China�s Space Odyssey

China’s space programme represents a major investment, aimed at enabling Beijing to utilise space in expanding its national power. China has acknowledged that its space industry has developed rapidly and is an important part of Beijing’s overall development strategy. While terming the next five years as crucial for “deepening reform and opening-up” and “accelerating the transformation of the country’s pattern of economic development”, China admits that space activities play an increasingly important role in its economic and social development.

 

The advancements in space technologies have become critical to the successful conduct of military operations as they empower Beijing to use its armed forces more effectively. Leading Chinese analysts have averred that in essence, China will follow the same principles for space militarisation and space weapons as it did with its nuclear weapons. This primarily means that Beijing is likely to develop anti-satellite and space weapons capable of effectively taking on an enemy’s space system, in order to constitute a reliable and credible defence strategy. For that matter, the Chinese vision of space warfare involves not just denying space to its adversary but also using space for affirmative ends such as the intercept of ballistic and cruise missiles through space-based combat platforms, strikes by space systems on terrestrial targets and attacks by land, air, sea, aerospace and space vehicles on an adversary’s space platforms and space-based command and control assets.

 

China’s military space capabilities cannot be understood outside the context of its current military strategy, which today is summarised by the phrase “active defence”. PLA’s Senior Colonel, Yao Yunzhu, predicts that “outer space is going to be weaponised in our lifetime”. The PLA comprehends that holding hegemony in space will enhance an ability that will impact upon ground mobility and air, sea and space combat.

 

Not just a flight of fancy

 

Although Beijing has been pursuing a diverse and comprehensive portfolio of space warfare investments ever since the late 1980s, perhaps the most complex and challenging engineering project ever undertaken by China came in the form of Project 921, launched on September 21, 1992, when the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party held a meeting headed by Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, and arrived at a consensus that the human space flight programme would be vital for China to make its presence felt technologically, politically and militarily. Thus began Beijing’s ambitious space odyssey, marking the birth of its human space flight programme. Project 921 is scheduled for implementation in three distinct phases beginning with the first phase (1992-2005), to attain human spaceflight; the second phase (beginning 2007) aimed to develop advanced techniques for spaceflight including manoeuvring and docking; and, finally, the third phase envisions the construction of a multi-modular permanently-manned space station by 2020-2025, which would approximately weigh over 70 tonnes, and comprise of a 20-tonne core module and two experimental modules.

 

Since 1992, China has spent approximately 39 billion yuan ($6.1 billion) on Project 921 and has accomplished stage two of the project. In June 2012, China launched its fourth and biggest manned space mission, Shenzhou 9 (Divine Ship 9) spacecraft at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre in Jiuquan, on the edge of the Gobi desert in northern China. The Chinese spacecraft docked manually with an orbiting Tiangong 1 (Space Palace 1) module. The docking was carried out by remote control from a ground base in China and the manoeuvre was regarded as “precise and perfect”. Manual docking represents a major breakthrough in China’s space rendezvous, with Beijing appearing resolute to eventually command expertise in areas such as navigation and deep space missions. According to China’s official Xinhua news agency, arrangements for the Shenzhou 10 mission will be decided upon and announced following a complete review of the Shenzhou 9 mission and status of the orbiting Tiangong 1 module.

 

China’s space plans can be regarded as far-reaching. This was reflected when the Information Office of the State Council in Beijing released the third White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2011, which outlines a plan for major tasks to be completed by 2016. These include “strengthening basic capacities of the space industry; accelerate research on leading-edge technology; and, continuing implementation of important space scientific and technological projects, including human spaceflight, lunar exploration, high-resolution earth observation system, satellite navigation and positioning system and new-generation launch vehicles”.

 

China is also likely to push for co-ordinated and sustainable development of its space industry, including creation of a comprehensive plan for construction of space infrastructure and promotion of its satellites and satellite applications industry, besides conducting space science research. More importantly, it will enhance the reliability and adaptability of launch vehicles in service, as well as development of new-generation heavy launch vehicles and their upper stages. In this reference, implementation of the first flight of the Long March 5, Long March 6 and Long March 7 next-generation launch vehicles holds critical significance.

 

China’s dream of placing a bigger space station in orbit pivots around the successful development of the Long March 5 booster rocket. The Long March 5 will use non-toxic and pollution-free propellant, intended to lift heavy payloads into space. It will be more than double the sizes of low earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) payloads that China can place into orbit. To support these new rockets, the construction of a new launch facility near Wenchang on Hainan Island began in 2008. Moreover, since 2006, the Long March rockets have accomplished 67 successful launches, sending 79 spacecraft into planned orbits.

 

Notwithstanding the strides embarked upon by Beijing in bringing its space mission to fruition, there is considerable opacity regarding the military applications of China’s space programme and counter-space activities. It is a foregone conclusion that there is an impending struggle between nations to gain supremacy in space exploration and military capabilities in space. The fact which further tends to complicate matters is the dual-use nature of space technology, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes. This, consequently, makes for a complex scenario wherein it is difficult to discern whether military space assets are intended for offensive or defensive purposes. China needs to be far more explicit and unequivocal in terms of the goals that it has set for itself in this regard. It, for instance, appears reticent when it comes to providing information regarding building of a permanent space station and also does not lucidly spell out its thinking on issues pertaining to space deterrence.

 

Code of Conduct

 

In order to address challenges related to outer space, a multilateral diplomatic initiative was launched by the European Union (EU) in June 2012 to negotiate for an “International Code of Conduct (CoC) for Outer Space Activities”. Expected to be adopted by 2013, the CoC’s purpose would be to ensure security and safety of all outer space activities. Ushering in transparency measures through a series of voluntary admissions, the CoC’s most significant objective is to limit the creation of space debris. The long-term sustainability and responsible usage of our space environment stand at risk from creation of huge masses of space debris.

 

By all means, space debris is recognised by all countries as a serious threat to space-based assets. That said, what makes the debate surrounding space-based issues more complicated is that they tend to be interpreted alongside a nation’s strategic interests and in this reference, any proposed space code of conduct should be approached with a will to strengthen stability in space by means of promoting liable operations in space. What perhaps could emerge as the biggest challenge herein would be a relative reluctance on part of nations to enter a code of conduct that would, in any way, hinder or constrain their respective national security-related activities in space.

 

China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test nearly five years ago in January 2007, with a medium-range ballistic missile lifting off from a launch site at the Xichang space facility in Sichuan Province and subsequently ramming into an ageing Chinese weather satellite, Fengyun 1C (FY-1C), deployed in LEO at an altitude of about 864 km. This test exponentially increased the amount of space debris in orbit, enough to last for a few decades in low orbit, thus proving hazardous to other operating satellites. Earlier in January this year, the International Space Station fired its thrusters to steer clear of an estimated 3,312 pieces of orbital debris created from China’s ASAT test in 2007, pronouncing the event as the largest debris-generating event on record. With more than 500,000 pieces of space junk being tracked daily, an update released by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) stated that the manoeuvre mentioned above “was designed to place the station at the correct altitude and trajectory for future visiting vehicle activities and to avoid a repetitive coincidence of possible conjunctions with a piece of Chinese Fengyun 1C satellite debris”. The Fengyun 1C satellite debris held the potential to cause seven conjunctions with the space station, and therefore steering the $100 billion safely into the clear was required.

 

China has stated officially that it will set up a design and assess system of space debris mitigation, and take measures to reduce space debris left by post-task spacecraft and launch vehicles in the next five years. In addition, China will experiment with digital simulation of space debris collisions, and build a system to protect spacecraft from space debris. How much of these assurances get translated into something tangible at hand remains to be seen.

 

China’s investment in the realm of both space and counter-space efforts is likely to adversely affect Asian strategic equations and the military capabilities of the major players in the region in a far-reaching manner. The script for China’s space odyssey is constantly evolving and it would only be prudent to innately engage Beijing in a space dialogue, protect the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevent potential conflict escalation in the space environs.

 

The writer is a Visiting Scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, USA

 

Courtesy: The Pioneer, 28 July 2012 

 

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