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A rapid increase in tensions in the Korean peninsula due to testing or firing of missiles in the neighborhood is hardly a new phenomenon. Periods of uneasy calm are foreshadowed by an ever looming fear of a breakout of hostilities. While USA has been a steadfast ally of South Korea, the Chinese and Russian support for Pyongyang has been mixed in the era of globalization. The tempo of geopolitics in the Korean peninsula alternates between high alerts & warnings on the one hand and appeasement & mitigation on the other. Today, what’s new is the leader of DPRK. The current premier, Ki Jong Un, like his father Kim Jong Il is not shy of applying the threat of military power towards political leverage. In fact, it would be safe to assert that sabre-rattling has proven an effective modus operandi for the DPRK. The only difference being that with the new leader it is harder for stakeholders to determine whether the threats are a long or a short term concern.
DPRK’s exhibitionist tendencies indicate a strong sovereign sensibility and an ambition to be considered powerful both regionally and globally. The refusal to tone down its military modernization, nuclear program and power projection has long caused unease in the neighborhood. It’s perceived as preparation for a contingency that DPRK seems inordinately preoccupied with. There has not been any interest indicated towards liberalizing economically despite its only ally China, nudging it to do so. Tagged as democratic, the leadership in North Korea has an unchallenged grip over the military political leadership. North Korea’s citizens remain mired in poverty while its power corridors fixate on geo-political threats- real, imagined or created.
North Korea’s isolation is predominantly self-imposed, as indicated by its impetuous withdrawal from the six party talks. DPRK’s nationalism is born out of the cold war era wherein there was an absolute polarization between communist allies and capitalist enemies. The end of the era did not remove this prejudice. Additionally, Japan’s imperialistic incursion during World War II also remains a vivid feature of North Korean nationalistic sentiment today. This is why USA and Japan are regularly reminded that the DPRK is prepared for war. The March 2013 positioning of missiles on standby has been the latest exhibition of a hard-line policy emerging from these threat perceptions. As North Korea’s economy falters, perpetuating the urgent menace of foreign powers also aids national unity. Herein the nuclear program is a crucial card for upholding both domestic pride as well as regional importance.
Unfortunately, war seems to be the only eventuality that the DPRK appears to work towards. For most countries in the era of globalization, there are economic and strategic incentives that pave the way for improvement of ties, keeping aggression in check. In the era of globalization foreign relations are considerably shaped by this ‘dependency theory’. The profitability inherent in opening up economically does not make a compelling case for DPRK. It goes against the grain, of the rigid model of sovereignty that has been perpetuated thus far. Changing orientations drastically would be tantamount to conceding defeat and perhaps even endanger DPRK’s uninterrupted reign of power. Arguably, this self-deprivation and petulant stance of the DPRK has sustained for so long is because it has big brother China in its corner.
Being the world’s second largest economic power makes it a significant ally. China is established securely in every continent and investing infrastructural and financial aid in various countries, rich in resources or of transit importance. Even though it has FTAs with various countries and regional bodies, its growth is of concern for East Asian nations. This concern is shared and perpetuated by external stakeholders who want to ensure that their access to the region is not denied by China. North Korea is the only country that is not threatened by China’s rise. In the long term, China’s indispensability in handling North Korea could be an advantage in balancing any criticism or uneasiness about its rise. China has only partially succumbed to US pressure on handling of DPRK. In 2006 and 2009, it back UN Security Council resolutions to apply sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear and missile tests. Meanwhile, it remains the largest supplier of food, infrastructural aid and energy to North Korea and the only country that DPRK has communicates with directly. Should China choose to, it can apply a game changing pressure on the ‘rogue-regime’. However, as a next door neighbor, it does not have the advantage of distance and takes a broader view of the problem.
Like other stakeholders China too is growing weary of DPRK’s sabre-rattling and the tensions it causes. Nevertheless, severe measures as the West seems inclined towards are not what China prefers for handling DPRK’s provocations. Withdrawal of economic and diplomatic support for North Korea could lead to a greater instability for both China and South Korea that are the bordering countries. However, a breakout of hostilities could push the commitments entailed in a security umbrella. Should USA get involved in any manner militarily in the neighborhood, it would set a precedent of USA’s regional role. This would bring to the fore China’s fears of encirclement in its immediate neighborhood and possibly force it to get involved on behalf of North Korea. A regression to Cold war dynamics, this would undo the economic collaboration that have been the foundation of closer ties in Sino-US relations. This is a contingency that all stakeholders want to avoid.
Whether it is six-party talks or sanctions, DPRK has not conceded letting go of its nuclear program. With the exception of Japan, today military modernization is common in East Asia and not unique to North Korea. DPRK’s nuclear program mirrors its threat perceptions. Nuclear arsenal allows it an asymmetrical advantage at the global level. As long as there are hostilities and unresolved issues between countries, this form of deterrence remains a dangerous proposition. DPRK feels a very real threat from USA and its regional allies South Korea and Japan. This is due to cold war legacies as well as USA’s invasion of Iraq under the pretext of weapons of mass destruction. In an age wherein most emerging nations are keen for both economic growth and military prowess, a direct coercive approach is not likely to yield results.
Resolution of tensions in the Korean peninsula would not be an overnight occurrence. It would be a milestone that is reached gradually and with a softer approach that only China could manage. Being the major trigger and enemy as perceived by DPRK, USA’s involvement in the region only serves to polarize parties involved in this brewing conflict. China can better utilize its influence on DPRK if it is not seen as coming under pressure from the US. Similarly, multilateral forums will also make the lone aggressor feel cornered and defensive. This political standoff cannot be solved unless DPRK’s threat perceptions are reduced. This is not feasible unless DPRK liberalizes its economy, gradually under China’s mentorship. For this path to open, it would be essential for China as opposed to USA, to the play the leading role. This would prove difficult as DPRK’s continues to test missiles. However, North Korea is not likely to calm down, as long as USA keeps perpetuating itself as a pacific power, especially in Northeast Asia.
The author is an Associate Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal
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