Maoist Insurgency: An Expanding and Intensifying threat

The Jehanabad (November 2005) and the recent Dantewara (December 2007) prison-break incidents signal the enormity of the threat which the Maoist insurgency poses to the Indian state. The Prime Minister has rightly characterised Maoist terrorism as ‘India’s number one security threat’ and it is being assumed that in the coming years, Maoist-Naxalite terrorism/ militancy would pose an increasingly serious threat to India’s internal security and integrity.

The biggest danger today is that of the growing militarisation, increase in the numbers and increasing spread of the area of activity of the Maoist cadres. Their arms procurement and distribution is spread across the country and, also, probably across India’s borders. Maoist cadres have been often found in possession of modern weapons and communication devices. Besides, there is growing apprehension that Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, i.e., the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which is becoming increasingly active along the Bihar-Nepal border, may try to incorporate Left-wing extremist groups in its ‘grand strategy’ of destabilising India. The growing evidence of criminalisation of Naxal groups further adds to the problem.

The activities of the Maoists have become increasingly daring and deadly. The scale and frequency of massive Maoist missions is alarming as they have started targeting urban centres. The seizing of control over portions of Patna’s high security Beur jail this month by the Maoists inmates for a couple of hours could be perceived as a manifestation of that. The prison breaks indicate that the attacks have become more audacious and coordinated and that they have gained confidence and precision. Their ambitions have grown big and attacks in more urban centres and on high profile targets could be expected in the near future.

The area coverage of Maoist activities has been continuously expanding. From their traditional strongholds in Andhra, they have been expanding and consolidating their influence in certain new areas such as Chhattisgarh, northern and southern districts, as well as parts of western Orissa, western districts of West Bengal, and parts of Northern Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh and eastern as well as southern Jharkhand. Further, media reports indicate that the PWG is gradually entering into parts of Karnataka on the borders with Andhra Pradesh. Some reports suggest that Naxalites are active in around 170 districts in 15 States across the country with some 20,000 armed cadres and that it is arguably the largest single armed group in the country. The degree of Maoist influence and control over these areas varies from those that have become bastions to those that are being targeted to gain a presence.

The mobilisation of the cadres along ideological lines symbolises the strength, commitment and deep-rootedness of the movement. It is because of the ideological underpinnings that the Maoist movement has been receiving support and sustenance from various political parties and civilian organisations. In the backdrop of the Maoist political success in Nepal, this factor has gained all the more credence. The active Naxal-politician nexus throughout the country further adds to the problem.

State response to the Naxal violence has been reactive, uncoordinated and inadequate and is constrained by geographical and political limitations. It is observed that there is no congruence of opinion and action between the Central government and the state governments while taking measures towards countering the Naxal menace. Experiments such as ‘Salwa Judum’ have been unsuccessful and have led to the killing of many volunteers. The lack of coordination between the police and intelligence agencies of various affected states complicates the response further. The state police forces in the affected states are ill-equipped and ill-trained to successfully combat the serious threat posed by the Naxalites. Even the Central police and paramilitary forces that have been deployed in areas affected by the Naxal violence despite being better equipped and trained, lack a proper organisational structure and cohesiveness and an institutionalised operational experience. The Prime Minister‘s indication of setting up of a ‘specialised and dedicated security force’ for the purpose recently is a welcome step in this regard.

The government has treated it as a law and order problem and there has been undue emphasis on the use of force. Intrusive and insensitive security forces action in the Naxal affected regions poses a threat to the socio-political and economic structures of those regions. The Naxal problem is essentially a socio-economic problem. Therefore, the Government needs to focus on the underlying causes of unrest which are poverty, unemployment, malnutrition and underdevelopment as these provide sustenance to the movement.

It is largely believed that a multi-pronged approach could be the best solution. While the military approach can be used temporarily, it has to be supplemented by efforts towards ensuring balanced and sustainable development of all the regions in the country. The army could also probably be roped in temporarily and in a limited way. While a military option is clearly undesirable in dealing with the problem, a non-combat role for the army could be envisaged in imparting training, providing medical services and technical equipment and expertise to the paramilitary forces that are deployed in Naxal affected areas.

In order to weed out a this forty year old ‘virus’, the Government needs to seriously undertake land reforms and ensure that the deprived sections of the society are brought into the mainstream of development. These have to be complemented by a sustained, patient and committed effort aimed at ensuring better governance and dignity and adequate means of livelihood. The fact that the Prime Minister had sought ‘progress report’ at the Chief Ministers’ Conference held last week could be perceived as a positive and serious effort on the part of the centre in this regard.