Revisiting the threat of nuclear terrorism

Japan’s Fukushima reactor damage was the result of a powerful tsunami which knocked out the backup power for the coolant supply to the core reactors. The significance of the disaster is that despite a number of measures taken to account for Japan’s unique geological characteristics, backup safety features and physical infrastructure were breached leading to a serious radiological incident. In its aftermath, there have been worldwide announcements of audits of the structural safety of nuclear reactors and introduction of additional safety-valve features. While welcome, another facet of nuclear safety and security needs revisiting, namely nuclear terrorism, especially in light of the fears which are reverberating worldwide on radiation poisoning.

To comparatively assess the fears of radiation poisoning incidents worldwide, we need only look to the public reactions following the improper disposal of Cobalt-60 in New Delhi in April 2010, the Chechen burial of Cesium in a park in Moscow which were discovered in 1995 by journalists acting on a tip-off, and the only known case of intentional radiation poisoning – the assassination by Moscow of former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko. In all mentioned cases, there was a degree of public hysteria surrounding radiation poisoning, which was controlled in large measure owing to extremely localised effects.

Terrorist groups could well believe from the media coverage and fears which are being played out globally, that they will need to refocus their efforts on nuclear terrorism and radiation poisoning. This was evident in a purported letter written by Al-Qaeda sent to an FBI official, which threatened the United States with nuclear attacks in the aftermath of the Japan disaster.

Counter-terrorism commentators highlight that nuclear terrorism fears are largely limited to a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), owing to the sophistication which surrounds detonating a conventional nuclear device. Chances of a RDD explosion are further limited owing to advances made in nuclear forensics, and monitoring and restrictions in access to nuclear fuels and radioactive materials.

However, an aspect of nuclear terrorism which has not yet been adequately addressed is the question of insider access to a nuclear facility. What if a terrorist organisation or a lone wolf extremist decides not to detonate a radiological explosion, but instead cause a radiation leak or create mass psychological trauma through such an attempt? For this purpose, a resourceful insider agent does not need to reach all the way into the more secure environs of the core reactor.

Spent fuel pools for example are a source of concern for governments. According to scholar Hui Zhang, a senior researcher with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, spent fuel pools (SFP) would be more vulnerable than the reactor containment building, because most SFPs are housed in far less robust structures than the reactor containment vessels. Moreover, a SFP would contain much more radiation than a reactor core.

Operatives with access can maliciously increase radiation levels in areas frequented by senior officials, and/or cause sabotage to reactor parts and cause a meltdown crisis. Fears of insider access have led many a country to adopt stringent measures of recruitment and continued employment at nuclear facilities. In Pakistan, for example, an official formerly associated with the programme, called it a “cradle to the grave monitoring”.

There is a history which warrants constant review of nuclear facilities, since nuclear terrorism threats are not geographically or ideologically limited. Insider threats to nuclear facilities have occurred in South Asia, Europe and even the United States. In 1978, for example, Spanish terrorist outfit ETA managed to detonate a bomb in the steam room of the Lemoniz Nuclear Power Station. In the US, Ohio in 1981, saw an intentional disabling of an emergency cooling system at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant.

More recently, in an under-reported incident, in late 2010, facilities in the United States were put under review by federal authorities after a former employee was found to be an Al-Qaeda sympathiser. Sharif Mobley, an American citizen arrested on suspicions of being a member of the group, Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, had worked at five different nuclear power facilities in the United States, and was a contractor in an additional three after having passed the required background and psychological tests including criminal background checks, drug testing, psychological assessments, and identity verification. While Mobley did not necessarily have access to sensitive parts of the plant, his insider access to the nuclear plants would nevertheless have been a significant success for the terror group Mobley was associated with.

There is therefore, a need to prioritise a review of existing safety and security features which go beyond merely physical security measures, and include re-assessments of present Personnel Reliability Programmes and screening procedures for recruitment at nuclear facilities.

Terrorists are known to revisit targets, especially those which offer opportunities of mass killings, and wide media coverage. Developments in Japan could therefore serve to reinvigorate terrorist interest in nuclear terrorism, especially in the realm of radiation poisoning. Insider access to sensitive locations would by itself be regarded a victory for such actors, whether or not a plot succeeded.

Siddharth Ramana is a Research Officer at IPCS, New Delhi

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).