Cambodia 2014: Assessing the state of Democracy and Society today

It is ironic that the tag of democracy was thrust upon Cambodia by the infamous and ruthless revolutionary leader of the Khmer Rouge (KR), Pol Pot who renamed the nation, ‘Democratic Kampuchea’. This tag can be confusing given that the KR was not at the time of its foray into power, aligned with the principal democracy in the world, the United States. Indeed, it was with the help of the Viet Cong i.e. the Communist guerrilla forces supported by North Vietnam that they shot into reckoning in their homeland in the mid 1970s. Despite the ideological bipolarity of the Cold War era and compulsions of projecting those loyalties clearly, it is probable that Cambodia’s self classification as a democracy served to endorse KR’s authority. It leant them legitimacy as an alternative to monarchy which they were opposed to. Thus, so began the pegging of Cambodia as democratic despite its people being poor, oppressed and disenfranchised in all the fundamental activities whether they were social, political, religious, educational or economic. It is indeed tragic that Cambodia’s association with democracy began with rulers who employed policies of repression, torture and massacres towards national reform.  

A central tenet of democracy is that the transfer of power is a peaceful process, done with the consent of the governed. Aside from its brutal inception, democracy in Cambodia today can be faulted on fact that the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen has been in power since 1985 i.e. nearly three decades. This is uncharacteristic of a democratic order and indeed more symptomatic of a society where freedom of information and expression are highly contained. While Hun Sen’s Cambodian People Party (CPP) can be commended for usurping power from a regime that committed genocide, they may also be faulted for not bringing to book the perpetrators of war crimes, responsible for the suffering and death of nearly two million Cambodians. The CPP’s tumultuous dynamic with the monarchy and the military coup in 1997 were two indicators of a disconcerting desire for absolute power. It is a stretch to attribute their extended rule to sheer popularity for even the most competent government may find it difficult to stay in power beyond a decade. That length of time naturally provides ample fodder for disgruntlement if not creating inertia that a democratic society self corrects through the freedoms inherent in it. 

Today, the opposition i.e. Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) led by Sam Rainsy is at a peak of disgruntlement in the wake of July 2013 elections which restored Hun Sen to power till 2018. The year 2014 has seen the ruling party engage with the opposition to draft electoral reforms, following vehement post-election protests that have been strongly clamped down upon. Are the electoral reforms merely a bone being thrown by the victors to the vanquished or can they really be viewed as the initiation of genuine change and transition to real democracy? At this stage, the reforms only represent a willingness of the two political rivals to engage with each other on a contentious topic. It is a step forward. Still, what constitutes as progress needs to be defined. There are two matters in question. One pertains to the composition of National Election Commission (NEC), whose members were previously appointed by the Hun Sen government. The other more controversial matter pertains to the July 2013 elections. With the latter, Sam Rainsy is sticking to his guns on his allegation of election fraud. He wants the elections to be held again, thus utilising the reforms to manifest his political ambitions.

The July 2013 elections were not a landslide but a close call with incumbent CPP capturing 68 seats and CNRP 55. This showcased growth of a bi-polarity among Cambodia’s electorate. Given the long uninterrupted rule of CPP, it is also indicative of certain impatience as subsequently demonstrated by the January 2014 protests wherein 21 people were detained and there was a ban imposed on public gathering. Admittedly, the Hun Sen government realised that it could not restore order with a clampdown alone. It is not a lasting solution. The CPP government has been slow to respond to the activist mood in the country. The pro-democracy protests began in July 2013 but serious negotiations regarding the electoral reforms stated only in March 2014 i.e. nearly nine months later. They entail crucial matters such as funding of political parties, role of NGOs, media reporting, voter registration, resolution of election disputes, neutrality of civil servants and armed forces etc.     

It is important for the Hun Sen to be mindful of democratic sensitivities and be attentive to concerns of the opposition given that they are observed and taken seriously by foreign stakeholders. Foreign aid from World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) remain significant contributors to the government’s budget. A hard-line approach to dissent is not congruent with the value system that these developmental organisations espouse. The ongoing detention of protestors from January and other curtailment of freedoms such as ban on public gatherings have been criticised by external stakeholders. Indeed in a March 2014 interview to Nation Multimedia Sam Rainsy has stated that, ‘The opposition does not have access to any TV or modern broadcast media’. This is atrocious for a democratic state. Clearly this merits room for reform. In the face of critique, China may present a nonjudgmental source of developmental aid for the CPP government. However, it remains more prudent for a liberalising economy to seek the freedoms inherent in a diversity of both aid and investment sources.

Ultimately, the political climate of a country that has hitherto not experienced democracy is determined by the behaviour of the few who hold power. A lot rests on a country’s precedence of power transfers, dynamics with adversaries and whether there is an existing trust deficit. Criticising one’s opponent outside the ambit of a democracy can deepen the trust deficit and does not bode well for power-sharing, a viable option in a functional democracy. However, what is also at the heart of Cambodia’s democracy woes is that the CPP and CNRP have very divergent views on significant aspects of both domestic and foreign policy. While Hun Sen has sought to deepen bilateral ties and improve investment climate for Vietnamese firms, Sam Rainsy feels the camaraderie built by CPP has put Cambodia in a subordinate position to a traditional enemy. The pro-democracy protests supported by CNRP have been accompanied with an increase in anti-Vietnamese sentiment. This remains a crucial aspect of CNRP’s political mobilisation apart from issues of corruption and transparency.

Whether, Hun Sen would be amenable to an early election following the finalising and implementation of electoral reforms remains highly questionable. The promise of reforms may not translate to Sam Rainsy’s political ascent in the near future but they do bode well for the growth of genuine democratic practices in Cambodia, which should be cause for optimism across partisan lines. Now that this door to change has been unbolted, it needs to be kept open by the support of the masses of Cambodia and as well as the international community.

The author is an Associate Fellow at CLAWS.Views expressed are personal.