Maoist Juggernaut

In a recent seminar on Maoists a DGP level officer from Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) took umbrage when asked how he viewed the situation a decade from now. He curtly responded insurgency would be over in next 3-4 years. In 2010, the Home Minister had said, “The government is confident that the problem of Left wing extremism will be overcome in next three years.” Post the recent kidnappings and killings, news described Maoists “Down But Not Out”. Some strategists call Maoists a ‘rag tag force’ with some captured weapons and little external support. Reminds one of Kashmiri militants being tagged ‘rag tag’ during 1990-91. Since 1989, Maoist insurgency has claimed some 11,575 lives (2,285 security forces, 2,913 Maoists and 6,377 civilians) albeit figures during 2011-2012 are lower than previous two years. How “down” the Maoists are may be gauged from:

• Release of jailed hardcore Maoists swapped for kidnapped Italians, Orissa MLA Jhina Hikaka and Chhattisgarh's Sukma District Collector Alex Paul Menon post hapless negotiations under extreme duress. More kidnappings particularly of ground level politicians and government officials are likely.

• Recent attack in Dantewada killing five CISF men, taking their weapons, concurrent killing of a police officer in Kanker and recent encounter in Borbora in Assam.

• Urban bases (bastis, slums) are being established and infiltrating security forces organizations is planned (followed by white-collar employees, intellectuals and youth), exhorting cadres not to undertake armed action in urban areas ‘at this stage’. Propaganda through student-worker organisations is present strategy – indications exist in JNU and DU. Some Maoist leaders have been arrested from New Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Thane, Nasik, Kolkata, Chandigarh in recent past.

• Colluding with terrorists in the Northeast (in accordance CPI (M) plan of forming a Strategic United Front), Bangladesh and Nepal. Very little external support to Maoists is a misnomer and being played down by the government. LeT (covert arm of ISI) representatives have been attending Maoists meetings and ISI is supplying arms. China has reportedly gifted a small arms manufacturing unit to Kachin rebels in North Myanmar and the weapons are flowing to the PLA in Manipur and Maoists. China is also arming and training ULFA and Chinese nationals with fake Indian identities have attempted contacting the NSCN. Joint training of Indian insurgents is being organised in northern Myanmar.

• AK-47’s and Uzi’s are flowing in. In recent past, sophisticated communication sets were unearthed in buried underground for future use. Laptops were recovered from some hideouts / camps during 2011.

• Ample explosives are locally available for legal and illegal mining industry. In a single raid, Maoists walked away with 12,000 detonators. Road stretches in designated military training areas have prepositioned underground explosives to blow up vehicles – which has imposed caution on military movement.

• Yearly fiscal turnover of Maoists exceeds Rs 1,500 crore, increasing by 15% annually. Poppy and Ganja cultivation flourishes, every acre of poppy yields Rs   1 crore each year. Cadres get monthly salaries ranging from Rs 250 to Rs 3,000.

• Women cadres are being expanded and a cyber warfare strategy is being evolved.

• Nexus between ground level politicians and Maoists cannot be ruled out as the former’s vote bank is influenced by Maoists. This may even lead to stage managed kidnappings to secure release of jailed Maoists.

• As per an MP of a Maoist affected state, the DGP has been paying hafta to the Maoists for his own safety.

• Though government will continue to downplay the situations, some 16 states are affected with Nepalese Maoists to the North and fast radicalising Kerala (with LeT footprints) to the South.

At the root lies India’s inability to manage social change, aggravated with rampant corruption in tackling economic disparities, social inequities and restoring tribal rights particularly with regard to forested areas though guaranteed by the Constitution. The flurry for a uniform hostage policy within days of the Prime Minister chairing an internal security meeting of Chief Ministers shows our pathetic approach in dealing with the Maoist problem. This, despite the Prime Minister describing declaring it as the biggest threat to national security for past several years and despite numerous hostage situations having occurred in the past including Rubaiya Sayeed in 1989 and the 1999 IC-814 episode.

As a nation, we need synergized simultaneous operations on the socio-political-economic-moral-physical planes rallying local population against Maoists organization / activities, destroying insurgents while blending development and education to ensure legitimate government rule. In execution, such a strategy implies: military solution is not the key - aim for peace treaty followed by political solution; population being the Centre of Gravity should be the main objective - wean them away from insurgents; rallying local population requires ensuring their full protection. This must be ensured; security forces need to fight simultaneously at moral and physical levels providing security / assistance to population and destroying insurgents; combat threats to strengthen legitimate rule of law to alleviate pressures that lead to instability; blend development and education with combat operations to win over population.

The present response of CAPF leaves much to desire. Mere expansion is not the answer. CAPF units in counter insurgency must be reorganized on lines of the RR/AR battalions to make them administratively self contained and provide resultant confidence to the ground level individual besides essential training and equipping. Presently, only whole units get pre-induction training but individuals / sub units being turned over inducted directly – a recipe for increasing avoidable casualties.

As of now, military deployment has not been undertaken against the Maoists. Well trained, well equipped PMF/CAPF/Police forces with an efficient intelligence network should actually be able target the Maoist leadership and hit insurgent infrastructure, cutting off their supplies and support. However, wisdom lies in preparing for developments that may trigger military deployment.

Considering the magnitude and expanse of Maoist insurgency, there is no escaping a centralized response including in hostage situations. This should be the forte of the Home Minister. Chalking out a uniform hostage response policy by itself is no panacea because for it to yield result the twin requirements of political will and execution have to be met. How is the Centre going to ensure political will at State level when latter show them two fingers like in instant case of NCTC? Then comes the execution part - just about anyone cannot handle negotiations. The interlocutors must be trained and skilled followed by physical action where required – take the IC 814 hostage case where a trained force like the NSG could not even be activated while the aircraft was on ground in Amritsar. For States to not accept it on grounds of turf encroachment will be suicidal. State Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTC) must be established duly linked with NCTC through NATGRID. If we are to fight terror successfully, it must be de-linked from law and order and fought in synergized manner.

In the ultimate analysis, security forces can at best lower levels of violence. The balance has to come through good governance – something that is grossly inadequate. India will have to muster the will and resources to improve this.

The author is a veteran Lieutenant General of Indian Army

Views expressed are personal