Role of Mukti Bahini in India�s Victory

 India’s greatest victory in recent times would not have been feasible without the support of Mukti Bahini.  It is often forgotten that the liberation of Bangladesh could not have been achieved within the short time frame of 14 days without the invaluable support of Mukti Bahini and the local population. The enormous sacrifices made by Mukti Bahini during this period have been often glossed over by both Indian and Bangladeshi historians. 

The fact that the Bangladesh Army after 1975 was generally dominated by the anti-liberation officers, those who had not taken any part in the liberation war and had been repatriated from Pakistan after the War, ensured that the Mukti Bahini’s role was generally played down.  On the other hand, Pakistanis keen to hide their misdeeds - the rape and genocide in Bangladesh, also played down the internal dissent and projected their defeat to be the result of Indian machinations.  It did not suit Pakistani military or the political leadership to accept that their policies had led to large-scale internal dissent and consequent defeat.  In India there was a clamour to claim credit for this unprecedented and unexpected victory.  Amongst those jostling to take credit, there was no inclination to share this glory with Mukti Bahini.

Mukti Bahini ensured that the Pakistani Armed Forces were worn out by the time they faced Indian Army.  The continuous harassment and interference with the supply lines of Pakistani Army had already degraded the fighting efficiency of the Pakistani Forces.  During the war, Mukti Bahini, not only provided the valuable inputs about the terrain, but it also ensured that there was total support of the local population.  It provided invaluable intelligence about enemy disposition and even gave the maps of the area to the Indian Army, which were at point not available with Indian authorities.  It also garnered local means of transportation to facilitate cross country movement of Indian troops. 

Mukti Bahini was the successor of Mukti Fauj, which comprised of Sangram Parishads, formed by the student and youth leaderships of Awami League in March 1971.  Mukti Bahini comprised of the Sangram Parishads and the members of the armed forces, para military forces and police of erstwhile East Pakistan.  The rebellion by the uniformed personnel, by and large began after the declaration of independence by Major Zia ur Rahman from Chittagong.  Initially Zia assumed the title of ‘Provisional Commander in Chief of the Bangladesh Liberation Army’, even though his area of operations remained confined to Chittagong and Noakhali areas.  Subsequently, on 17 Apr 1971, a retired officer Colonel MAG Osmany took over as the Commander-in-Chief of Bangladesh Armed Forces at Teliapara (Sylhet) headquarters. 

However, despite rebellion by most of the Bengali officers and men present in East Pakistan and the initial success of Mukti Bahini, the absence of heavy weaponry and lack of officers and JCOs, led to Pakistani Army with a combat strength of 38, 717 officers and men recapturing most of the territory within a month.   Mukti Bahini attempted to fight Pakistani Army in a conventional war rather than a guerrilla war and failed.  Despite exhibiting extreme valour and determination, the force suffered heavy casualties in fighting pitched battles at Bhairab Bazar. 

Mukti Bahini realised its mistakes and reorganised itself in July 1971 and decided on a two-pronged approach.   It was resolved that both guerrilla warfare and frontal assaults would be undertaken simultaneously.  Irregular forces were trained for guerrilla warfare.  Five to ten member guerrilla teams were deployed for specific tasks in different parts of Bangladesh, whilst combat soldiers would continue frontal assaults against enemy.  Volunteers both armed and unarmed were tasked to gather intelligence about the enemy.  The guerrillas were sent inside to carry out raids and ambushes.  All industries were brought to a grinding halt and the electric supply was severely disrupted.  Pakistanis were prevented from exporting either the raw material or the finished products from Bangladesh. 

Communication networks were targeted to disrupt the movement of Pakistani forces.  The guerrilla actions forced Pakistanis to disperse forces to maintain control.  Mukti Bahini attacked scattered Pakistani troops with the intention of annihilating them.   

The regular forces initially consisted of five under strength East Bengal Regiment battalions.  By October 1971, eight regular battalions and one artillery regiment had been raised and were  organised into three brigades.  Z Force operating in Chittagong and Noakhali Sector under the command of Major Zia ur Rahman, K Force operating in Sylhet-Comilla Sector under the command of Major Khaled Musharraf and S Force operating in Mymensingh-Tangail Sector under the command of Major Shafiullah.  Subsequently, Kushtia-Jessore Sector and Faridpur-Barisal-Khulna-Patukhali Sector were placed under the command of Major Usman and Major Jalil, respectively. After the reorganisation, the whole of Bangladesh including the seas off the coast was divided into 11 sectors and the regular forces were organised into battalions and divided into these sectors.  Besides the regular and irregular forces, there were various independent forces like Mujib Bahini, Kaderia Bahini, Afsar Battalion and Hemayet Bahini, which fought in various parts of Bangladesh and liberated certain areas.

Bangladesh Navy was created in August 1971 with two ships MV Polish and MV Padma and 45 former naval personnel of the Pakistani Navy, which included many frogmen.  The ships were fitted with 40 mm Bofors and proved to be extremely effective for warfare in the estuaries.  They launched many successful attacks on Pakistani targets, sinking over a lakh ton of shipping.  Bangladesh Air Force started functioning from Dimapur on 28 September 1971 under the command of Gp Capt AK Khandekar and consisted of 17 officers and 50 technicians who had deserted the Pakistani Air Force to set up the nascent force.  The aircraft inventory of the Force included a Dakota, an Otter and an Alouette helicopter.  It was mainly employed in communication duties with the Bangladesh Government in exile and the military top brass.  After the Indian war of liberation began in December, the air force commenced its combat role and successfully launched 12 sorties against Pakistani targets. 

Mukti Bahini carried out numerous raids on Pakistani forces since October 1971 and continuously harassed the Pakistani forces. The psychological impact of nine months of hostility on Pakistani troops is not often appreciated.  Once Indian forces attacked Pakistani forces, the Mukti Bahini not only fought along side Indian troops, but also ensured that supplies to Pakistani troops were disrupted. Heli-lifting, para dropping or largescale crossings by ferries of troops could not have been attempted if the population was hostile and local support from Mukti Bahini was not available.  When the forces of Major General Nagra entered Dhaka, they were escorted by Tiger Siddiqui.  The enormous support of Mukti Bahini ensured that despite the difficult geomorphology of Bangladesh, it was liberated in two weeks giving India its greatest military victory in centuries.  Mukti Bahini was represented at the surrender ceremony by its Second in Command Group Captain Khandekar.   

India needs to acknowledge the immense role played by Mukti Bahini, in its most spectacular victory and as a nation should express its gratitude to Mukti Jodhas.  Mukti Bahini veterans should be honoured at India’s victory day celebrations.  As the citizens of the two countries shed their blood to achieve this spectacular victory, they also need to celebrate it together.

Alok Bansal is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal