Strategic Stability in Southern Asia: Challenges and Prospects

The key geo-strategic challenges in Southern Asia emanate from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and on the Af-Pak border between the Taliban and the al Qaeda on one side and the US-led NATO-ISAF forces on the other with the Pakistan army playing a double game; unresolved territorial disputes between India and China and India and Pakistan; and, the possession of nuclear weapons by neighbouring states that have fought several wars with each other in the past.
 
In May 1998, India and Pakistan had crossed the nuclear Rubicon and declared themselves states armed with nuclear weapons. Tensions are inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons by neighbours with a long history of conflict. India and Pakistan have fought four wars over the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which Pakistan considers the unfinished agenda of Partition. For over 60 years, India and Pakistan fought a low intensity limited war on the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K. The latest manifestation of this long-drawn conflict is the 20-year old state-sponsored ‘proxy war’ waged by Pakistan’s ISI-controlled mercenary terrorists against the Indian state. The localised Kargil conflict of 1999 was part of this proxy war. Major terrorist incidents like the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the killing of innocent women and children at Akshardham temple in Gujarat in September 2002 and a terrorist strike executed by Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) mercenaries at Mumbai in November 2008, as also terrorist strikes at Bangalore, Hyderabad, Jaipur, New Delhi and Varanasi, are all part of Pakistan’s proxy war. However, it is noteworthy that India has exhibited very high levels of tolerance by not relating in anger and there has been no major war in Southern Asia since 1971.

While there was some nuclear sabre-rattling between India and Pakistan, particularly during the Kargil conflict, the two nations have never come close to a situation of deterrence breakdown. Hence, overall the Southern Asian region can be characterised as essentially stable. The “ugly stability” that is prevailing can be attributed primarily to India’s unwavering strategic restraint in the face of grave provocation, democratic checks and balances in its policy processes and tight civilian control over its nuclear forces. However, the Pakistan army, which also controls the country’s nuclear arsenal, has lost India’s trust after the Kargil conflict and the terrorist strikes at Mumbai. It is capable of once again stepping up trans-LoC terrorism or even engendering a Kargil-like situation that could escalate to a major war. As there is a limit to India’s tolerance, the subterranean undercurrents of tension can rise to the surface and lead to a conflict situation without much advance warning. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the real threat to peace and stability in Southern Asia is the Pakistan army that has a stranglehold over the nation’s polity, has direct control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and continues to sponsor international terrorism through the ISI, its external intelligence agency.

India’s border with China has been relatively more stable than that with Pakistan. However, China is in physical occupation of 38,000 sq km of Indian territory in Ladakh, J&K, and China claims the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (96,000 sq km) in the north-east. Even the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has not been demarcated on the ground and on military maps. While the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993 and the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field of 1996 have contributed to stability, patrol face-offs occur often and one of these could lead to a major incident involving firing. Such an incident is likely to have the potential to escalate to a larger conflagration. Also, recently China has exhibited unprecedented assertiveness in its diplomacy and military posture. Hence, it can be deduced that until the territorial dispute between the two countries is resolved satisfactorily, another border conflict cannot be ruled out even though the probability is quite low.

China does not recognise India as a state armed with nuclear weapons and demands that India should go back to a non-nuclear status in terms of UNSC Resolution 1172. This is wishful thinking on China’s part as India will not give up its nuclear weapons unless there is genuine progress towards universal nuclear disarmament. China refuses to discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) with India. There is also a collusive nexus between China and Pakistan for nuclear weapons, nuclear-capable missiles and military hardware. Most analysts in India believe that this nexus will lead to India having to face a two-front situation during any future conflict. Hence, the prevailing strategic environment is not conducive to long-term strategic stability even though in the short-term there is no cause for major concern. India is developing robust military capabilities and is in the process of upgrading its military strategy against China from dissuasion to deterrence in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. In the nuclear weapons field, India is moving towards the deployment of the third leg of its triad, i.e. a nuclear-powered submarine armed with a submarine launched nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles (SSBN with SLBMs). This will give India genuine nuclear deterrence capability so as to prevent deterrence breakdown and reduce the risk of nux exchanges in any future conflict.

The conflict in the Af-Pak region could lead to a larger regional conflict in case the US forces and NATO-ISAF commence their drawdown of forces without making viable alternative arrangements for maintaining security in Afghanistan. Major world powers should support the weak democratic regime in Pakistan rather than resorting to expedient strategies for short-term gains. They should also encourage the Pakistan army to gradually hand over control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to the civilian regime. Pakistan could also be given help to secure its nuclear weapons against Jihadi terrorists. The Pakistan army needs to be convinced that fighting the scourge of radical extremism within its borders is in the long-term interests of Pakistan if it is to survive and flourish as a nation state. China is too large a state and too self sufficient economically to be overly influenced by other major powers. However, if it behaves irresponsibly, it will need to be appropriately censured.

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).