Army and the Naxal Challenge

Left Wing Extremism (LWE) continues to pose a major security challenge to the Indian state. It forms a substantial part of the two and a half front threat scenario faced by the Indian Army (Pakistan and China forming one front each and the half-front threat being of insurgencies in J&K, parts of North East India and LWE). While insurgency to a large extent has been contained in J&K and in the North East, it continues to fester in the Indian heartland, where according to some unofficial estimates, it has claimed more than 10,000 lives since 1980. Today, nearly 200 districts of the country spread across parts of nine states are affected by LWE, of which about 30 districts have very high levels of violence. The influence of the Naxalites in the forest and mineral rich belts of the Indian heartland has dangerous portents for the internal security and economic growth of the nation.

Apart from a brief engagement in the early 1970s, the Indian Army has not been directly involved in combating the Naxalites. Presently, 76 battalions of the Central Police Forces (CPF) are supporting the state police in the Naxal affected states in combating the insurgency. The past decade has been marked by a rapid increase in Maoist-inflicted casualties on civilians and security forces which has resulted in thousands of tribal villagers being displaced from their homes. Response to Maoist attacks has often been haphazard and knee jerk, with police forces being deployed wherever incidents occurred. The state and central police forces were often ill-equipped, ill-trained and inexperienced to directly combat the insurgents in an inhospitable jungle terrain. This was evident from the superior attrition rate enjoyed by the Naxals over the security forces.

The deadly ambush in Dantewada in April 2010 which left 76 security forces personnel dead exposed the inadequacy of the CPF in directly taking on the Maoist guerillas. The Indian Army with its tremendous combat experience has been stepping in to improve the tactics, training and combat ability of the state police and CPF units. From 2006 onwards, the Army has provided a six-week pre-induction training capsule to more than 1 lakh state and central police personnel prior to their induction for anti-Naxal operations. Improvised explosive device (IED) detection and de-mining training is also been provided by army engineers. The Army has deputed select officers and men to the several counter-insurgency and jungle warfare schools run by the state governments and CPOs to impart expert training skills to the CPFs and to also ‘train the trainers’.  Recently, the government has approved induction of more ex-servicemen including from specialist arms such as engineers and signals into the CPFs to improve their operational efficiency. Temporary attachment of young officers from the CPFs with infantry battalions of the Army could prove useful in improving the quality of junior leadership and combat experience of the CPFs.

In the past six months, an infantry brigade from the Army’s Central Command carried out its collective training in the red bastion of Bastar in Chhattisgarh. The Army presence in the Maoist heartland has been useful in extending the reach of the civil administration to an area which was purportedly ‘liberated’ from government control by the Maoists. The Army is not involved in operations against the Naxals, but its presence is felt as it trains in the area. This has helped deter the Maoist guerillas and establish a sense of security in the area. The civil administration now has the opportunity to build on the favourable security environment created by the Army’s deployment and extend developmental projects to that area. Training of CPFs alongside the Army brigade could also be considered to provide the latter with hands-on and live experience in operating in a counter-insurgency environment and refine their skills.

The year 2011 has seen a nearly 50 per cent decline in casualties inflicted by the Naxals as compared to the year 2010. Only time will tell whether this is a tactical ploy on the part of the Maoists or whether it represents a dent in the Maoist movement made possible by political, developmental and security initiatives taken by the Centre and the state governments. The Army however will continue to support the CPFs engaged in anti-Naxalite operations by imparting training and other guerilla warfare skills. In the meantime, the rotation of infantry brigades for collective training in the Maoist heartland ensures that Army formations acquire first-hand knowledge of the terrain, operating conditions, Maoist strength, etc in case its deployment is warranted in a future contingency. While the Army will continue to assist the CPFs through training and other initiatives, a holistic effort is required on the political, social, developmental, administrative and security fronts to counter the Naxal challenge. It is essential that the CPFs acquire the requisite cutting edge skills to enable them to defeat the military challenge posed by the Maoists over the next decade. Failure to do so may result in the Army getting sucked into anti-Naxal operations. Such a deployment could adversely affect the field to peace rotation cycles of infantry battalions and impose an additional burden on the Army’s perspective planning to tackle a two and a half front threat scenario. The CPFs must succeed and the Army is there to help them to do just that.

Rohit Singh is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

Courtesy: The Indian Express, 15 January 2012