India�s Nuclear Energy: To be or not to be

Just before embarking on her trip to India, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made an announcement that her country would reject nuclear energy as a source of electricity production in her country by 2022. This was immediately followed up by press reports indicating that Switzerland too was considering a proposal to abolish its nuclear energy programme by 2034. This decision can be traced back to the ongoing Fukushima disaster in Japan. Should India consider adopting an anti-nuclear energy position? This article seeks to discuss some of the wider developments of ‘compounding India’s energy woes’, if India considers moving away from the nuclear bandwagon.

The reverberations of Fukushima were immediately felt in India, with the government ordering a safety audit of all its nuclear plants and commentaries elucidating upon the pros and cons of nuclear energy. More recently in June 2011, the National Disaster Management Authority after a meeting with the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board announced that while Indian nuclear facilities were safe, further augmentation of its safety systems were needed. These developments have provided fodder to the anti-nuclear brigade, with its followers in India also advocating for a nuclear energy-free India.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on the other hand, continues to stand by his position that nuclear energy is important for India, articulating that nuclear energy would remain one of the “essential options” for the country, irrespective of the developments in Fukushima. His thoughts were echoed by a study conducted by The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI). The study states, India’s energy requirements under the business-as-usual model, sees a quantum jump from 285 Mtoe (Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent) in 2001 to 2,123 Mtoe in 2031, using an eight per cent economic growth model. If assessments of economists are accurate, the actual growth rate during this period can touch 10 per cent, which would further raise requirements to 3,351 Mtoe in the same period. To maintain this growth model, nuclear energy is clearly necessary, since it would augment the traditional fuel sources of the country.

While, the study admits that renewable energy resources and high nuclear capacity would form only 4.5 per cent of the total energy requirements during this modelling period, and argues that the requirement for the three conventional forms of energy-coal, oil and gas will continue to remain high for the coming decades, it is important to note the implications of the negative dependence on non-nuclear fuel for the country.

The need to go for nuclear energy should also be seen in the context of geo-strategy. Presently, an overwhelming majority of India’s crude oil requirements are met from West Asian countries. Among them, Saudi Arabia and Iran constitute the two leading exporters to India. Regional tensions in the region, combined with speculation over oil availability have pushed up India’s crude oil basket prices which in turn have impacted domestic inflation and economic growth. Furthermore, wider regional alliances are also affected by India’s quest for fossil fuel from these countries, as is evident from Israeli opposition to Indian trade with Iran. Attempts to diversify fuel trade beyond West Asia, into Africa, for example, face the same hurdles. This is most particularly exemplified in the case of the Western opposition against Libya, and Indian oil interests in Sudan during the Darfur Crisis.

Security implications on moving forward with traditional fuel sources also play a significant factor in delineating India’s energy strategy. Attempts to source fuel through long-distance pipelines incur high political costs especially since the transiting countries face domestic security disturbances or evidence support for anti-Indian activities. Depending on fossil fuels would therefore provide a strategic leverage to elements hostile to Indian interests. These security considerations are also mooted through the economic front, since a uniform price structure for oil agreements is not easily forthcoming, which further impedes negotiations and ratification.

An added geostrategic aspect in favour of nuclear energy should be seen in the outcome of the Indo-US strategic agreement. The agreement which was advocated in terms of addressing nuclear energy requirements provides much needed relief to Indian scientists, and entities which are engaged in dual-use nuclear technology. Restrictions on India being treated as a nuclear weapons power were broken through the advocacy of nuclear energy.

Additionally, any shift away from nuclear energy would compound India’s problems in dealing with the climate security. Effective alternatives to nuclear energy need low-carbon emission sources, which are resourcefully low in India. Since, India is presently engaged in an acrimonious debate on its role in combating climate change; any non-nuclear measure will complicate India’s international dealings.

Finally, while uranium imports are needed for our reactors presently, they do not constitute the form of geostrategic security risks which fossil fuels entail. Additionally, investing in nuclear fuel technology and reactors also carries significant benefits for India in achieving the elusive goal of nuclear self-sufficiency if its third stage of nuclear power production is achieved. Under the third stage, India would have advanced nuclear power systems which can use Thorium as a nuclear fuel. Indian reserves for Thorium are the largest in the world with 360,000 tonnes, which can fuel nuclear projects for 2,500 years.

Siddharth Ramana is a Research Officer at IPCS, New Delhi

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).