Security for the Commonwealth Games: Government has Pulled out all Stops

With the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth games having been successfully conducted, it is worth examining the threats and challenges to the games and whether the security agencies are well prepared to handle these during the rest of the games up to October 14th.

In what is now being described as an act of terrorism, two men on a motorcycle closed up to a bus full of tourists and fired indiscriminately, injuring two Taiwanese men. Though not a major incident in itself, the fact that it occurred in the run up to the Commonwealth Games, it has served to heighten threat perceptions. In fact, various terrorist organisations are suspected to be getting ready to strike just before or during the games and the probability of one or more terrorist strikes increases by the day. Terrorist organisations have always attempted to gain maximum mileage by launching spectacular strikes during high-profile international events and the Commonwealth Games fall in that category.

Threat

Islamist terrorist organisations based in Pakistan (LeT, JeM, HuJI) are suspected to be working in concert with some of their Indian affiliates such as the Indian Mujahideen to disrupt the games. An al Qaeda-LeT operation cannot be ruled out as the two outfits are now known to be working in close coordination in Afghanistan. In February 2010, Ilyas Kashmiri, an al Qaeda commander, had warned foreign teams to stay away from sporting events in India, including the Commonwealth Games. Given the volatile situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) since early-June 2010 and the public anger with the security forces, a coordinated LeT-HM (Hizbul Mujahideen) strike is also a possibility. The intelligence unit of the Punjab Police has warned the government that foreign-based Sikh militants are planning to resume their anti-India activities and the games are likely to be one of their targets. Ranjeet Singh Neeta, a known Sikh terrorist is said to be the ring leader of this group.

During the International Security Liaison Conference attended by security officials from 33 participating countries on July 28-29, 2010, officials of the Intelligence Bureau, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Delhi Police emphasised that the threat of terrorist strikes is generic rather than specific. The participants were also informed that a Games Operations Centre, headed by the CEO, Commonwealth Games, would function round the clock to coordinate security.

An empowered security committee headed by Mr. G K Pillai, the Union Home Secretary, and a Commonwealth Games security review committee headed by Additional Secretary (Centre-State) have been constituted in the MHA to review the security arrangements for the games. However, notwithstanding the absence of specific threats to any of the games venues or individual players, the MHA and the Delhi Government are taking no chances and very elaborate arrangements are being made to prevent or foil terrorist strikes as well as to put in place evacuation drills and contingency plans, particularly for the Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, the main stadium where the opening and closing ceremonies will be held, and for the Games Village.

Four-tier Security

Security cover will be provided by 155,000 security personnel, including almost the entire 80,000 strength of the Delhi Police and 75,000 personnel from Central Police Organisations (CPOs) of the Union Government. Security arrangements around each of the games venues will be organised in four tiers or layers to minimise the probability of a terrorist strike. Mr. Neeraj Kumar, Special Commissioner of Police, has characterised these layers for all Games-related venues as outer, middle, inner and exclusive levels of security. In addition, extensive aerial reconnaissance by the Indian Air Force (IAF) will supplement arrangements on the ground. 

The outer cordon, to be manned by CPOs like the CRPF, will comprise park-and-ride facility monitoring, access control measures like soft checking of tickets and surveillance through closed-circuit television cameras. In the middle cordon, spectators and visitors will be individually screened at a safe distance from the venue. At the inner level, tickets will be rechecked through barcode screening and spectators will be photographed for a quick comparison with a central data base on known terrorists being maintained by the National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC). Entry to the exclusive zone will be allowed after screening through door-frame metal and hand-held detectors, X-ray baggage scanners, manual frisking and CCTVs.

Inside the stadia, security personnel in plain clothes along with volunteers will escort guests and spectators to their enclosures. Vehicles of organisers, VIPs, visiting dignitaries, participants and their families will be checked through pre-allotted radio-frequency identification, under-vehicle and licence plate scanners. To prevent forcible entry, boom barriers followed by ‘tyre-killers’ and road blockers will be in place. Well-trained sniffer dog squads with a total of 123 canines will be employed extensively to detect explosives.

The games venues, residential complexes and parking lots will be sanitised and closed a week ahead of the Games. Antecedents of the hotel staff will be checked; food for the participants will be tasted by experts; and, the vehicles carrying the food will be escorted by security personnel. The 12 hotels where dignitaries and officials will be put up will be given extra security protection and access control besides their own in-house security measures.

At the Games Village, only designated vehicles will be allowed to enter. Only properly-screened supplies will be permitted inside the premises. The security arrangements at the Games Village include a three-meter perimeter wall along with 1.5 metre iron grills, CCTV surveillance, Quick Response Teams and teams to battle CBRN attacks. During the Games, there will be continuous patrolling both inside and outside the perimeter wall. Throughout the games, the complex will be monitored by helicopter-borne surveillance teams of the IAF.

Security Umbrella

An unprecedented security umbrella will be thrown over the entire city. Access to the city will be strictly controlled. Intra-city traffic will be carefully monitored. The security plan will be executed by the Delhi Police in coordination with various civic, medical, security and intelligence agencies. It will cover 12 competition venues, 15 stand-alone practice venues, the Games Village, 12 hotels for housing dignitaries, over 50 stand-alone parking sites, the media and logistics centres at Pragati Maidan exhibition grounds on Mathura Road and the Indira Gandhi International Airport where a new terminal that incorporates the best international aviation security measures was commissioned in July 2010.

Flaws in the chain of command for security have been reolved. A Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Integration Centre has been set up at Delhi Police Headquarters. All the agencies responsible for security will remain interconnected through wireless sets, mobile phones, landlines and hotlines.  Apart from aerial survey by the IAF, heli-borne assault teams from the National Security Guard (NSG) will be deployed during the Games and snipers will be positioned on rooftops. Army Special Forces may also be placed on stand by alert. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and improvised explosives devices (IED) response teams will be deployed at selected locations. The Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) has been given the contract to set up an Integrated Security System for the Commonwealth Games for access control.

Transportation

All the road routes to be used by athletes, officials, dignitaries and VIPs have been identified and surveyed closely. Taking a cue from the terror attack on Sri Lankan cricketers in Lahore in March 2009, the police have arranged to provide an exclusive lane guarded by security personnel for vehicles ferrying participants. The entire road stretches will be sanitised before the Games and even utilities like telephone boxes, letter boxes, underground drains will be checked and sealed. Vehicles ferrying athletes and officials will undergo anti-sabotage checks every morning. Armed commandos will accompany each team. The antecedents of drivers will be verified and fuelling of these vehicles will be done at designated parking lots. Alternate routes have been identified for back-up in case of an emergency requirement.

Security on public transport, mainly buses of the Delhi Transport Corporation and subway trains of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, has also been beefed up, with special emphasis being laid on access control. Traffic intervention vans, with cranes and portable signals, will be stationed on the routes. All buses carrying officials will also be accompanied by police commandos, mobile teams and ambulances.

Assessment

While all possible efforts are being made to provide foolproof security in the run up to and during the Commonwealth Games, the sheer scale of this major sports event, the unruly movement of the teeming millions who live in Delhi or come to work in the city daily and the declared intentions of hard-line terrorist organisations, particularly those based outside India, have enhanced the magnitude of the security challenge manifold.

It would be prudent to anticipate one or more terrorist strikes before or during the games. However, such of these strikes as do succeed despite all the efforts, are likely to be executed either by suicide squads or through low intensity blasts in public places such as crowded markets – as has been the trend in recent times. This is because the athletes and officials as well as VIPs will be extremely difficult to target successfully due to the high levels of protection provided to them. As the aim of the terrorist organisations will be create a fear psychosis and exhibit their ability to strike at a time and point of their choosing despite the success – though limited – of the Global War on Terror, they are likely to be satisfied with small-scale strikes.

At the same time, it would not be prudent to completely rule out a terrorist strike of the nature of the Mumbai attacks of November 26, 2008, despite the difficulties of successfully coordinating such an attack in Delhi that is deep inside India and well away from the international boundary unlike Mumbai that is on the coastline. However, the probability of such strikes is low as their scale and magnitude requires state support and the Pakistan Army and the ISI are unlikely to plan or approve a repeat strike due to the tough stand taken by India in not resuming the stalled rapprochement process till Pakistan acts against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks and the recent embarrassment caused to the Pakistan Army and the ISI by the revelations on WikiLeaks.

Hence, the Commonwealth Games may be expected to proceed smoothly with the safety and security of all the participants being assured to a very high degree, but with the small risk that some low intensity blasts or suicide attacks may take place during the Commonwealth Games in some of the relatively less secure markets of Delhi.

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies)