication devices to pass on information in real time. Delayed information is as good as no information. What is also required on an urgent basis is a suitable informer protection mechanism. According to the Home Minister, out of 424 civilians killed in 2010 so far, 192 were informers.  Unless informers are protected, it is difficult not only to sustain the present crop of informers, but also to develop their network further. At the same time, intense counter-intelligence should be carried out just to make sure that Maoist informers working within the government and their militias do not succeed. Attention should also be paid to enhancing investigative and analytical capabilities of the local police to tap maximum information from the target population. Intelligence also has to target external linkages of Maoists that are forged for the purpose of procuring arms, training, funds, and propaganda.

Dr. N Manoharan is Senior Fellow, CLAWS

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).