The recent Mumbai serial blasts which claimed 26 innocent lives and a spike in infiltration attempts in J&K are clear indicators that even as India and Pakistan take tentative steps towards putting relations on an even keel, India can ill afford to take its eyes off the ball from the complex and vicious terror infrastructure that punctuates the length and breadth of that country.
Coming back to the incidents on the LoC in Kupwara district of J&K. Four Indian soliders were killed and five injured in two incidents on 27 and 30 July in the Machal and Keran sectors respectively. It is not clear whether these attacks were akin to the 2000-02 Border Action Team actions or attacks by infiltrating terrorists. In either case, already, senior Army officers in the theatre were ringing alarm bells on activation of terror launch pads in PoK. In the months of June and July more than a dozen LeT militants including its Divisional and Deputy Divisional commanders for North Kashmir were eliminated in successful operations in Lolab, Handwara and Sopore. The leadership of HM and JeM were also neutralized in South Kashmir’s Tral and Pulwama belts respectively. All this has put increased pressure on the terrorists to replenish their cadre strength in the valley and are therefore making desperate attempts to infiltrate. Already in the month of August nearly 10 infilitartion attempts have been made.
The degree of desperation can be gauged by the recent attempt in Gurez sector. At the death of night, nearly 20 heavily armed LeT militants attempted to infiltrate through the Kishanganga river (using two boats, including a rubber dingy) in Bakhtoor. The audacious attempt included trying to navigate the boats against the flow of the river. 12 of these militants were killed while combing operations are on to track down some militants who may be holed up in the Kanzalwan forests. One officer made the supreme sacrifice in this counter-infiltration operation while two other soliders were injured. In the absence of covering fire by Pakistani troops due to the cease-fire, the success rate in such infiltration attempts is quite low. Yet, these incidents are a cause of concern for many reasons.
One, statistics over the last two years have shown that while 239 out of 485 infiltrating terrorists were killed in 2009, 232 out of 489 terrorists were killed in 2010. These figures show that whereas almost an equal number were killed, significant number successfully infiltrated. So, although the number attempting infiltration were low compared to, say, 535 in 2007 or 2417 in 2001, the numbers successfully infiltrating has gone up. Are there chinks in the LoC fence armoury ?
Two, 2009 and 2010 were lean seasons as far as Pakistan’s ISI is concerned with GWOT consuming much of its attention span which included a 35 % reorbatting of Pakistani troops from the East to the West. For the very first time the complete Pakistan XI Corps (Peshawar) was deployed to the West supported by two to three additional divisions. If this was the situation, then what is the expectation, when the US troops drawdown from Afghanistan, which has already begun, reaches substantial numbers in the summer of 2012 ?
Three, already, in effecting its drawdown, the US Army has thinned out from the Afghan border with Pakistan, leaving gaping security holes unlikely to be filled either by drone strikes or Pakistani offensives – for instance, its Army has launched three offensives in Mohmand in the past year or so with little effect.
The above ground realities seriously impact Indian security as we know that LeT has significant infrastructure in FATA, Khyber Pakthunkhwa and Afghanistan. LeT, as is well known, is a strategic proxy to further ISI’s ambitions both in Afghanistan and Kashmir. It is important to note that US troops who have encountered LeT in Afghanistan over the last five years rate them first among equals. There are unconfirmed reports of Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar’s group) intended to be used in J&K in the future, once these fighters are relieved of their primary task of fighting US soldiers in Afghanistan.
There are, also, reports of Ilyas Kashmiri (twice reported killed) crafting a ‘neo-Taliban’ strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, in order to spread mayhem in all these countries through high profile attacks and kidnappings. This ‘neo-Taliban’ group is reported to be composed of Arab and former Kashmiri militants.
Whether Ilyas Kashmiri succeeds or not, there can be no doubt on LeT’s intentions and execution plans once it itself begins its own draw down from Afghanistan. Having learnt its lessons, well, when it stamped out indigenous militants from Kashmir with its ruthless operating style and becoming unpopular, this time around, it has forged alliance with the HM, thereby to gain safe havens inside J&K.
India will have to bolster its security architecture to prevent infiltration and shore up its ground intelligence network. It will also do well to control the psychological/propaganda narrative, as well, on the lines of the US (Pentagon) setting up a Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency to monitor and counter propagandists actions on the social media space. The attacks on moderates like Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi in 2009 and the killing of Maulvi Showkat Ahmed Shah in April 2011 by extremists need to be highlighted. The incompatibility between the brutal methods followed by the Ahle-Hadith ideologists of the LeT with the sufi Kashmiri muslims should be pointed out. The psychological narrative must continually remind the Kashmiri youth to stay tuned to India’s growth story besides reminding them of lack of liberty and dignity in PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan.
So even as the diplomacy goes on, India and PM Manmohan Singh must take meaningful steps concurrent to Pakistan, incrementally, dismantling terror infrastructure from its territory. Having graduated their diplomacy from foreign ministers tete-a-tete and even as the Government mulls over an invite to our Prime Minister to visit Pakistan, demanding action to be taken against 26/11 perpetrators is only one part of the story.
Rohit Singh is an Associate Fellow at CLAWS
(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).
|