Seoul Summit and the Future of Nuclear Security

The recently concluded Seoul Summit 2012 on nuclear security re-affirmed nuclear terrorism as a significant challenge to international security and carried forward the agenda of nuclear security, first hosted by US President Barack Obama in Washington in 2010.

One of the key areas that the agenda of nuclear security seeks to address is preventing sensitive and hazardous nuclear material, including highly enriched uranium (HEU), and separated plutonium from falling into the hands of terrorist groups/networks. The Obama administration has committed to "lead a global effort to secure all loose nuclear materials around the world" during its first term in office. The Washington 2010 Summit asserted that effective security of nuclear materials should include sensitive nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, in nuclear facilities, and prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malevolent purposes.

The need for robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security is a key issue that merits special focus in the larger debate on nuclear security measures. In this regard, the Obama administration has urged states to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in a span of four years between the 2010 Washington and 2012 Seoul Summit. Resultantly, approximately 480 kgs of HEU has been secured, accounted for, and eliminated, while recognising that both HEU and separated plutonium require special precautions and measures.

The Seoul Summit released a non-binding communiqué which underscored fortification of nuclear security mechanisms to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and prevent terrorist groups and non-state actors from acquiring sensitive nuclear materials. To achieve this end, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism have been identified as central pillars of the global nuclear security architecture.

It would be pertinent to mention here that the Seoul Summit appears to have fallen short in translating Obama's vision of securing all nuclear materials within a four-year deadline. While the Seoul Communiqué did not set specific targets for either elimination, or reduction of nuclear material, it encouraged each state to voluntarily set and announce targets for minimising possession of HEU by the end of 2013.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works in close coordination with Member States to create and improve measures that are needed to control and protect nuclear materials. According to the Director of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security, Khammar Mrabit, "On-going international cooperation and support contribute to a 'nuclear security culture' that transcends borders and provides a common basis for understanding and action at local, regional and global levels." The IAEA plays a crucial role in strengthening the nuclear security framework which, is designed, implemented and managed in nuclear facilities in a consistent and phased manner.

Since 2002, the IAEA has assisted to repatriate 1,600 kgs of HEU research reactor fuel to their countries of origin. The IAEA has identified a notable example of repatriation of HEU from the Vinèa Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Serbia back to Russia. According to the IAEA, this was the largest shipment of spent fuel ever removed as part of the international programme to repatriate research reactor fuel. Besides, the IAEA is presently working on a mechanism which shall provide a meeting ground between nuclear security and safety.

The efforts to improve nuclear security globally also addresses the very critical issue of radiation dispersal devices, commonly referred to as "Dirty Bombs" that use conventional explosives to spread radioactive material thus causing injuries and the subsequently related aspect of cleaning-up of contaminated property. Industrial and medical radioactive sources such as cobalt-60, caesium-137, strontium-90, and iridium-192, emit high levels of radiation and their sources require careful monitoring and protection to prevent misuse.

Additionally, the facet of nuclear power plant safety, which remained unaddressed at the Washington Summit in 2010, was discussed at length in Seoul. The nuclear crisis at Fukushima, Japan in 2011 has been a focal area of discussions, with an urgent need to maintain effective emergency preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities. The Fukushima incident presented the world with a scenario wherein nuclear power plant accidents could be the outcome of a natural disaster or that of terrorism.

Moreover, the nuclear security agenda supports the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Debating the Iranian nuclear pursuit under this light is likely to be at the centre of discussions during the next Summit on nuclear security scheduled to be held in the Netherlands in 2014. While Iran has the right to pursue a nuclear programme with the objective of developing nuclear energy strictly for peaceful civilian purposes, it should ensure that no diversion towards any potential military usage should take place. The programme has to be consistent with Tehran's international obligations as per IAEA regulations and provisions of the UN Security Council Resolutions.

Achieving effective nuclear security would require a persevered effort and the 2012 Seoul Summit has failed to provide any tangible advancement to the subject. Perhaps the greatest challenge to nuclear security is that of combating illicit nuclear trafficking. The Seoul Summit sought to enhance technical capabilities with respect to inspection and detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials outside of regulatory control at international borders. In this reference, the focus of the 2014 Summit in the Netherlands, more specifically, needs to be in terms of holding states accountable when it comes to the proliferation of sensitive WMD material, since comprehensive nuclear security can be ensured only then.

Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

Views expressed are personal