Militarisation of Naxaliltes

The activities of the Naxalites are in pursuance of their declared objective of seizing political power and putting into place a ‘revolutionary Democratic order’ through the power of gun. Naxalism typifies a particular kind of militant and violent armed struggle by the peasants, tribals and dalits, led by a leadership drawing doctrinal support from Marxism-Leninism and strategic inspiration from Mao. Contemporary Maoists draw heavily upon the iniquitous land tenure system and exploitation of the peasantry by landlords in framing their ideological aims. They aim at unfolding a revolution with agrarian revolution as its axis and protracted people's war as its path. The 1990s witnessed a renaissance of the movement, with Naxals acquiring weapons and picking up skills in guerilla warfare. Lately, they have managed to put the police and para-military forces under considerable pressure, while achieving some degree of unity to their cause.

The biggest danger as of today is of the growing militarization, spread and expanding numbers of Extremists cadres. Naxalite groups have been making concerted efforts to militarize their cadres through formation of special guerilla squads and extending their activities over larger areas within the country. The Naxals of one state have been providing leadership to the other states and help spreading the movement to new areas. There strike capability has also been enhanced due to the increase in the number and sophistication of weapons possessed by them.

Militarisation
 
The Naxal organizational profiles and strategies have been continuously evolving. The People Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) of the CPI (Maoists) has emerged as highly equipped force that has been trained on the lines of a regular army. It has an elaborate command structure. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is at the top of the hierarchy which is followed by five regional bureaus. Under each regional bureau there is a Zonal Military Commission, which is responsible for executing armed operations. The people's militia is at the bottom of this structure. A remarkable strategic congruity and coordination between the Naxal groups operating in various states have been observed. Their intelligence network appears to be far more superior to that of the state police forces. Guerillas are capable of carrying out isolated large scale military operations as well as witnessed in Jehanabad, Dantewada and Nayagarh in the last two years. In such conditions the security forces do not have a counter strategy either of offence or defence.
 
Naxals run their training camps all over India. It is estimated that there are around 80 such camps and each camp has the infrastructure to train around 300 cadres at one time. The have acquired precision and are very well trained in Guerilla tactics. There are indications that the PWG cadres received training in the handling of sophisticated weapons and IEDs from some ex-LTTE cadres. There ability to successfully conduct big operations that involve thousands of their cadres also suggest of an elaborate planning, coordination and training network that they might be having. Their proficiency in setting off explosions and the enhanced lethality and frequency of attacks also suggest that they have a network of training and operations. The unification of the PWG and the MCC in September 2004 has considerably enhanced their intelligence network, operational capacity and confidence.

Significantly, with increasing influence, cadre strength has also increased concomitantly. According to one estimate, the Naxal outfits have around 15000-20,000 regular armed cadres and about two to three times this strength provide logical support. It could not have been possible for them to undertake undertaken such daring assaults on the state structures without having enough numbers. Some of their strikes involve thousands of their cadres. The frequency, success rate in conducting big and audacious attacks have lately increased.

An added advantage is the use of various innovative non-conventional apparatus and tactics, as also the inaccessible terrain that offers them a strategically favorable position and is ideal for their guerilla operations. From the safe haven offered by the hilly region, Naxalites carry out strike-and-run tactics with impunity. One of the reasons that they obstruct any kind of developmental activity is that it would deprive them of this advantage. The border areas of Naxalite-affected States have become more vulnerable in the recent past. Taking advantage of the lack of a proper coordination among law-enforcement agencies of different states, Naxalite groups commit crimes in one State and take refuge in the neighbouring states. The Jharkhand-Orissa border, Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border, Andhra Pradesh-Chhattisgarh-Maharashtra border, Orissa-Chhattisgarh border and Bihar-Uttar Pradesh border have witnessed such a phenomenon.

Arms and Ammunition

Weapons possessed by the left extremists in India have evolved in nature and sophistication and increased in numbers. Their arsenal is a mix of hand-made agricultural tools, country made weapons and sophisticated weapons. The cadres have been found in possession of modern weapons. Frequent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) suggest that the easy acquisition of sophisticated weapons and expertise in operating the same. One of the estimates suggests that they are in possession of 6500 regular weapons including the AK-47 rifles and the SLRs besides a large number of unlicensed country-made arms. Besides having dedicated teams for repair and fabrication of weapons they are said to have various R & D units as well.

The level of sophistication of the weapons possessed by the extremists has witnessed a conspicuous evolution. From the traditional farm equipments such as a sickle, crowbar, spears, the plough-head they are now found in possession of modern guns (double and single barrel both 12 and .315 bore), light machines guns , SLRs, AK series rifles, other automatic weapons, shotguns and crude rocket launchers.

Naxals have a huge number of country-made weapons which they procure through a chain of underground arms production units in the dense forests of Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. The majority of weapons found in possession of the extremists are locally made or assembled. The procurement and distribution of sophisticated arms by the left wing extremists spreads across the country. Such arms are largely acquired through the armory raids or by looting police officials. For long, ULFA has been a major source for supplying automatic weapons to Maoist cadres. Their aim to build a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) that would stretch between Nepal the Dandakaranya forests in central India would facilitate an easy movement of arms across the sub-continent and would help in safely re-locating rebel cadres in distant areas in the wake of the security forces intensifying their operations against the guerrillas in an area. This would also facilitate an expansion of extremists’ presence into new areas.

Countering the threat
  
The governmental efforts, military as well as developmental, have been bottlenecked by geographical and political limitations. Therefore, there has been no congruence of opinion and action between the Central government and the state governments while taking measures towards countering the Naxal menace.
 
State police forces are ill-equipped and ill-trained to successfully combat the guerilla squads and tactics adopted by the latter. There is an acute shortage of manpower among the law enforcement agencies. Due to various factors the new appointments have been stalled time and again and therefore, there is an adverse ratio of police strength to the population ration in almost all the Naxal affected states. This factor has indirectly led to an increase in cadre strength of the Naxals as there remains no option but to join the Naxal cadres to assure security to oneself and family. Besides, the due to the lack of adequate infrastructural support the police forces are left vulnerable to the Naxal arms. Further complicating the situation is the lack of coordination between the police and intelligence agencies of various affected states.

At present, Central police and paramilitary forces have been deployed in areas affected by the Naxal violence. Despite being better equipped and trained they lack the organizational structure and cohesiveness, institutionalized operational experience as that of the Army. The role of the army, therefore, has been often talked about. Given the rate at which the security situation has been deteriorating, it appears that, perhaps, sooner rather than later, the Government might decide to call upon the army to tackle the rising tide of Maoist violence. However, as far as involvement of the army is concerned, deep reservations have been expressed. Within the armed forces also, there is great clarity that the army should not get involved in this problem. Punjab has often sited as an example of army-police cooperation. Intrusive and insensitive security forces action in the Naxal affected regions could threaten the socio-political and economic structures of almost half of the Indian states.
 
Alternatively, while following a multi-pronged approach, the army could also be roped in temporarily in a limited way. While a military option is clearly undesirable in dealing with the problem, a non-violent role for the army could be envisaged in imparting training, and providing medical services and technical equipment and expertise to the paramilitary forces that are deployed in Naxal affected areas. The Indian Army within the framework of the Government’s Counter Naxal Strategy is extending training and advice to Central Police Organisations (CPOs)/State Police Forces in Naxal affected States. There is no proposal to deploy Army in the Naxal affected areas.

(Courtesy : SP’s Land Forces, Issue 2/ 2008, Vol. 5, No. 2. p.10)
 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.