Can North Korea's New Leadership keep it Afloat with China's Tacit Backing ?

The sudden demise of the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-il in December 2011 has placed the cloistered nation at the centre stage of political activity, both domestically and in Northeast Asia. The power transition expectedly appeared on track, with the announcement of Kim Jong-un as the supreme commander of the nation’s influential military. The aim of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party and the elite in the powerful military of the country, was to quash any potential power squabble and ensure a smooth and undisputed transition of power. However, the real test of regime survival has just about begun as questions loom large regarding Kim Jong-un’s political future.

 

Having thrived on an intense personality cult, Kim Jong-il inherited the reins of power from his father Kim Il-sung, and ruled North Korea irrefutably for 17 years beginning 1994. Much in contrast, Kim Jong-il declared his third son, Kim Jong-un as his political successor only recently in 2009 and started grooming Kim Jong-un for the final takeover. However, Kim Jong-il's death has catapulted Kim Jong-un into the ruling chair, without providing him enough time or exposure to consolidate control in the domestic corridors of power.

 

It would also be interesting to gauge whether Kim Jong-un would be able to translate nuclear brinkmanship into diplomatic breakthrough in terms of foreign policy with respect to the regional players and the United States. It needs to be recalled here that Kim Jong-il had successfully managed to flash the "nuclear card" and harvested substantially on it ever since signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994.

 

More significantly, by promptly endorsing the decision, North Korea’s closest ally and benefactor, China, seems to be aiding Pyongyang at managing North Korea’s succession route. Recognising that regime survival would be critical for North Korea's overall stability at this given point, China has displayed tacit support and approval for the new leadership through its state-controlled media. Declaring “Kim Jong-il immortal”, the front page of the state-owned People's Daily underscored the significance of Beijing’s relationship with the opaque Northeast Asian nation.

 

It needs to be remembered that it was China’s backing that facilitated survival of the Kim Jong-il regime in the backdrop of international economic sanctions. Today, Kim Jong-un too, is banking on implicit Chinese support, as he takes charge of North Korea. In the past, with the intent of viewing China as the source that would provide political and ideological sanctity to his regime, Kim Jong-il had visited China seven times, both officially and unofficially since 2000. Significantly, the primary aim of his last few visits was to ensure a smooth passage for his son's undisputed takeover of leadership.

 

China's ability to wield influence in Pyongyang is seeded in it being North Korea's largest provider of food aid that accounts for almost 50 percent. Being the largest foreign direct investor in North Korea, China's economic assistance to North Korea is almost half of all Chinese foreign aid. Additionally, China also contributes almost 90 percent of Pyongyang's energy imports, including 80 percent of its conventional fuel.

 

According to Chinese customs figures, Beijing is North Korea's largest trading partner with bilateral trade reaching $3.5 billion in 2010, although heavily leaning in China's favour. However, it is important to mention here that a fair share of cross-border trade between North Korea and China goes unreported. This includes data relating to Chinese arms exports to North Korea which is not available in most trade estimates.

 

In addition, the issue of North Korea's drug trafficking into Northeast China, which has risen considerably in recent years, also concerns Beijing. In particular, China's Jilin Province, and Dandong city in the Liaoning Province, placed close to the North Korean-Chinese border, have been identified as key transit points for drug trade.

 

Based on these statistics, it would not be inappropriate to state that in the backdrop of international sanctions, North Korea could not have managed to remain afloat, if it were not for Chinese economic aid, military assistance and political backing. The spectre of a collapsing North Korea will likely have a ripple effect not just throughout Northeast Asia, but beyond. From Beijing's perspective, such an event could prospectively lead to the possibility of a unified neighbour (Korea), with thousands of US troops and marines moving right next to the Chinese borders—a scenario that Beijing in all probability would absolutely be averse to.

 

Ensuring the survival of Kim Jong-un's regime shall serve Beijing to wield political leverage against the US and guarantee the continuing presence of a responsive communist ally on its north-eastern border. Given the extent of North Korea's dependence on China, any sharp withdrawal of economic/political support could impinge upon the overall stability of the Korean Peninsula. So, as of now, Kim Jong-un will cash in on the personality cult and political bequest as he leads North Korea into the 21st century. The North Korean leadership has strived, and to a large extent, succeeded, in maintaining a firm grip over domestic political calculations and the trend shall likely continue even as new power configurations emerge. The debate centres around whether he would be able to fashion the future of Pyongyang based on the pillars of nationalism and an almost religious allegiance to the state, and its survival.

 

 

Views expressed are personal