China�s Military Modernisation: An Appraisal

Sixty one years ago Mao Zedong stood before a sea of people at Tiananmen Gate and proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China, largely the result of a home-grown revolution. Since then, the PRC appears to be gearing up to showcase its military prowess to the world—as was visible on the 60th anniversary parade in 2009. Backed by its sizeable armed forces, nuclear weapons, and improving force projection capabilities (along with its overall dynamic economic growth), China increasingly is a political and military force to be reckoned with. Thus, vociferous Chinese claims of a ‘peaceful rise’ stands opposed to the robust military modernisation that the PLA has undertaken in the past decades. The entire debate centering on China’s ‘peaceful rise’ is meant for public consumption. Beijing has chosen to undertake swift modernisation of the PLA by planning to make up for its poor hardware capabilities while at the same time enhancing abilities to wage asymmetric warfare in the space, cyber-space and information warfare domains.

The post-1991 Gulf War period witnessed the Chinese leadership take note of the rapidly changing nature of modern warfare. As a response, the leadership of the PLA set upon a path of reform aimed at building a more professional force in a corporate and institutional sense, and a more capable force in the operational sense. The Chinese White Paper on national defence issued in 2004, stated that the objective of the PLA was to win local wars under the conditions of ‘informationisation’. The 2010 Annual Pentagon Report on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China underlines this Chinese emphasis on the concept of informationisation which would enable integrated joint operations that require integration of the entire PLA with common information systems.

The primary obstacles acknowledged by the Chinese military leadership in realisation of integrated joint operations at the moment include inadequate training; shortage of qualified staff of PLA personnel; equipment, and tactics of the other services. In an effort to rectify this existential paucity, the PLA reportedly is undergoing robust training for integrated joint operations on future battlefields. In line with the strategic requirements of high mobility operations and three-dimensional assault, the PLA has been moving from regional defence to trans-regional mobility. The units are becoming small, modular and multi-functional in organisation through appropriate downsizing and structural reform. While accelerating the development of aviation, light mechanised and information counter-measure forces, it is giving priority to the development of tactical missiles, surface-to-air missiles and special operations forces, so as to increase its capabilities for land-air integrated operations, long-distance manoeuvres, rapid assault and special operations.

The PLA has chosen to justify pre-emptive military action at the operational and tactical level under the guise of a ‘defensive posture’ at the strategic level. The Chinese doctrinal concept of “active defence” (jiji fangyu) thus, could be interpreted as a tactic of employing the weak against the strong. Although stated to be defensive in purpose, the doctrine seeks to take the initiative and stay on the offensive from a conflict’s earliest stages in order to bring hostilities to a swift and more importantly, favourable conclusion. The concept is in concurrence with the doctrine that puts a premium on surprise, pre-emption, indirect/asymmetrical confrontation and concentrated strikes on the most critical platforms and capabilities of the adversary, particularly its C4I2SR systems, and on high-value psychological targets. The effort is to overwhelm and undermine the adversary’s will to resist during the early stages of conflict.

Thus, the focus is on anti-access, area-denial strategies, procuring platforms with the capability and intention to deter, prevent or complicate the intervention of the US (and/or others) in a Taiwan-like scenario. From an Indian stand point, the scenario is applicable to a Tibet-like situation. China’s force structure for long-distance air and naval operations is consistent with a limited regional force projection capability. The production of conventional missiles and upgrading the quality and survivability of China’s nuclear arsenal from silo-based to road-mobile and from liquid-fuelled to solid-fuelled, accentuates PLA’s aim to render its strategic nuclear forces as more survivable and hence provide a far more credible deterrent.

It is in this light that the concealment of actual PLA military expenditures is well known. As against inflation and rupee-dollar parity, the Chinese defence budget has grown in double digit figures since the past many years, while India’s continues to remain stagnant in single figures. The proposed Chinese defence budget in 2010 is $ 78 billion – up 7.5 per cent from actual defence spending in 2009. The figure breaks a string of double-digit increases going back many years. This could well imply that as time goes by, the Chinese military is bound to benefit both quantitatively and qualitatively from the surge in budget allocations.

Realising the shortcomings in inter-service cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises and combat operations, the Chinese leadership appears to be stressing more upon asymmetric strategies to leverage China’s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents, for e.g., the counter-space and cyber warfare programmes. As computer technology increasingly integrates itself into modern military organisations, including the PLA, military planners shall assign it the twin role of being both a target and a weapon. Cyber forces are most likely to be integrated into an overall battle strategy as part of a combined arms campaign. The Chinese find information warfare extremely attractive as they view it as an asymmetric tool that will ultimately enable them to overcome their relative backwardness in military hardware. In Chinese thinking, information warfare presents a level playing field for prevailing upon the adversary in future wars.

Thus, robust military modernisation can be interpreted as China’s negotiating strategy wherein it aspires to resolve all outstanding disputes (including one shared with India) when they are placed in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength. In a quarter of a century from today, China is placing its military and diplomatic might in a fashion so as to be able to affirm more power and influence than it is today, with a greater propensity to assert itself on issues and projecting power far beyond its shores.

Dr Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies)