| #156 |  | 976 |  |
February 23, 2009 |  | By Dr. N Manoharan | ||
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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has now been confined to small pockets of Mullaithivu district. In 2006, when the ‘open confrontation’ broke out in the island, the Tigers were in control of over 15,000 sq kms in the districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaithivu, Mannar and parts of Vavuniya, Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa, virtually running a proto-state. Using the ceasefire agreement effectively, they augmented their manpower and military arsenal manifold, while selectively assassinating identified “traitors” and “enemies”. The writ of Colombo did not run in those “uncleared areas” under LTTE control. However, as of end-January 2009, the LTTE controlled less than 300 sq kms of territory after losing its administrative capital Kilinochchi and the strategic Elephant Pass. It is only a matter of time before the Sri Lankan forces take control of the remaining areas from the Tigers. The dramatic turnaround came about as a result of a few factors. Firstly, Karuna, one of the able LTTE commanders from the East, deserted the outfit with a chunk of its cadres in March 2004, to connive with the government forces. Karuna’s men knew the terrain well, but also provided timely and useful intelligence to the government forces. They also, to a greater extent, stifled local support for the Tigers in the east, an area that was its largest recruiting ground.
Secondly, during the same period, the LTTE started facing international isolation for various reasons. The international community was irritated over LTTE’s obduracy for not willing to negotiate. The way the Tigers violated the ceasefire agreement with impunity further annoyed the international community, which, especially after 9/11, equated use of illegal violence by non-state actors with “terrorism”. Meanwhile, an “international safety net” woven by the previous Ranil Wickremasinghe regime worked. As a result, in early 2009, the LTTE was banned by as many as 31 countries, the latest being Sri Lanka itself. The Tigers lost the aura of “freedom fighters”. The proscription by important countries like the United States, EU, Canada and India, where most of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora are concentrated, obviously severely impinged on arms and funds flows to the Tigers. LTTE’s network with various Indian militant groups indirectly pushed New Delhi to cooperate with the Sri Lankan state to dent the Tigers’ military capability.
Thirdly, the LTTE lost some of its best leaders. The list includes, apart from Karuna, Shankar, Anton Balasingham, Tamilselvan and Balraj. Shankar was the founding chief of LTTE’s air wing and possessed many technical skills crucial for the LTTE. Anton Balasingham was the political advisor and ideologue of the LTTE. He acted as an international face of the militant group for over 25 years. It was mainly due to Balasingham’s untiring efforts that the Tigers acquired a reputation as a progressive organisation in the West. The demise of Tamilselvan, chief of the LTTE’s political wing was an “unparalleled loss” to the Tigers and created a vacuum on the political front since he was known for his clear articulation of the Tigers’ ideas on various aspects of the ethnic issue. Balraj led the Tigers in many successful military missions, including the capture of the Wanni region and the Elephant Pass military base in 2000. He was considered one of the chief military strategists of the LTTE. Fall of these important pillars have obviously weakened the LTTE.
Fourthly, overall professionalism of the Sri Lankan armed forces has improved in the recent past. New training modules coupled with increased training tenure, attractive monetary compensation, sophisticated weapons system, new fighting strategies and tactics, etc. have increased the confidence of the government soldiers. The employment of ‘Deep Penetration Units’ (under Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol) by the Sri Lanka Army, for instance, is a novel method to take on select LTTE targets. This has paid rich dividends in not only neutralising important LTTE commanders, but also in penetrating the thus far impregnable LTTE-controlled territories.
Most importantly, the Sri Lankan Air Force – that gained sophistication to overcome the air defence systems of the LTTE – played a vital role in supporting the ground troops and to destroy the Tigers’ military installations and conventional defences. SLAF was also involved in precision aerial bombings to kill LTTE leaders, based on specific intelligence. On its part, the Sri Lanka Navy indulged in cutting the supply lines of the LTTE and at the same time weakening the Sea Tigers to reduce amphibious operations. With the addition of Rapid Action Boat Squadron that uses Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats, the SLN is now able to operate even in shallow waters.
The Sri Lankan military has benefitted from military help from various countries like China, Pakistan, Israel, India, United States, Ukraine, and Iran. Significantly, a strong and determined politico-military leadership backed the military efforts. There was resolute political will, more than ever before, to take on the Tigers. The government skilfully exploited the international environment against “terrorism” to grind its axe against the Tigers. LTTE’s mistakes, from time-to-time, were also used to gain diplomatic mileage.
Given the above, it is going to be an impossible task for the LTTE to overcome the many setbacks and reclaim its former status of running a proto-state.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)
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