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In April 2012, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) undertook political-economic reforms and a fledgling peace process under the leadership of President Thein Sein. Unfortunately, the Rohingyas, a Muslim minority in Myanmar - has not benefitted from this historic transition. Often referred to as the ‘boat people’, the Rohingyas have had a tough time finding legitimate refuge in their immediate neighborhood. The Buddhists extremist that persecute them allegedly do so with impunity and state complicity. The downward spiral for the Rohingyas picked up momentum after the 1982 citizenship act was added to the constitution. It deemed them illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, consequently depriving them of a homeland. It subjected them to restrictions on travel, marriage, livelihood, religious freedom etc. Today, as Myanmar opens its door to economic investment – its treatment of the Rohingyas has come under scrutiny by the international community. However, the state’s tacit agenda of ethnic cleansing is underway, uninterrupted.
Ideally, as is the ASEAN way – the domestic problems of a country are not the business of other nation states. However, gross violations of human rights and the threat of genocide has been the experience of the Rohingyas for many years now. This does merit a response from the international community. Moreover, the predicament of the Rohingyas qualifies as transnational, given that they are either forced or compelled to escape to neighboring countries in order to survive. To manage this problem, there should already have been a joint discussion amongst the impacted countries. Instead, the reins have been taken over by economic opportunists. For instance, Rohingyas escape to Thailand often ends in smugglers extorting money from the family of the captive. If that does not come through they are sold to traffickers as indentured servants on fishing boats. Now and then, they are mistaken for pirates when sailing to the safety of neighboring shores. A central facet of the Rohingyas troubles is that the neighboring countries do not legitimately welcome them. Bangladesh foreign minister Dipu Moni has stated that the issuing of passports to Rohingyas in 1978-79 was “not only a historic mistake but an offense too{C}{C}[i]”. Thus, there is unfortunately no place to call home.
The political opportunism has come in the form of hard-line Islamic groups mobilizing support, with mistreatment of the Rohingyas being the pitch. A news report by the Irrawaddy takes the example of Indonesian groups such as Umat Islam, alleging that ardent support for the Rohingyas has “bolstered their popularity in a Muslim majority country{C}{C}[ii]{C}{C}”. Notably, it has been the extra-regional stakeholders that have brought helpful attention to the internal social turmoil and put pressure on the government. Most recently, Riyadh has expressed concern over the spate of violence in March-April 2013. This stemmed from an apprehension that the ongoing violence against Muslims in Myanmar has the likelihood of spreading throughout the country. Consequently, Riyadh advocated a long term solution, entailing restoration of citizenship and other legal birth rights for the Rohingyas{C}{C}[iii]. Under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Riyadh has expressed its willingness to work with the Myanmar government in offering humanitarian assistance and facilitating confidence building measures (CBM). Additionally, both the UN and USA have condemned the violence, perceiving it as insincerity towards the reforms process.
On the other side of the rift lie the Myanmar government and its national mandate of 1982, which recognizes motley of races and ethnicities as comprising Burmese with the exception of the Rohingyas. Their persecution, disenfranchisement and other imposed hardships stem from the idea that non-Burmese must not benefit from the land and resources of the country. This would also be the reasoning behind the two child policy i.e. a preemptive measure against a possibility of demographic change in a country transitioning to democracy. Travel restrictions and acquisition & destruction of their property are significant indicators of disenfranchisement and ethnic cleansing. The latter may be understood as an undeclared agenda of the reform process. It would explain the worsening plight of the Rohingyas and the surge in violence since 2012.
It is interesting that while Rohingyas are struggling to be accepted, other ethnicities such as Kachin and Shan are rebelling against the imposition of the national mandate. The Buddhist majority which has dominated the political economy of Myanmar is the judge and jury of who qualifies as Burmese and who does not. Reversing their ascendance in the socio-political sphere is a mathematical impossibility. Furthermore, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be expected to raise the cause of the Rohingyas given she has only just returned to political life. Upsetting her military colleagues in parliament, may almost wipe out any possibility of the 1982 constitution being amended. Perhaps one can expect a positive change for the Rohingyas in the remote possibility of the constitution being amended to allow Suu Kyi to run for presidential office and assuming she wins elections. Even so, the support of the military incumbents in the legislative assembly would have to be brought on board to pass any bill that seeks to normalize conditions for Rohingyas.
Not so long ago, the Military Junta was belligerent in the face of sanctions, not buckling under international pressure. Today it is urging EU and USA to withdraw sanctions in order to facilitate business and access markets. At this stage if the international community applies pressure on Myanmar by withdrawing aid or delaying removal of all sanctions, it may cause the Myanmar government to reexamine its treatment of the Rohingyas. However, any change emerging from such pressures is likely to be superficial and short term. The reform process in Myanmar seeks to rework not just the political apparatus but also the Burmese identity. The larger question remains that of reconciliation and assimilation. Arguably it may be the pre-existing social distance between the Muslim and Buddhist communities that has over time, nurtured an “us versus them” feeling. Furthermore, in wake of the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamiyan valley – the perception of the Rohingyas perhaps worsened in the eyes of the majority. The July 2013 blasts on the holy Bodhgaya temple shrines have only deepened the fault lines of identity and conflict. In light of all this it is highly unlikely that the Buddhist majority would reconsider their hard-hitting approach.
Salvaging the identity of the Rohingyas as Burmese is not in the hands of the international community. Regionally, when countries close their doors to the Rohingyas it only causes distress to the displaced. It does not solve the problem. Progress may be expected if the governments of the impacted countries (Thailand, Malaysia, India and Bangladesh) engage Myanmar in a joint dialogue and urge it towards a peaceful resolution of the problem. Generally, it is the government of the country itself that can play a defining role in fostering reconciliation. A meeting of the hearts and minds cannot take place unless the legal barricades are removed. Thus, reversing the loss of the Rohingyas identity remains unlikely.
The author is an Associate Fellow at CLAWS
Views expressed are personal
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