Analysing the bomb attacks in India since November 2008

There have been five notable terror attacks on India since the infamous November 2008 attacks, which warrant review. These are Pune (February 2010), Bangalore (April 2010), Varanasi (December 2010), Delhi (May 2011) and Mumbai (July 2011). It is suspected that the group-Indian Mujahideen is responsible for all these blasts.

The bomb material

According to available reports, it is now understood that in all these incidents, ammonium nitrate was used in varying quantities. Besides, in order to magnify the lethality of the blasts, the terrorists added RDX in some cases, and sometimes even fuel as an incendiary. At times, additional material such as ball bearings were also added, which during an explosion become flying projectiles, killing more people than the initial blast itself. In the case of Delhi, the total explosive used was less than 250gms, and the low intensity of the blast makes it similar to the Bangalore and Varanasi cases. Comparatively, Pune and Mumbai used significantly higher amounts of explosives, and therefore their lethality was much higher.

Analysing the attacks

Press reports which discussed the Varanasi and Delhi bomb blasts point out that the Indian Mujahideen, has been on the backfoot ever since its chief bomb maker Arif was arrested following the Delhi blasts of 2008. Investigators have also pointed out flaws in the designs of the Delhi High Court bomb which resulted in its malfunctioning, and the fact that the deaths in Mumbai were mitigated because one of the bombers inadvertently placed the bomb facing skywards. However, despite these minor instances, it can be argued that the tactical preparedness of the group is still very high, and their may have been a more sinister logic in their tactic.

With the exception of Delhi, which was an abject failure for the group, the low intensity blasts of Varanasi and Bangalore, may have been designed for secondary injuries. For example, the terrorists may have intended to use limited explosives, to preserve their stock, and cause casualties through the stampede like situation which followed. The detection of a second bomb in a garbage bin, in Varanasi, without any ball bearings, could have been intended to add panic in an already tense situation. The same holds for the Bangalore blasts, which occurred outside a cricket stadium, as spectators were making their way into the grounds.

An added feature to these attacks has been the recurring focus on pushing for a communal divide, by targeting a Hindu religious site (Varanasi), and a predominantly Gujarati dominated area of Mumbai (in possible revenge for the Gujarat riots of 2002).

Terrorists verses the state

It is a sad reflection of India’s counter-terrorism ability that despite a number of instances where ammonium nitrate has been misused, there has been no accounting for the sale and transfer of the substance. Lethargy and inactivity in restricting the sale of proven dangerous substances, simply allows for rapid copycat attacks. Terrorists are not going to be hampered through reactive measures, since they use their ingenuity in enhancing their arsenal. A case in point is the recent printer cartridge bomb plot of Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula. The device managed to elude both physical and chemical detection owing to the composition of the explosives. For a country like India, where adequate care to security is not given, an incident like this could be on the horizon.

Furthermore, the lack of basic community policing and laxity or complete lack of law enforcement has been responsible for the deficit of public service messages and awareness programmes. It is now revealed that a constable failed to work on a tip-off provided by an alert citizen about the recent Mumbai attacks. What is shocking is that a similar incident preceded the 1993 serial bomb blasts in Mumbai.

Why is Mumbai the repeated target?

The spate of terror attacks against Mumbai as a city, and Maharashtra as a state indicate a deeper malaise which exists in India’s counter-terrorism capability. Augmenting police forces such as the “Force One” will only help in a hostage or siege situation as was seen during the November 2008 attacks. These forces cannot be an alternative for what constitute basic police functions, including developing human intelligence and community policing.

Recent incidents in the state including the brutal killing of an Indian Administrative Service officer by the oil mafia, and the assassination of a leading criminal reporter, highlight a breakdown in tackling organised crime. While some headway has been made in cases, an overall failure in tackling organised crime has a corresponding effect on dealing with other organised underground groups. The fact that the terrorists have learnt to cover their tracks after an attack reflect that they remain two steps ahead of the establishment, which unfortunately leaves investigators groping in the dark for answers.

Siddharth Ramana is a Research Officer at IPCS, New Delhi

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).